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This thesis aims to determine what is distinctive to the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel 
(1889-1973). While hiȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ
¡Ȃȱǻ¢ȱ¢ȱ-Paul Sartre), and thus interpreted in relation to other 
philosophies of existence, it is my contention that this prevents an appreciation of his 
specificity. I therefore recommend a new reading of his thought, which, through 
analysis of his various philosophical presentations of time, re-situates him within the 
twentieth-century French intellectual tradition. Part I of the thesis provides an 
introduction to his philosophy of time, analysing his position in specific relation to 
Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Chapter One raises the question as to whether his position 
is then compromised by his engagement with eternity, for this seems to undermine 
Ȃȱ. However, what begins to emerge from Chapter Two onward, is 
that ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
philosophy. Part II (Chapters Three and Four) then explores the implications that his 
 Ȃȱvarious modes have on the content of his arguments: first, the diary-form of 
his formative works and his (continuing) use of a first-person narrative style in his 
essays and lectures; and second, the (non-narrative) form of his theatre, to which 
Marcel also accorded philosophical significance. Here, Marcel is read alongside Paul 
êȱǻŗşŗř-2005) and Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995), who also tried to approach 
philosophy differently Ȯ as is especially manifest in their conceptions of time. Finally, 
ȱȱǻȱǼȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ
religion, asking how his references to God affect the basis of his philosophy, and what 
this entails for interpreting time in his work. In light of these discussions, the 
conclusion then reflects on what philosophy is for Marcel, and how he should 
therefore be received.
Acknowledgements 
This doctoral research would not have been possible without the financial support of 
the Arts and Humanities Research Council, which included funding to spend three 
weeks working in the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris (July-August 2008), and 
to attend and speak at the 2009 Romance Studies colloquium on storytelling (1-3 
October). Both of these opportunities were crucial for the furtherance of my research. I 
would also like to thank the Graduate School at the University of Nottingham, for 
awarding funding that enabled me to attend and speak at the 2009 meeting of the 
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (29-31 October). This 
experience was equally pivotal to the development of my ideas. I must express 
particular gratitude to Camille de Villeneuve and Eric Severson, for inspiring and 
encouraging me. In addition, thanks must go to everyone in the French Department at 
Nottingham, who have supported me continually and offered valuable advice. I am 
especially appreciative of discussions I have had with my second supervisor, John 
Marks, who has helped me to think creatively and see the broader implications of my 
ideas. Above all else, though, I am indebted to William Grainger and to my first 
supervisor, Rosemary Chapman Ȯ to William for his constancy and understanding, 
and to Rosemary for thinking both with and against me, and for her exemplary rigour, 











Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Works ........................................................................ v 
Introduction: an Unplaced French Philosopher ................................................................ 1 
Part One: Time and Subjectivity....................................................................................... 12 
Chapter One: Being and Time ...................................................................................... 12 
ŗǯŗȱȂȱȱ ȱ ....................................................................... 13 
1.2 Ruptures ................................................................................................................ 34 
1.3 Memory, Time, and Eternity ............................................................................... 40 
Chapter Two: Phenomenological Time ....................................................................... 54 
2.1 The Irrelevance of Time? ..................................................................................... 55 
2.2 Approches concrètes................................................................................................ 63 
Řǯřȱ¢ǰȱ¢ǰȱȱǱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ
Philosophy ................................................................................................................. 81 
Conclusion to Part One: Metaphysics and Presence ................................................... 96 
Part Two: Time and the Problem of Hermeneutics ...................................................... 105 
Chapter Three: Narrative Time .................................................................................. 105 
řǯŗȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱǱȱȱȱê ................................... 108 
řǯŘȱȱȱȱ¢Ǳȱȱȱê ........................................... 115 
3.3 Being-with-Others: Narrative Time, Ontology, and Ethics ............................. 133 
ȱǱȱȂȱǱȱ-Other Time ....................................................... 148 
4.1 Philosophy and Theatre, Narrative and Ethics ................................................ 151 
ŚǯŘȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱ ....................................................... 159 
4.3 ThinȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ ..................................... 183 
ȱȱȱ Ǳȱ ȱêȱȱ· ............................................ 194 
Part Three: Time and Eternity ........................................................................................ 200 
Chapter Five: Time and God ...................................................................................... 200 
5.1 Time and Eternity: Marcel and Augustine ....................................................... 203 
5.2 Challenging Augustinian Time ......................................................................... 212 
5.3 Philosophy, Ethics, and Theology: The Meanings of Eternity in Marcel ....... 220 
Conclusion: Toward what Metaphysics? ...................................................................... 242 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 245 
 
 v 
Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Works 
 
Works by Marcel 
 
CPM Cinq pièces majeures 
 
DH La Dignité humaine et ses assises 
existentielles 
 
DS Le Déclin de la sagesse 
 
EA Être et avoir 
 
EC En chemin, vers quel éveil? 
 






FP Fragments philosophiques 
 










HV Homo viator 
 
JM Journal métaphysique 
 
ME I ȱ¢¸ȱȱȂ¹ȱ 
 
ME II ȱ¢¸ȱȱȂ¹ȱ 
 





PI Présence et immortalité 
 









Full details can be found in the bibliography. 
Other Works 
 
AE Lévinas, ȱȂ¹ 
 
DMT Lévinas, Dieu, la mort et le temps 
 
DVI Lévinas, ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂ· 
 
EAGM Belay and others (eds), Entretiens 
autour de Gabriel Marcel 
 
EN Lévinas, Entre nous 
 
HS Lévinas, Hors sujet 
 
b Bergson, b 
 
SA êǰȱSoi-même comme un autre 
 
TA Lévinas, ȱȱȱȂ 
 
TI Lévinas, Totalité et infini 
 
TR I êǰȱTemps et récit I 
 
TR III êǰȱTemps et récit III 
 1 
Introduction: an Unplaced French Philosopher 
 
Le temps philosophique est [...] un temps grandiose de coexistence, qui 
Ȃ¡ȱȱȂȱȱȂ¸ǰȱȱȱsuperpose dans un ordre stratigraphique. 
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
avec son histoire. La vie des philosophes [...] obéit à des lois de succession 
ordinaire; mais leurs noms propres coexistent et brillent [...]. La philosophie 
est devenir, non pas histoire; elle est coexistence de plans, non pas succession 
de systèmes. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 58-59) 
 
The philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) is notoriously difficult to situate, and 
his elusiveness to categorization is noted by virtually every study of his work. To cite 
ȱȱ ȱ¡Ǳȱȱ	ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁrelentlessly unsystematic 
thinkerȂȱǻŗşŜŘǱȱ¡ǼǲȱBrendan Sweetman ȱȱȱȁinchoate and often scattered 
ȂȱǻŘŖŖŘǱ 26şǼǲȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȁdoes not fit the usual 
picture of the philosopher Ȯ we associate no university chair, no philosophical system, 
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȂ (1963: 12); and Philip Stratton-Lake comments 
ȱȂȱȁoften fragmented and evocative style of writing makes it difficult to get 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱřŚśǼǯ With his position 
so difficult to pin down, it is unsurprising that many critics restrict their analyses to a 
more general discussion of his thought, and choose to interpret his writings in relation 
to the wider context of existentialism.1 Indeed Ȯ encouraged by Sartre (1905-1980), 
who, in his ŗşŚśȱȱȁȂ¡ȱ-ȱȱǵȂ, divided 
existentialism into two varieties: the Christian and the atheistic2 Ȯ MarcelȂȱ ȱhas 
largely been received as a form of ȁChristian existentialismȂ.3 However, I do not 
believe this to be the most fruitful way of characterizing his specificity. Studies that 
analyse MaȂȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
                                                        
1 Blackham (1951), Wahl (1954), Mounier (1962), Collins (1968), Macquarrie (1972), Lescoe (1974), and 
Cooper (1991) all interpret Marcel in specific relation to this context. 
2 ȁȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ¸ȱȂ¡Ǳȱȱǰȱȱt chrétiens, et parmi lesquels je rangerai Jaspers 
ȱ	ȱǰȱȱȱǲȱǰȱȂȱǰȱȱ¡ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
ranger Heidegger, et aussi les existentialistes français et moi-¹ȂȱǻSartre 1996: 26). 
3 	ȂȱŗşŚŝȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱExistentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel
 2 
assuming the legitimacy of the Sartrean label Ȯ both with respect to its alleged 
ȁȂȱǰȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȁȂǯ ȱȂȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ
unreligious origins.4 His earliest philosophical writings date from 1909 (his mémoire de 
âȱȂ·tudes supérieures, on the metaphysical ideas of Coleridge and their relation 
to the philosophy of Schelling),5 whereas his conversion to Catholicism was not until 
23 March 1929 (aged 39) Ȯ and even then, he did not become a resolute defender of the 
Church; quite the opposite, he is often highly critical of its dogmatism. Furthermore, 
the motivation for his conversion is unclear.6 A wave of French writers and 
intellectuals were converting to Catholicism at the time (others included Claudel, 
Maritain, and Péguy), rendering this religious movement an equally literary and 
artistic phenomenon. As Frédéric Gugelot observes: ȁȱȱ[à cette époque, 
est souvent] un événement par·ǰȱȂ¡ȱȱȂ·ȱ·ȁǲȱȁe 
Ȃȱ¹ȱȱ, des livres, des lieux, des hommes ont influencé leur 




ȱȱȱȱȱ··ȂȱȮ as is ȱȱ¢ȱȁȂȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱřŜŗǼǯ Thus, as Gugelot helps to illustrate, while Marcel 
may indeed ȱȱȱȱȁȂȱ¡ǰ it does not follow that straightforward 
implications concerning his position can be drawn from this. Indeed, both the notion 
ȱȁȱ·Ȃȱ the notion of ȁȱȂȱare problematized in my reading of Marcel; 
                                                        
4 See for example EPR: 77; RA: 300. Abbreviations have been introduced for frequently cited primary works. 
These are listed on p. v. 
5 Published in 1971 under the title Coleridge et Schelling (Marcel 1971a). 
6 ¡ȱǻŗşŞşǼȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱǯ 
7 ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱǱȱȁȱ¡ȱȱ
¥ȱȱȂȱ(EC: 139), he writes in En chemin, vers quel éveil? ǻŗşŝŗǼǲȱȁȂȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ
présence encourageante de Du Bos, je ne serais peut-être pas devenu catholique parce que, jusque là, au 
fond, le catholȱȂȱ¸ȱȱ·ȂȱǻGM: 20), he confessed to Pierre Boutang in 1970. See also GM: 
27. 
 3 
their significance emerges to be much more complex than any tidy, contextually-based 
classification suggests. 
 
As regards existentialism, while Ȯ again Ȯ there is some justification for identifying 
Marcel with this movement, it must be noted that he rejected the existentialist label.8 
Association with thinkers such as Camus, Jaspers, or Sartre may be enlightening to 
some extent, but one must also recognize that the label is retrospective (all the more so 
for Marcel, who was born in December 1889 Ȯ nearly sixteen years before Sartre), and, 
being extremely difficult to define itself,9 can pick out only a ȁ¢ȱȂȱȱ
is of no help when seeking to determine his individuality.10 Ȃȱother varying 
allegiances only continue to manifest his unplaceability. He may be associated with 
Ȃȱ11 and the Esprit movement,12 for example, and also with 
MaritainȂȱ,13 the Oxford Group and the Réarmement moral.14 But although 
this provides useful contextualisation for the reader, it is difficult Ȯ and moreover, 
misleading Ȯ to define his position in relation to any one of these contexts in particular, 
                                                        
8 EAGM: 10; EC: 228-31; EPR: 73-75; GM: 72; Marcel (1967b: 9; 1969: 254-55); ME I: 5. 
9 The term was first introduced by Marcel, in 1943, in order to make reference to the currently developing 
ideas of Sartre (Cooper 1991: 1; Daigle 2006: 5). In the autumn of 1945, the term then appeared again in the 
title of Ȃ 1945 ǰȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ




immediately by philosophers such as Heidegger, who did not wish their thought to be considered 
equivalent to the set of ideas outlined by Sartre. Marcel tolerated the association for a while, but he too 
came to renounce it. Even Sartre came to look back on his lecture with contempt, and, disliking what he 
himself had encouraged the existentialist label to represent, disowned the title. So if, to begin with, there 
was any uncertainty as to what exactly the term meant Ȯ ȁȂ¡ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȂǰȱ
Beauvoir (1963: 50) quotes Sartre as saying in the summer of 1945 Ȯ it becomes all the more vague once the 
main philosopher to have appropriated the label abandons it. 
10 	ȱǱȱȁ[MarcelǾȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ£ȱȱȱȃ¡Ȅǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ
limited validity but is about as misleading as any other. He does not derive from the line of descent to 
which ȱ¢ȱȱȱȃ¡Ȅȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱne that is vaguely drawn from 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; the influence of these thinkers oȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȂȱǻŗşŜŘǱȱ¡-x). 
11 See for example Sayre (1997). 
12 Marcel played a central role in the initiation of Esprit, by helping to persuade Desclée de Brouwer to offer 
administrative services, inexpensive printing, and funding (Hellman 1981: 39). See also Hellman (1981: 45) 
and Loubet-del-Bayle (1969: 131, 135). 
13 See Devaux (1974); Bars (1991); Sweetman (2008). 
14 EC: 163-66; Marcel (1969: 261). 
 4 
for all these associations were relatively fleeting. Instead, what emerges is the fluidity 
of his stance; and thus, as Neil Gillman commented in 1980, what is needed (indeed, 
still needed) is ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ 
its primary impulses and internal stresses, and evaluate it according to its coherence 
and faithfulness to its owȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞŖǱȱx). This is the aim of my doctoral 
research. 
 
Interestingly, the way to do this, I will argue, is not to attempt a general exposition of 
ȱ¢Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȮ 
most comprehensively by ȱȂȱȱȂ¡ȱ¥ȱȂ¹ (1953), which 
draws ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱhis published 
works (to date), but also (for example) by Gallagher (1962), Cain (1963), Jeanne Parain-
Vial (1966; 1989), and the collections of essays compiled by Paul Schilpp and Lewis 
Hahn (1984) and William Cooney (1989). However, the analyses in these works are too 
neat; none really confronts the comp¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱ . 
Stratton-Lake may see Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
understanding his thought,15 but I suggest that such a fragmented style of 
philosophizing is precisely what can enable us to grasp his distinct contribution, 
despite its apparent incoherence. Furthermore, I contend, in order truly to engage 
 ȱȂ ideas it is necessary to bring him into contact with a range of critical 
partners, so that he can be (re-)considered in the broader context of twentieth-century 
French thought. I will not be tracing the development of his work chronologically, 
therefore. Rather, focusing my questioning on specific problematics relating to the 
theme of time, I seek to engage with his work in a philosophical manner, and to 
                                                        
15 ǯȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȁȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱǽȱ




consider his ideasǰȱȱȱ ȱȂǰ on a plane.16 Thus, in each chapter I 
will draw on a range of sources from different periods; and these will be read with 
and against a number of other thinkers, the most significant being (in order of 
appearance) Bergson (1859-1941), êur (1913-2005), and Lévinas (1906-1995).17 
 
Ȃȱȱêȱis of a particularly varied nature. Rather than writing 
formal treatises, for example, he preferred to philosophize in a diary. As Étienne 
Gilson ǱȱȁȂêȱȱ·ȱȱ	ȱȱȱȱȱ
Journal métaphysique ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ·ȱȱǰȱȱȱ
ȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱ¹ȱȂȱǻ1947: 1). Cain (1963: 14) and 
James Collins (1968: 129) also remark upon the diary-ȱȱȂȱ ǰȱȱ
neither they, nor Gilson, comment in any detail on its further significance. I, on the 
other hand, will argue that MarcelȂȱetaphysical journal is more than ȱȁȱ
¢ȱȂǰȱas Collins suggests. It is the key to discovering what is distinctive to his 
philosophy as a whole. However, the range of sources I will be drawing on extends 
further than this, and I will equ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ¢ǰȱǰȱȱ
articles, conference papers, and theatrical works, as well as a number of interviews Ȯ 
 ȱêȱǻȱŗşŜŞǲȱǯȱǯȱŗşŜŝǼǰȱȱȱǻȱŗşŝŝǲȱ
conducted in 1970), Marianne Monestier (Marcel 1999a-f; conducted in 1970), and 
Pierre Lhoste (1999; conducted in 1973). Also important to consider will be studies by: 
Hilda LazaȱǻŗşŝŞǼǰȱȱȂȱǲ Sumiyo Tsukada (1995), on Marcel and 
Bergson; Thomas Busch (1995), on Marcel and êǲ Brian Treanor (2006a), on 
                                                        
16 Cf. Deleuze and Guattari (1991), cited above. 
17 There ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ·Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱ
general, French publications retain the accent whereas English publications do not. However, there are 
exceptions in both cases, some of which may be deliberate attȱȱ£ȱȱ·Ȃȱȱ
or Jewish origins (by omitting the accent), or his French identity and later (from 1930 onward) citizenship 
(by retaining it). As this is a French Studies thesis, I have conformed to French orthography and kept the 
accent. Orthographic patterns in references and citations, however, will vary according to the author. 
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Marcel and Lévinas; and Jeanne Parain-Vial (1976; 1985b; 1989: 145-57) and John 
Vigorito (1984), on Marcel and time. 
 
Although the theme of time, itself, is not explicitly discussed by Marcel at length (nor, 
in general, by other commentators of his work; Parain-Vial and Vigorito are 
exceptions), it is my contention that his position cannot adequately be examined 
without an appreciation of the underlying relation with time that his existential 
philosophy implies. Furthermore, as illustrated by the following five chapters, his 
presentation of time lends itself to a range of different but Ȯ crucially Ȯ equally 
possible interpretations: (i) ontological; (ii) phenomenological; (iii) narrative; (iv) 
Lévinassian; (v) Augustinian. In one sense, this simply manifests inconsistency; but in 
another, it is this indeterminate status that  ȱȂs writings to be 
(productively) read with a range of other philosophies. Reading his work as a series of 
departures or explorations in this way then offers an insight into the motivations that 
drove various shifts in philosophical approach during the twentieth-century, in 
response to a general dissatisfaction with Western philo¢Ȃȱȱconception 
of metaphysics.18 
 
Indeed, fiercely opposed to deductive, analytic approaches to investigating the nature 
of human existence, Marcel sought a new philosophical method, a style of 
philosophizing that was less impersonal and dogmatic, and more in tune with life. 
Although he was initially drawn to idealist works by philosophers such as Schelling 
                                                        
18 ȁ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱthe nature of 
reality, seeking, more specifically, to explain aspects that are not immediately discoverable (e.g. the nature 
of time, space, identity, or the mind). It is therefore one step removed from empirical analysis (meta-
physics), investigating how the world needs to be in order for our (direct) experience of the world to be the 
way it is. What, more precisely, it means to do metaphysics is what the history of philosophy debates. 
ȁ¢Ȃȱǻȱ¢ȱȱǼȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢¢ȱȱȁ¢ȂȱȮ that is, it has 
often been assumed that the study of Being just is the study of reality. However, this is contested by various 
philosophers discussed in this thesis, thus raising (again) the question as to what metaphysical investigation 
entails. 
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(1775-1854),19 Bradley (1846-1924),20 Royce (1855-1916),21 and Hocking (1873-1966),22 he 
became critical of their approach and tried to dissociate his philosophy from their 
totalizing methods. Iȱȁȱ ¸ȂȱǻŗşŚŝǼ he writes: 
je me suis insurgé [...] contre la façon dont un certain idéalisme majore la part 
de la construction dans la perception sensible, au point de paraître juger 





Marcel recollects the First World War as the major turning point for his philosophical 
position Ȯ specifically his experiences when working for the French Red Cross. 
Responsible for relaying information about missing soliders to their family members, 
Marcel became closely involved in the complex interpersonal and circumstantial 
networks of a great many individuals Ȯ something that contrasted sharply with the 
military documentation with which he also dealt. As was only too evident when 
confronted with these solidersȂ grief-stricken relatives, the people he was concerned 
                                                        
19 ȱȁȱȱ¸ȂȱǻŗşŚŝǼǰȱcel makes rȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ
devait bénéficier à mes yeux. ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻRA: 295). Marcel felt an affinity with the post-
Kantian notioȱȁȱȂȱǻ for example FP: 66-67), embraced by Schelling and Hegel in 
defence of the metaphysics Kant had declared impossible (Beiser 2002: chap. 8). The style and spirit of 
Ȃȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
une aventure héroïque comportant des risques et côtoyant des abîmes, [Schelling] demeurera toujours un 
compagnon exaltant, et même [.ǯǯǾȱȱȂȱǻŗşśŝǱȱŞŝǼǯ 
20 As ȱȱȱ¡Ǳȱȁ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
MȂȱǯȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȃ¡Ȅȱȱȱ¢ȱȃȄǰȱ
then everything in this well-ordered universe is internally affected by its relations with every other thing. 
[...] for Bradley all relations are internal, since they affect the very nature of things taken as existences. By 
the same token, the whole world becomes one unified system of internal relations. This theory led Marcel to 
ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ¡Ȅȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ
(1984: 126). 
21 Along with Schelling, Royce was one of the first philosophers that Marcel worked on in depth, writing 
four articles on him for the Revue de métaphysique et de morale between 1918 and 1919, republished in 1945 as 
La Métaphysique de Royce. ȱǰȱȁ¢ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ¡·ȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱùȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻMR: 9). Thus, 
in the foreword to the American edition of La Métaphysique de Royce (1956; repr. in MR: 241-44), Marcel 
Ǳȱȁ¢Ȃȱ¢ȱȮ and this is its great value Ȯ marks a kind of transition between absolute 
ȱȱ¡ȱȂȱǻMR: 244). 
ȱȱȱȱȁ¢ȱȱȱorient my own 
ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȃthouȄȂȱǻMR: 241). And ¢Ȃȱȱȱ¢¢ȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ¢Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ
the particular and lȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ¢¢ǯȱ
ǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ
the advancement of ethics in a concrete direction which is in profound accord with the demands of 
¢ȱȂȱǻMR: 244; see also DH: 96-97). 
22 ȂȱJournal métaphysique was dedicated to Hocking as well as ǯȱȁ
ȂȱȱǽThe Meaning 
of God in Human Experience ǻŗşŗŘǼǾȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻMR: 242; see also MR: 223-24, 238), writes Marcel 
in his foreword to the American edition of La Métaphysique de Royce. 
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with were more than just names with ranks and reference numbers. They were whole 
existences, intimately connected to the lives of other existences, the reality of which no 
(abstract) military file could ever begin to convey. Thus, as Marcel explains in the 
introduction to his first major work, Journal métaphysique (1927), he rejected his 
original philosophical intention to write something rigorous and dogmatic,23 vowing 
ȱȱȁȱ¥ȱȂ¡ȱȱé métaphysique dont lȂ·ȱȱ·ȱ
ȱȂȱǻJM: xi).24 
 
As a consequence, Ȃȱȱ ȁ¡Ȃ changes in his philosophy.25 
Whereas the first part of the Journal, written in the months prior to war breaking out 
in 1914, defined it objectively in relation to the physical and the spatial,26 the 
introduction to the work as a whole (which also includes a second part composed 
between 1915 and 1923, that aimed to take account of Ȃȱȱ) re-
presents hiȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȁȂ¡ȱȱȱ¹ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ
posée, ni conçue, ni même peut-être connue, mais seulement reconnue à la façon dȂȱ
ȱȂȱ¡Ȃ (JM: xi). ȱȱȁȱ¢¸Ȃǰȱas Marcel later describes it, not 
¢ȱȱȱȁ¸Ȃȱthat may be philosophized about at a distance, in 
isolation from our own existential situation. In keeping with this emphasis on 
exploration, the foreword to Présence et immortalité (1959) therefore ȱȂs 
philosophy to be ȁȱ¢ȱȱ·ȂȱǻPI: 10), where his philosophical 
explorations (as opposed to explanations) represent ȁn cheminement parfois 
hasardeux comportant des tâtonnements, des arrêts, des reprises, des remises en 
                                                        
23 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ǰȱȱȱÉȱȱȱȱǰȱ
les thèses essentielles auxquelles ȱ·¡ȱȱȂȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂȱǻJM: ix). 
24 For more detail concerning the impact of World War I on MaȂȱǰȱsee EC: 89-96; EPR: 12-21; GM: 
14-17; RA: 311-12. 
25 ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱon a plane, owing to the evolution that 
occurs in his philosophy an attention to chronology will still be important. Where diary entries are cited, 
therefore, their exact date will also be given. 
26 ȁȱȱȱ¹ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱelations de contact, en relations spatiales avec mon 
ǯȱȱȱ¥ǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 26; 20 January 1914). 
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ȂȱǻPI: 10).27 For Marcel, philosophy itself becomes ȱ¡Ǳȱȁǽȱ
ǾȱȱȂȱȱ¸ȱȱ¡·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
¥ȱȂ·ȱȂȱure beaucoup plus vaste, qui est celle de la pensée humaine 
ȱȱȂȱǻPST: 28), he asserts in his late lecture ȁȱ-on attendre de la 
ǵȂȱ(published 1968). And thus the form of his philosophy also becomes 
significant Ȯ to the extent, this thesis argues, that it cannot be dissociated from the 
content of his arguments. 
 
More specifically, what proves of interest is Ȃ first-person narrative style28 Ȯ 
which shaped his philosophy from the very beginning, for his theory was largely 
developed through the writing of a personal diary. Although Marcel did not initially 
ȱȱȱȁ¢ȱȂȱȱȱȱc, he later decided to 
present it as a philosophical work in itself (EC: 130). He then continued to 
philosophize in a diary until 1943, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
second work, Être et avoir (1935), and the main content of Présence et immortalité. This 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȂ also became a feature of Ȃs essays and lectures, 
which are similarly self-conscious, meandering, and strewn with autobiographical 
anecdote. ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ
                                                        
27 	ȱ Ǳȱȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
than on any results  ȱ¢ȱȂǯȱȂȱ¢ȱȁȱ¢ȱȱ -Ȃǰȱhe ǰȱȁȱȱ
of tentative, disconnected excursions into various philosophical issues, which, with its false starts, its 
internal dialogue and persistent self-criticism, its detours as well as its slowly but progressively cumulative 
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȃȱ¡ȄȂȱǻŗşŞŖǱȱ
17). 
28 The significance of the narrative form of Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱked. Admittedly, 
unlike other philosophers of existence such as Sartre, Beauvoir, or Camus, who all explored their ideas 
through the writing of novels as well as theory, Marcel failed to find a narrative voice in fictional prose 
(EAGM: 105; EC: 11, 16, 127), abandoning his only attempted novel, Ȃȱ¥ȱȱ (1921; the 
unfinished manuscript is held at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center in Austin), in favour of 
ǯȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱ ǯȱ
 ǰȱȱȱit as irrelevant is to 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȁȂȱǰȱȱȱȱ
itself directly with universal truths (see Rée (1987: 1; 1991: 78)). Indeed, narrative theory has, in general, 
neglected the role of narrative in philosophical texts (exceptions being Rée (1987; 1991) and Trainor (1988)), 
ȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ
¢ȱǯȱ¢ȱȁȂȱȱȱȱǰ mediated mode of enunciation where a 
¢ǰȱȱȁȂȱǻ¡ȱȱǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻ-temporally; 
in a possible world), and meaningfully relate, a sequence of events to an audience. 
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in parentheses when writing their philosophy, the complexities with which Marcel 
struggles remain on the page. As a result, not only is (temporal) existence explored in 
ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǲȱthe time of Ȃȱ ȱlived experience is 
equally visible in the first-person form of his philosophy. 
 
Whether or not Marcel successfully reconceives philosophy and escapes idealist 
totalization is another question, however Ȯ and a question that is especially prompted 
by the importance he accords to eternity and a separate, allegedly more authentic, 
ȱȱȁ¹Ȃ, over and above his discussions of time and existence. Does this not 
compromise his philosophy? This is the question Chapter One asks, and the rest of the 
thesis continues to debate. Focusing primarily on its formation, Chapter One will 
provide ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǰ presenting his initial preoccupations 
and the direction in which they developed in relation to Bergson, who had a profound 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ Ȯ especially with regard 
to time. Chapter Two then examines, in more detaǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
to move away from Bergson, in order to determine the specific preoccupations 
underlying his different metaphysical discourse on time Ȯ a discourse that starts to 
appear problematic, as its indeterminate status becomes all the more apparent and the 
importance of (the more authentic notion of?) eternity is reinforced. Part II (Chapters 
Three and Four) then considers the implications that the varying forms of Ȃȱ
philosophy have for an understanding of time in his work, examining his thought in 
ȱȱêȱȱ·ǯȱȱȱto Ȃȱt-person style, this requires 
that attention be paid to the ȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱs 
expressed: his theatre. While this has not been neglected to the same extent as the 
ȱȱȱȂȱ ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ taken for 
granted, to the exclusion of the two genresȂ individual styles. This study of his work, 
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however, enables a reconsideration of the relation between the two, for as will be seen, 
the presentation of time in his plays is rather different from the discourse one finds in 
his philosophy. Finally, Part III (Chapter Five) will reassess the relation between 
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ ther or not his discussions of time and 
eternity need to be understood in the context of his Christian belief. Because I will be 
experimenting with a number of different interpretative approaches, it will be 
appropriate to conclude at the end of each of thȱȂȱparts. The general conclusion 
 ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱs.
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Part One: Time and Subjectivity 
Chapter One: Being and Time 
 
It is in reaction to Bergson, perhaps more than any other philosopher, that Marcel 
came to establish his own philosophical position: ȁȱȂȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ Ȃȱ
(EM: 79), Marcel confesses in the 1952 article ȁ·ȱȱȱȂǯȱHis 
ȱ ȱȂȱȱȱtherefore be understood as the catalyst behind 
his entire philosophical project.1 ȁǽǾȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱâȱȱ·eur 
¹ȱȂȱȂȱȱ¡¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱȱȂȱ
ȱȱ¹ǰȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻGM: 29), he declared in a 
1970 interview with Boutang. If Marcel cannot pinpoint what, precisely, his 
philosophy owes to Bergson, this is likely because he went on to develop his own 
independent position. Bergson was influential with respect to the early formation and 
individuation of his thought, this chapter argues; and this, I will show, can be seen to 
hinge particularly on the question of time. The chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first describes Ȃȱencounter with Bergson and details the similar ways in 
which both approach human reality, especially their insistence on the importance of 
recognizing temporality for an authentic understanding of Being. The second then 
observes the rather different metaphysics underlying their apparently homologous 
descriptions of the human immediate, exposing remarkably dissimilar philosophies of 
time. Finally, section three relates time in Marcel and Bergson to their conceptions of 
                                                        
1 Cain is of a similȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȂȱ
(1963: 22). Gilson has also described Marcel as a disciple of Bergson: ȁȂȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ




Bergson et G. Marcel (1995). 
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eternity, and uses a comparison of the differing dialectics that emerge to reflect on the 





In 1908 and 1909, while completing his âȱȂ·tudes supérieures at the Sorbonne, 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱCollège de France;2 and as Marcel readily 




révélation. [...] oui, on avait bien le sentiment que Bergson était en train de 
découvrir quelque chose.4 
(EPR: 15) 
 
Particularly influential for Marcel was Ȃȱȱȱizing, which 
prompted him to reorient his philosophical investigations in favour of concrete reality: 
ȁȂȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ··ȱȂȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
beaucoup plus tard dénoncer les méfaitsȂ (EC: 81), he acknowledges in En chemin, vers 
quel éveil? (1971). Indeed, Bergson launched a critique against ¢Ȃȱȱȱ
precision,5 which, he contended, derived precisely from its attempts to offer 
universality of scope, for this rendered philosophy indifferent to the detail and 
movement of reality. In the introduction to La Pensée et le Mouvant (1934) he writes: 
                                                        
2 Bergson became a professor at the Collège ȱŗşŖŖǰȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱ of Ancient 
Philosophy. In 1904, he transferred his position to the Chair of Modern Philosophy, following the death of 
Gabriel Tarde. He then continued to hold this chair until he retired from his duties in 1920. For a 
ȱ¢ȱȱȂȱǰ see Bergson, Ansell-Pearson, and Mullarkey (2002: viii-xi). 
3 Marcel was not the only philosopher to be inspired by Bergson. Jacques Chevalier, for example, also 
ȱȂȱȱǻȱŗşŖŗǼǰȱȱȱ ȱȁȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
chaire où le maître [BǾȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱ¥ȱȱ·ǰȱȱǰȱȱȂ·ȱȱ
ǰȱȱǰȱȱȂȱǻŗşśşǱȱřǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱǱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȂEssai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Et là, 
Ȃȱ··ȱǯȱȱȂ·ȱǱȱȃǰȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ··ȄȂȱǻŗşŝŝǱȱŚŖǼǯ  
4 ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱêȱȱȱgiven, but evidence suggests that they took place in 
1967. 
5 ȁȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȂȱȱ·Ȃȱǻb: 1253). 
 14 
Les systèmes philosophiques ne sont pas taillés à la mesure de la réalité où 
ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ¡£ȱȱȂȱ¡ǰȱ
ȱǱȱȱ£ȱȂȱȂuerait aussi bien à un 
ȱùȱȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ǰȱȱȱȱǲȱùȱ
les hommes se passeraient de boire et de manger; où ils ne dormiraient, ne 




ȱȱǰȱȱ¹ȱȂimpossible, à côté du réel. 
(b: 1253) 
 
For Bergson, then, precision was relative to subject-matter.6 Abstract thinking may be 
methodologically appropriate for the mathematical sciences, but if philosophy is to 
have any connection to life, he maintained, it must root itself in concrete experience in 
order to avoid missing its subject-matter entirely.7 Indeed, he notes in his 




grand système qui embrasse tout le possible, et parfois ȱȂǷȂǰȱȱ
therefore declaims ȱŗşřŚǲȱȁcontentons-ȱȱ·Ȃȱǻb: 1307). 
 
Thus Bergson and (subsequently) Marcel turned to the human experience of the 
immediate as the starting point for their philosophical reflection: ȁȱȱ à 
considérer avec ǽǳǾ méfiance une pensée philosophique qui oserait se formuler en-
                                                        
6 Cf. Marcel: ȁȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻDH: 11). 
Dilthey (1833-1911) argued similarly: ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
the human studies must work towards more definite procedures and principles within their own sphere by 
trying them out on their own subject-matter, just as the physical sciences have done. We do not show 
ourselves genuine disciples of the great scientific thinkers simply by transferring their methods to our 
sphere; [...] the methods of studying mental life, history and society differ greatly from those used to 
ȱ ȱȱȂ (Rickman 1976: 89). 
7 ȁȱ·¢ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȂ¡·Ȃȱǻb: 1432). Bergson was 
ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱ
différence de méthode, nous nȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱǰȱȱȱ·¢ȱȱȱȂȱ
(b: 1285). ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱ¢ȱǽȱȱȱȱȱ·¢Ǿȱǰȱȱ
Ȃȱȱǰȱégalement ·ȱȱǯȱȂȱȱȂ ȱȱȱ··ȱ¹Ȃȱǻb: 
1286; my emphasis). 
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³¥ȱȂȱ¡·ȱȱ·ȂȱǻDH: 28), declared Marcel in the first 
of his William James Lectures, delivered at Harvard in 1961 ǻȁȱȱ·ȂǼ. In so 
doing, Bergson and Marcel contested a more dominant philosophical tradition, which, 
because of its desire to be universally applicable, assumed that individual personal 
experience could only bias the thought process, undermining the legitimacy of 
conclusions intended to be of relevance to anyone other than the author. Bergson 
voiced such a challenge by positioning himself against Eleaticism,8 which rejected the 
epistemological validity of sense experience, instead taking logical coherence and 
necessity to be the (only) criteria of truth.9 Marcel, on the other hand, opposed the 
rationalist certainty boasted by Descartes (1596-1650) Ȯ particularly the cogito, on 
which this assurance was initially founded. ȁȱ··ȱȱȱȱ·¸Ȃǰȱȱ
contends in the 1şŘśȱȱȁ¡ȱȱ·Ȃǰ10 ȁȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱ
Ȃ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂétablir que de reconnaître, de 
ȱ·¢ȱȱ·ȱȂȱǻJM: 315). 
 
ȂȱȱȂ opposition to abstraction, more specifically, entailed a 
renunciation of both idealism and materialism; and Bergson was influential with 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱ. Although initially drawn to idealism, Marcel 
came to understand it as banishing the self to regions of ineffable transcendence, so 
that it rendered individual subjectivity insignificant. As his experiences of the First 
World War caused him to realize, his concern was with the person and his or her 
                                                        
8 E.g. b: 51, 75-76, 156, 326-29, 755-60, 1259. 
9 Eleaticism was one of the principal schools of pre-Socratic philosophy, which was founded by Parmenides 
and flourished in the fifth century BCE. As the Encyclopædia Britannica explains: ȁȱǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ
perceptual appearances, pursued a rationalisticȯi.e., a strictly abstract and logicalȯapproach and thus 
found reality in the all-encompassing, static unity and fullness of Being and in this aloneȂȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱŘǰȱǯȱŘǲȱ
for further reading on the pre-Socratic philosophers, see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983)). Ȃȱ
opposition to the Eleatics has wider implications, however. Their rationalist methodology and principles 
greatly influenced the Greek thought that followed, and the Greek philosophical canon in general has 
ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱǻǼȱȁȂȱǯ  
10 First published in the April-May edition of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale in 1925, this article was 
ȱȱȱŗşŘŝȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂ Journal métaphysique (JM: 309-29). 
 16 
¢ǰȱȱȁȱȂ (RA: 295). It was Bergson who helped confirm to 
Marcel the inadequacy of an idealist approach. Marcel thus credits him, in particular, 
when speaking ȱȁȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱ·Ȃȱin a 1950 Gifford 
Lecture at the University of Aberdeen: ȁȱȂa vu Bergson avec une admirable 
clarté, ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¸ǲȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¹ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂȱ·Ȃȱ
(ME II: 51-52). 
 
A materialist approach, however, was considered equally excessive.11 It too, Bergson 
argued, sought to equate perception with absolute knowledge, for while idealism 
subordinated the domain of science to the (epistemologically superior) realm of 
consciousness, materialism attempted the inverse, insisting that facts of consciousness 
could only be derived from science (b: 177). This reductive approach was something 
to which Marcel had been averse ever since his school days. He detested the narrow, 
prescriptive education system that had dominated his formative years, encouraging 
all truths to be thought of in terms of cold, impersonal sets of facts which were to be 
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǱȱȁǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱȱÉȱȱȱȱȂ¸ȱȂencyclopédisme de pacotille qui 
ȱȱȱȱǽ¢·ǾȂȱǻEC: 63), he writes in En chemin.12 
Ȃȱȱ ȱ-psychical aspects of existence Ȯ that is, with concrete 
experiences that surpass conceptualization or rational explanation Ȯ therefore 
impressed Marcel considerably. ȁ[Bergson] a été le seul parmi les penseurs français à 
ÉȱȂȱȱȱ·¢Ȃǰȱhe writes ȱȁȱȱ¸Ȃȱ
ǻŗşŚŝǼǲȱȁla pseudo-·ȱȱȃtout naturelȄ a contribué non seulement à décolorer notre 
                                                        
11 ȁ·ȱȱ·ȱȱ¡ȱ¸ȱ·ȱ¡Ȃȱǻb: 161). 
12 ȁȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢·ȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȂȱȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱȂȱȂȂȱ(RA: 304). See also EC: 37-39; HV: 22-23. 
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univers, mais encore à le décentrer, à le vider des principes qui peuvent seuls lui 
conférer sa vie et sa signification. [...] Ȃȱ·¢ȱȱe à 
ȱȱȱȂȱ(RA: 313). Hence, Bergson also helped to consolidate 
Ȃȱȱreaction against scientific reduction; and Ȃȱown 
investigations into the ȁ·¢Ȃȱǻwinter 1916-17), for him, only testified further 
to a reality beyond the empirically demonstrable and expressible.13 
 
Bergson and Marcel, then, were in search of a third, intermediate approach to 
philosophizing about the human, between these extremes of materialism and idealism: 
ȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ·ȱ
cérébral; mais ȱȱ¢·ȱȂ·ȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ¸ȱ·ȱ
ȱȱâ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻb: 318), states Bergson in 
Matière et mémoire (1896). Tȱ¢ȱȱȱȁȱ ¢Ȃǰȱȱǰ lay in taking first-
person consciousness seriously, as a deeper, foundational level of reality. Similar to 
their German contemporary Husserl (1859-1938), whose new discipline of 
ȁ¢Ȃ14 was announcingǰȱȱȱȂȱ ǰȱȁa bold, radically new 
way of doing philosophy, an attempt to bring philosophy back from abstract 
metaphysical speculation [...] in order to come into contact with the matters 
ǰȱ ȱȱȱ¡Ȃ (2000: xiii), Bergson and Marcel 
(independently) emphasized the importance of subjectivity, arguing that it was not 
only a legitimate ground for philosophical reflection, but the only basis on which 
philosophy could investigate the nature of human Being. ȁȱ·ȱȱȱ
investigation, il nous faudra placer un indubitable, non pas logique ou rationnel, mais 
                                                        
13 ȱȂȱ¢ical experiences themselves see EC: 100-08; GM: 16-17; Marcel (1999c). For related 
philosophical reflection, see JM: 33-36, 151-52, 165-69, 173-75, 233-36, 239, 243-45, 246-48, 262-63; RA: 309-10. 
14 ȁiterally, phenomenology is ȱ¢ȱȱȃȄǱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
in our experience [...]. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or 
first person point of viewȂ (Woodruff Smith 2008: section 1, para. 2). 
 18 
¡ǲȱȱȂ¡ȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȂ (RI: 25), affirms 
Marcel in ȱŗşŚŖȱ¢ȱȁȂ3ȱ·Ȃ.15 Not only did they advocate a distinction 
between (third-person) objectivity and metaphysics Ȯ an argument which may be 
attributed to all the ȱȁȱȱ¡Ȃ,16 Bergson and Marcel also 
underlined the specific need to recognize the temporality of human existence ǻȱȁla 
duréeȂ, in Bergsonian terms) for a genuine philosophy of Being (ontology).17 As Marcel 
maintained ȱȱȱȁȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
(published 1968), the responsability of a philosopher is to be engaged, which means 
situating his or her philosophizing in the world.18 Philosophy is relevant to life, and 
must be shown to be such. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱ
ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱurbi et orbi, 




Although Husserl and Heidegger (1889-1976) also highlighted the importance of time 
with respect to understanding human experience, BȂȱach, which Marcel 
embraced, can be seen as marking a decisive moment within the French philosophical 
tradition, for unlike later French thinkers such as Sartre or Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), 
                                                        
15 CfǯȱǱȱȁȱ··ȱȱȂȱ¡ȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱȱȱ¡·Ȃȱǻb: 1292). 
16 Associated philosophers include (but are not restricted to): Berdyaev, Buber, Beauvoir, Camus, 
Heidegger, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche, Ortega, Sartre, and Unamuno. All of these 
thinkers reacted against the arrogance of the EnlightȂȱ¡ȱȱȱ his all-powerful faculty 
of Reason, questioning the resultant assumption that logical consistency and deductive reasoning were 
sufficient for grasping all truths. All turned to personal lived experience in their search for truth, advocating 
an exploration of Ȯ as opposed to objective deductions about Ȯ the human. 
17 For Barrett, Bergson wȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
richness of experience, on the urgent and irreducible reality of time, and Ȯ perhaps in the long run the most 
significant insight of all Ȯ on the inner depth of the psychic life which cannot be measured by the 
quantitative methodȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻŗşşŖǱȱ15). Indeed, as Milic Capek writes: ȁȱȱ ȱ
exceptions as Heraclitus, Schelling in his last period, and, to a certain extent, Hegel, there has been a 
persistent tendency in the philosophy of all ages to interpret reality in static terms and to consider temporal 




neither was especially influenced by contemporary German philosophy. ȁȂȱȱ
ȱȱ	ǯȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȂǰȱ
Tsukada affirms (1995: 19).19 Nevertheless, many parallels can be drawn between 
Husserlian time and time in Bergson and Marcel, some of which are outlined below. 
Human time for Heidegger (1962), on the other hand, found its true meaning through 
a confrontation with mortality, so that authentic existence was characterized in terms 
of Being-toward-death (Sein zum Tode). This contrasts sharply with BergsonȂ and 
MarcelȂȱ, for whom human temporality is conceived in relation to the here 
and now, the immediacy of which, this section suggests, they describe in very similar 
terms.20 ȁȂ-ȱȱȱ¸ǵȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱȱhic et nuncȂȱǻRI: 
85), Marcel insists ȱȁȱȱ·Ȃȱ(1940). And similarly, Bergson 
ȱȱ¡ȱǻȱȁȂǼȱȱla durée with consciousness of the immediate: 




If (the here and now of) human reality is temporal and dynamic, as Bergson and 
Marcel contend, the fact that it is possible to conceive of things in static atemporal 
                                                        
19 Bergson analysed human temporality before Husserl, who examined internal time consciousness in a 
series of lectures delivered in 1928. But as Lawlor and ȱ¡ǰȱȱȁǽǾȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱǽǳǾȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱ
particular, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Like any new generation, this one had to differentiate itself from the 
tradition it was inheriting; in many reǰȱȂs thought dominated this tradition. But more 
important was the fact that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty became interested in Husserlian phenomenology, and 
then in Heidegger's thought. The influence of German philosophy on post-World War II French thought [...] 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻ2008: section 7, para. 1). ȱȂȱǰ see, for 
example, Spiegelberg (1994: 467, note 4) and Cain (1963: 99-100). êǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ
Husserl and Marcel, also comments in detail on parallels and differences between them in his 1973 paper 
ȁ	ȱȱȱȱ··ȂȱǻŗşŝŜǼ. And in MarcelȂȱesponse to the English publication of this 
paper, his lack of acquaintance with Husserl, at the time his thought was developing, is again emphasized 
(Schilpp and Hahn 1984: 495). 
20 ȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşŜŞǼȱMarcel in fact criticized Heidegger for failing to 
appreciate the ȱȱǱȱȁȱǰȱȱ¥ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂÉȱȱȱȱ
que si la vie est assimilée à un certain parcours. Mais elle ne se présente à moi de cette manière que si je la 
considère du dehors Ȯ et dans cette mesure, elle cesse Ȃ¹ȱ··ȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȂȱǻPST: 181). See also 
EC: 76; Marcel (1945: 98-99). 
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terms nevertheless requires explanation. Paralleling HusserlȂs ȁȂȱȱȱ
ȁȱȂǰȱso as to ȱȱȱ ȱȁȱ¡ȱin the 
concrete fullness and entirety with which they figure in their concrete cont¡ȂȱǻŗşřŗǱȱ
116),21 Bergson therefore distinguishes between real, lived time (la durée; this can be 
ȱ ȱ
Ȃ immanente Zeit)22 and ȁle temps homogèneȂ (the ordinary, 
objective conception of time which relates primarily to an awareness of succession, 
analogous to 
ȂȱRaum-Zeit).23 For Bergson, this second form of time is not really 
ȱȱǲȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȁizeȂȱȱȱ,24 which freezes the 
motion of reality so that fixed observations can be made.25 In his doctoral thesis and 
first major philosophical work, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (1889), he 
affirms this radical distinction between time and space proper, using the example of 
following the movement of ȱȂȱands and pendulum as an illustration: 
ȱȱȱȱ¢¡ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
durée, comme on paraît le croire; je me borne à compter des simultanéités, ce 
qui est bien difféǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂǰȱȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ··ȱ






So whereas time is change and movement, space is static simultaneity: there is never 
more than one spatial arrangement of things at any one time; if anything is re-
arranged, the previous arrangement is no more. Consequently, no link exists between 
                                                        
21 See, more generally, Husserl (1931:101-16, §27-34). 
22 For further detail on 
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ
ȱǻŗşŜŚǼǯ 
23 As Marcel does not analyse time so directly, it is not possible to provide equivalent terms in his 
philosophy. However, as will be seen, many parallels can still be drawn between his position and that of 
Bergson. As Parain-Vial states: ȁ	ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ¸ȱ¡·ȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱŗŚŝǼǯ 
24 ȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱRaum-Zeit is, similarly, ȁ-Ȃǯ 




these separate states of affairs without an observer to make such a connection. 
Conceiving the movement of the hands and the pendulum depends on my temporal 
duration, for it is only my consciousness of a multiplicity of states, which have been 
strung together in my memory over time, that creates a relation between these spatial 
arrangements. Thus, for Bergson Ȯ and as will be seen, for Marcel Ȯ lived human 
experience is not a one-dimensional succession of discrete events. Rather, its many 
facets are all lived at once, intermingled to the extent of indissociability in the complex 
flux of la durée.26 Our everyday conception of time, however, treats time as a 
homogenous space in which events in our life are located, encouraging us to spectate 
our life, to view it one frame at a time.27 Bergson and Marcel wanted to correct this 
understanding of temporality, and demonstrate that there was another more authentic 
way of conceiving of ourselves. 
 
Bergson therefore deliberately avoids visual or spatial metaphors in his descriptions 
of la durée, so as not to encourage its structure to be understood in terms of graspable 
atomic parts, which can be conceived of in isolation from one another and at 
distance.28 Indeed, language, with its fixed objectifying concepts, can be misleading, 
and Bergson often warns against becoming ȁdupe du Ȃ (b: 109). In the 1888 
foreword to his Essai he writes: 
Nous nous exprimons nécessairement par des mots, et nous pensons le plus 
ȱȱȂǯȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ
établissions entre nos idées les mêmes distinctions nettes et précises, la même 
·ȱȂȱȱȱ·ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
vie pratique, et nécessaire dans la plupart des sciences. Mais on pourrait se 
demander si les difficultés insurmontables que certains problèmes 
                                                        
26 ȁ multiplicité des états de conscience, envisagée dans sa pureté originelle, ne présente aucune 
ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻb: 80). 
27 ȁȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·Ȃȱǻb: 753). 
28 ȁBergson purposely avoided visual metaphors in describing the structure of duration; auditive and 
kinesthetic images (melody, elan, explosion) definitely prevail in his writings. Once we get rid of a symbolic 









Of course, as Bergson recognizeȱȱȱŗşŗŗȱȱȁȂȱȂǰȱȁȱȂ¢ȱ
aurait pas ȱȱ¡ȱ¸ȱȱÉȱȱȂ¡·ȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱ
nous sous deux aspects différents [...]. Dans les deux cas, expérience signifie 
ǲȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱǰȱȱȂ¡·ȱ
par rapport à elle-même [...]; dans le second elle rentre en elle, se ressaisit et 
ȂȂȱǻb: 1361). So both modes of understanding are just as real 
experientially Ȯ and as mentioned above, engagement with our surroundings on a 
practical level actually requires us to conceive of things in detached, fixed terms. If we 
are to come to any deeper, metaphysical understanding of existence, however, the 
expressive limitations of language need to be recognized. It is not sufficient to base 
conclusions on this spectatorly, instrumental form of understanding, for this is a 
spatialized and consequently atemporal construction29 that ignores the richer 
underlying reality of la durée. In his Essai, therefore, Bergson creates a distinction 
 ȱȁȱȱȂȱȱȁȱ ·ȂȱȱȁȱȂǱȱ 
notre moi touche au monde extérieur par sa surface; nos sensations 
successives, bien que se fondant les unes dans les autres, retiennent quelque 
ȱȱȂ¡··ȱ·ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱǲȱt 
Ȃȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
homogène sans que ce mode de représentation nous coûte un grand effort. 
Mais le caractère symbolique de cette représentation devient de plus en plus 
frappant à mesure que nous pénétrons davantage dans les profondeurs de la 
conscience: le moi intérieur, celui qui sent et se passionne, celui qui délibère et 
se décide, est une force dont les états et modifications se pénètrent intimement, 




Both are experiences of one and the same self: ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
ȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻb: 83). But the moi profond is more 
                                                        
29 ȁȱȱǽ¸ǾȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ³ǲȱȱȂ ȱ³Ȃȱǻb: 628). 
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ontologically real,30 and it is in defence of this reality that Bergson criticizes 
spectatorship. 
 
Marcel launches a similar critique Ȯ ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȁȂȱ
warning and reaction against optical or spectacular thinking forms the vehicle 
throuȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂ (1989: iii).31 Although Marcel 
does not, for the most part, present his opposition to spectatorship in relation to time, 
as I will illustrate, he was not unaware of its relevance and does, on a number of 
occasions, apply his thoughts to time more explicitly. First, however, it is useful to 
outline Ȃ objection to spectatorship in general, so that his reflections on time 
can be appreciated in relation to his philosophy as a whole. 
 
For Marcel, human existence is not an object I ȱȱȱȱǲȱȁe ne puis 
ȱȂ¡ȱȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱǻRI: 8-9), he insists in the introduction to 
ȱȱ¥ȱȂ (1940). This distinction between existence and objectivity, which 
Marcel described in the lecture ȁȂ
ȱȱȱȂȱ(published 1968) ȱȁȱ
ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻPST: 220), is first introduced in the 1925 article 
ȁ¡ȱȱ·Ȃ;32 and here, sȱȂȱ(1724-1804) denial that 
existence is ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȁ·ȱȂȱ
(JM: 319), rather than a simple definable property about which logical deductions can 
be made and entities can be said to possess. ȱȱ ǰȱȱȁȂȱȱ¢ǰȱwhich 
we can ȱȱȂȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ
ȱȁȂȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱt maintained 
that the (logical/grammatical) predicate of existence gives us no further information 
                                                        
30 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȂȱǻǯǯȱb: 80). 
31 See also Cain (1963: 14). 
32 It is however anticipated in his Journal métaphysique (JM: 236-37, 252-53, 266-67, 273, 292-93, 304-06). 
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about that to which it is attributed (1998: 563-69),33 this only confirms that existence, 
understood as a property, is an empty notion with respect to identity. If identity is 
Ȃ concern, the significance of existence needs to be reconceived. Thus, Marcel 
gives primacy to existence over objectivity, consolidating his philosophical turn to the 
experience of the here and now. 
 
In the diary entries published in Être et avoir (1935; the entries themselves date from 
1928 to 1933), Marcel develops the distinction between existence and objectivity into a 
broader division between two kinds of understanding, ȁ¹ȂȱȱȁȂǰ following his 
reflections on the self and ¢ȱȱȁ¡ȱȱ·Ȃ.34 The (linguistic) fact that I 
ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ¢, he observes, makes it possible to understand my body 
as a tool at my disposal. However, iȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȱȂǰȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȁ¢ȱ¢ȂǯȱThe status of my body is 
therefore ambiguous. But, Marcel insists, while the mode of avoir makes it possible to 
adopt an impersonal, wholly instrumental attitude toward my body, this nevertheless 
rests on the underlying reality of être.35 Just as, for Bergson, le moi superficiel depends 
on le moi profond, for Marcel, possession and instrumentality already presuppose the 
body as mine Ȯ or rather, presuppose the lived body that I am. ȁJe ne me sers pas de 
mon corps, je suis ȱȂȱǻJM: 323), he contends in ȁ¡ȱȱ·Ȃ.36 Thus, 
être is the deeper mode of existence that needs to be recognized if human identity is 
the subject of enquiry;37 and Marcel demands that we stop and question the very 
                                                        
33 Kant is specifically arguing ȱȱȂȱontological argument for the existence of God, which 
claims that existence is a perfection, and uses this to define God (who is perfect) into being. 
34 EA: I, 14, 102-05, 167-68. 
35 ȁȱavoir effectivement, il faut être à quelque deg·ǰȱȂ-à-dire être immédiatement pour soi, se sentir 
ȱ·ǰȱȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 167-68). 
36 ȱȂȱȱȱȱJM: 262. See also DH: 114; ME I: 115-20; RI: 28-32. 
37 See also DH: 67-70. 
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language we use when talking about human existence, so as not to fall prey to its 
equivocity.38 
 
Ȃȱreaction against the instrumentality of avoir articulates a much more general 
concern with the increasing dominance of technology in society,39 an anxiety which 
was widespread amongst French non-conformist thinkers during the 1930s Ȯ 
including Bergson, although it is less visible in his philosophical writings.40 Jean-Louis 
Loubet del Bayle explains: 
la guerre avait ébranlé la foi dans le Progrès et la confiance en la Raison qui 
avaient guidé le XIXe siècle. [...] Des phénomènes convergents vinrent nourrir 









For Marcel, the ever-increasing importance society places on technology favours a 
¢ȱȱ ȱ ǱȱȁȂ¦ȱȱȱÉȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱdésorbitation ȱȂ·ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȂȱ
ȱ¥ȱȂÉe et à apparaître aussi aux autres comme un simple faisceau de 
Ȃ (HP: 192-93), he observed in the ŗşřřȱǰȱȁȱȱȱ
¸ȱȱ¢¸ȱȂǯ Further contextualizing his argument, he 
continued: 
                                                        
38 It is in fact to Bergson that Marcel feels indebted, ȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱ ȱ
ǯȱȱȱŗşśŞȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱêȂȱȱǱȱȁȱȂȱȱ¥ȱ
ȱȂȱ·ȱǰȱȱȂȱȱ¹ǰȱȱȂȱ··ȱȱi la recherche 
ǰȱȱȱâȱ¥ȱȱȂȱ¡·ȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
en un langage presque toujours élaboré à partir des objets, à partir des choses. [...] un des points sur lesquels 
la rencontre avec ȱ·ȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȱ·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ(EM: 94). 
39 See especially DH: 199-219; HH: 33-76; Marcel (1954a); PST: 151-74. 
40 ȂȱLe Rire (1900) expresses this concern to an extent: by characterizing humour as an impression of 
ȁȱ·ȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱǻb: 405, 410), he implies that acting like a machine is the furthest one 
can be from human reality. Other twentieth-century thinkers who are critical of technology include 
Berdyaev, Heidegger, Jaspers, and the philosophers of the Frankfurt School. 
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ȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂ¡··ȱȱȱȱȱ
être la vie ou la réalité intérieure de tel employé du métropolitain par exemple; 
Ȃȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ³ȱȱǯ41 Il faut bien 
ÉȱȂ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ lui tout concourt à déterminer 
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȂ¢·ǰȱȱȱ¢·ǰȱȱȂ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱ









ȱ ȱȁǽǾȱȱȂ·ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ·ȂȱǻHP: 195). However, 
precisely because of the inauthenticity of this functional existence, Marcel insists that 
it is possible to become aware of its insufficiency. In his 1933 lecture he therefore 
declared: 
ȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱce spectacle pour celui qui le regarde; il y 
ȱȱǰȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱ





According to Marcel, this tendency to translate human experience into functional or 
possessive terms is equally reflected in our interpretation of the temporality of 
existence: we are tempted either to understand time in impersonal terms of succession, 
or to talk about it as something we simply ȁȂǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
defines our being. ȁalgré nous, nous imaginons cette durée concrète comme une 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻPI: 88), he observes in his diary on 1 June 




sollicitude pour la commande du client [...]. ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȂȱ¥ȱÉȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱ·ȂȱǻŘŖŖŚǱȱşŚǼǯ 
42 Le Monde cassé ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ -known theatrical works, but he also uses the term 
frequently in his philosophy. It is the title of his second 1949 Gifford Lecture, for example Ȯ and in fact, 
¢ǰȱȱǻǼȱȱȁȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ
play. The ȱ ȱȂȱ and theatre will be examined in Chapter Four. 
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1942. ȱȱǻ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȁ·ȂǼǰ 
Marcel therefore rejected the idea that life is a chronological chain of discrete events, 
from which we can distance ourselves as we might from a film: ȁtoute tentative pour 
ȱȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱ¸ȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱ¹ȱ
·ȱ··Ȃǰȱȱ in a 1949 Gifford Lecture; 
ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǽǳǾ ȱȱȱȂȱȱ
réduise à des images, et par conséquent que sa structure soit purement et 
ȱȱȂȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ¡·ȱ·ǰȱȱȱ
nous la vivons, serait impossible pour un être qui ne serait que succession 
ȂȱǽǳǾǯ43 
(ME I: 204-05) 
 
And in the 1967 conference paperǰȱȁȱȱȱȱǻȱȱǼȂǰȱhe related a 
possessive attitute toward time to a state of despair (ȱȱ·ê·e; MT: 13) 
analogous to that described in relation to le monde cassé. For Marcel, the phrase ȁȱ
Ȃ describes ȁȱȱ·ȱȱ·ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȂȱ
éclusage du temps, les journées sont assimilées à des bassins de retenue, à des vases 
ȱȱ¥ȱǯȱȱȂȱȱȱȂ (MT: 11). But as he 
explained in 1967: 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¹ȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ
menée contre ce que nous appellerons très approximativement une puissance 





To attempt to appropriate time in such a way Ȯ that is, to conceive of it in terms of 
avoir Ȯ is not to think about the reality of human time at all, for time cannot be 
controlled. With this realization, Marcel notes, time can ȱȁȂȱ ȁ 
[sic]Ȃǰȱand the person in question ȁȱȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱ¥ȱȂ·Ȃ (MT: 13). 
But just as he argued in relation to le monde cassé, Marcel suggests such a feeling to be 
symptomatic of an inauthentic understanding of Ȃ (temporal) existence. ȁIl existe 
                                                        
43 See also PI: 56-57; RI: 209-10. 
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une connexion secrète et rarement discernée entre la façon dont le moi se centre ou 
non sur lui-même Ȯ et sa réaction à la durée, plus précisément à la temporalité (HV: 
52), he remarked in the ŗşŚŘȱȱȁȱȂȱ··ȱȱȂȱ
·¢ȱȱȂ·Ȃ. Consequently, Marcel stresses the need to hold a non-
possessive, non-reductive conception of time (ȱȱȱȁȱȱêȂȱ
(MT: 13; also PI: 169-70)), which recognizes the irreducible complexity of human 
temporality and ȱȱ¢ȱȱ£ȱȂȱ:44 




ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱǯ Il se 
peut que chacun de nous soit appelé, au cours même de cette vie, à tisser en 
ȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
au temps utilisé ou aménagé comme à la surface du gouffre [...]. Dans cette 
ligne de pensée, le temps prend une tout autre valeur; il apparaît, en effet, 
ȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ·ȱȱ
ȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
nous sommes tentés de dire normales. 
(MT: 18-19) 
 
Thus, as Bergson and Marcel both highlight, the way things appear to us can differ, 
depending on our particular reflective mode. ȁȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱ ȱȃȄǲȱȱȱ	ȱȃȄǰȱsens means not only meaning 
and sense, but ȱȂ, writes Leonard Lawlor (2003: 3).45 And the same must 
be emphasized for Marcel.46 As philosophers concerned with grasping the 
unadulterated, temporal character of Being, both therefore argue for une conversion de 
Ȃ away from practical utility or function. ȁȱâȱȱȱȱȱ-il 
pas ici de nous amener à une perception plus complète de la réalité par un certain 
                                                        
44 ȁȱ·ȱȂȱȱȂ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱréalisme du tempsȂȱǻȱŗşŘŚǱȱŚŚǼǯ 
45 Indeed, for Bergson it is crucial to recognize that our engagement with the world is motivated (cf. 

Ȃȱȱȱ¢ǲȱȱȱȱon p. 62, in note 12). Our observations are therefore not 
purely impartial, made only out of a desire to further truth; rather, our perception always occurs in the 
context of action, necessarily relating it to the specific way in which we happen to be interacting with the 
world. ȱȱǱȱȁȂ·ȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȂ·ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ
notre perception consciente, et les conditions de notre perception consciente, vers la connaissance pure, non 
ȱȂȂȱǻb: 362). 
46 Marcel makes this argument in ME I: 188-89. 
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·ȱȱȱǵȂǰȱȱȱn his 1911 Oxford ȱȁȱ
Perception du changemeȂǯȱȁȱȂȱȱdétourner cette attention du côté pratiquement 
·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱretourner vers ce qui, pratiquement, ne sert à rien. 
ȱȱȱȂ ȱȱȱ¹Ȃȱ(b: 1373-74).47 This 
requires a non-objectifying act of reflection, which BȱȱȱȱȁȂ48 and 
contrasts with the intellectualizing human facul¢ȱȱȁȂ.49 And Marcel 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȁ·¡ȱȂǰȱȱȱȱ
ontologically authenȱȁ·¡ȱȂ, defined in ȁȱȱȂ as ȁȱ
ȱȱȂ (HP: 214) Ȯ ȁȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¦Ȃȱ
(HP: 212). 
 
So unlike the neo-Kantian Natorp (1854-1924), who argued that it was impossible to 
access and investigate subjectivity directly, because of the objectifying and 
intellectualizing nature of self-reflection,50 Bergson and Marcel can be aligned with 
Heidegger in that, ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱ
neither believe that subjective life is completely inaccessible or inexpressible. Alan 
Kim ȱȱȱȁȱȱȃ¡Ȅȱȱȱ-Kantians is restricted to 
ȃȱ¡ȄǰȱȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȃȱȄȂ (2008: 
section 4, para. 1). Heidegger, Bergson, and Marcel, on the other hand, contended that 
self-understanding was not dependent on conscious reflection, and sought guidance 





49 In addition to intuition and intelligence, Bergson distinguishes a third mode of knowledge: instinct. These 
three notions are discussed, for the most part, in Ȃ1ȱ· (1907) (especially b: 578-652). Here 
Bergson suggests that, with the evolution of animals, a dichotomy developed between an innate knowledge 
of matter (instinct), and a pragmatic, analytical engagement with life (intelligence). When humans evolved, 
a third form of knowledge emerged, namely intuition. Intuition is instinct in its most developed form: it is a 
reversal of the intellectual, but more than an attention to matter, it is an attention to the essence of life itself, 
and as such, in touch with the very becoming (devenir) of Being. By the time Bergson wrote Ȃ1, this 
no longer meant la durée (of the individual), but the collective generative movement of all human life, which 
ȱȱȁȂ·ȱȂǯ 
50 ȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱ(2006: 73-78). 
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from (temporal) life-experience itself when attempting to disclose this non-objective 
form of acquaintance.51 Heidegger valued poetic form for its evocative power 
(particularly the works of Hölderlin (1770-1843)), the significance of which transcends 
the literal and the categorical, opening up a space for meaning without delineating 
(and therefore limiting) it. Bergson and Marcel, on the other hand, privileged musicȂ 
expressive capacity,52 seeing, in its non-representational form, an illustration of the 
non-objective unity they believed intuition and secondary reflection were capable of 
apprehending, an illustration of la durée.53 As Bergson famously asks in his EssaiǱȱȁNe 
pourrait-on pas dire que, si [les notes Ȃȱ·Ǿȱȱ¸ǰȱȱȱ
apercevons néanmoins les unes dans les autres, et que leur ensemble est comparable à 
un être vivant, dont les parties, ȱǰȱȱ·¸ȱȱȂȱ¹ȱȱ
ȱ·ǵȂȱǻb: 67-68). ȁȱȱȱȂǰȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȂȱ
pas sa longueur exagérée, en tant que longueur, qui nous avertira de notre faute, mais 
ȱȱȱ·ȱȱ¥ȱ¥ȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱǻb: 68).54 
ǰȱȱȁȱȱȱȂ, Bergson concludes that as far as human 
existence is concerned: 
                                                        
51 ȁȱǽ
Ǿȱ ȱȱȱŗşŗşȮ20 lecture course Grundprobleme der PhänomenologieǱȱȃȱȱȱȱ
understand this character of self-acquaintance that belonȱȱ¡ȱȱȄȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱ
¡ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ£ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȃȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȄȂȱǻȱ
2006: 80). 
52 Bergson and Marcel nevertheless recognize the potential of poetic expression. ȱȁȱomprise et 
ȱ·ȂȱǻŗşřŝǼǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ·ȱ¢ȱ
ȱȱȱÉȱȱȱȱ·ȱ·¢ȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱǻEM: 45). And 
Bergson also relates intuition to poetr¢Ǳȱȁȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
·ǰȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱ¥ȱȱ·ǰȱȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
Ȃ·ȱȂȱȱȱ¡Ȃȱǻb: 1321). 
53 ȁȱȱȱȱ the pervasive post-Hegelian concern with the limits of systematic philosophy. 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are the major figures in the nineteenth century who believed that music was 
the metaphysical art. There are others in the twentieth century, Adorno most notably, who give some 
privilege to music. Philosophy, particularly in its logicist forms, can run roughshod over the subtleties, 
intimacies of being. Music may sing these, as it were, in a manner that forces philosophy to raise the 
question of the unsayableȯȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱǻȱŗşşŚǱȱŗŗŘ-13). 
54 ȁȱȱ·ȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
avoir, Ȯ une impression aussi éloignée que possible de celle de la simultanéité, Ȯ ȱȱȂȱȱ
·ȱ¹ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȃȄȱȱȂȃ¸ȄȱȂȱȱÉǰȱȂȱȱȱ
mêlons des iȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ··Ȃȱǻb: 1384). 
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ȱȂ¢ȱȱȱn substratum rigide immuable ni des états distincts qui y passent 
comme des acteurs sur une scène. Il y a simplement la mélodie continue de 
notre vie intérieure Ȯ mélodie qui se poursuit et se poursuivra, indivisible, du 
commencement à la fin de notre existence consciente. Notre personnalité est 
ȱ¹ǯȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ




ȂǱȱȁȱyse comme celle que M. Bergson esquisse met incontestablement 
en lumière Ȯ ou du moins nous aide à définir Ȯ ȱ¢ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂ·ȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱ·Ǳȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ·ȱȂȱ¸ȱȱȱ
ȱȂȱȂ (EM: 36). He himself had a deep appreciation for music, and often 
refers to the impact that pieces of music, or his own piano improvisations, had on his 
thought.56 Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱhimǯȱȁ·ȱȂȱ
expression non-représentǰȱȱȂǰȱȱ  in his diary on 16 December 
1930 Ȯ ȁun ordre où la chose dite ne peut pas être distinguée de la manière de dire. En 
ce sens, en ce sens seulement, la musique ne signifie rien, mais peut-¹ȱȱȂȱ
est ȂȱǻEA: I 69).57 And in his lecture ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
êȂȱǻŗşśŞ) he declared: ȁȂȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ··ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱ
Ȃ¹ȱȱ¥ȱȱȂ¹ȂȱǻEM: 93). 
 
For this reason, Marcel also uses musical imagery to describe the form of his 
¢ȱǻȱȁ¸ȱȱȂǼǰȱand employs musical analogies to express the 
content of his ideas. In his lettre préface to Ȃ 1953 exposition of his 
philosophy, for example, he describes his Ȃȱ in terms of ȁune 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ (1953: 10). Such a characterization 
emphasizes the process ȱȂȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ
                                                        
55 Husserl also describes internal time-consciousness using a musical analogy (e.g. 1964: 41, 43). 
56 E.g. EA: I, 170-71; EC: 207-08; DH: 44. On the importance of music for Marcel in general, see for example 
EC: 46-51. 
57 See also EC: 119. This is recognized by Cain (1963: 15). 
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conclusions; indeed, this gradual or improvisational development is very evident in 
Marcel (almost overwhelmingly so, in places). But arguably this conforms to his and 
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ constituent of human reality, and 
our thoughts and experiences as becoming with and through time. For Bergson, too, 
to think intuitively Ȯ that is, in faithful concordance with Being Ȯ is to acknowledge 
ȱȱ¢Ȃȱǰȱȱȁȱȱ·Ȃȱǻb: 1275) as opposed to confining 
Ȃȱȱȱǰȱ¢-made concepts.58 In ȱȁction à la 
·¢Ȃȱhe describes an authentic metaphysics as follows: 
les concepts lui sont indispensables, car toutes les autres sciences travaillent le 
plus ordinairement sur des concepts, et la métaphysique ne saurait se passer 
des autres sciences. Mais ȱȂȱȱ-¹ȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱ
concept, ou du moins ȂȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
créer des concepts bien différents ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱ¡ȱ
dire des représentations souples, mobiles, presque fluides, toujours prêtes à se mouler 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂ.59 
(b: 1401-02; my emphasis) 
 
Such a conception is then echoed by Marcel in the 1958 presentation he gave to the 
Société française de philosophie, ȁȂ3ȱȱȱ·ȱȂǱȱȁȂȱȱ··ȱ
en garde contre un certain rancissement du langage philosophique; je suis convaincu 
Ȃȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱization ne peut 
Ȃ·ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱ·¡ȱȱȱȱ perpétuellement 
ȱȱȱȂ¡·Ȃ (PST: 77-78). Accordingly, his own metaphysical 
terminology is in constant flux, testifying literally to the temporality of existence. 
Secondary reflection, for example, is also referred to as ȁȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 151), 
ȁ·¡ȱ··ȱǻHPǱȱŘŖŝǼȂǰȱȁ·¡ȱ¥ȱȱ¡¸ȱȂȱǻHP: ŘŖŝǼǰȱȁȱ
recueillementȂ (HPǱȱŘŗŗǼȂ ȁȱ·ȱȂȱ(RI: 21-22), and ȁȱȂȱǻME I: 
                                                        
58 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱǰȱȱȱ
ce que nous appellerions la socialisation de la vérité. ǽǳǾȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ¡ȱ··ȱ
ȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ
science ou philosophie. [...] Nous recommandons une certaine manière difficultueȱȱȂȱǻb: 1327-
28). See also b: 1292. 
59 See also b: 1288. 
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139)60 Ȯ for, as Marcel explained to his audience in one of the William James Lectures 
ǻȁȱȱ·ȂǼ, the philosophy he aspired to write was 
ȱȱǰȱ¥ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱȂ·ǰȱȱ
néanmoins et devait rester une recherche Ȯ bien loin de se commuer en un 
ensemble de ȱȱȂ¹ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ




Thus, there are extensive similarities between BergsonȂ and MarcelȂȱȱȱ
philosophy. ȁȱȱȱ	ǯȱMarcel est [...] le même que celui de Bergson: retour à 
Ȃ·Ȃ, asserts Tsukada (1995: 82). Certainly, both emphasize the temporality of 
existence, considering an engagement with lived human time to be essential for any 
investigation into the nature of Being; and for both, this then manifests itself in a 
critique of a linear, spectatorly understanding of time, which Ȯ they argue Ȯ fails to 
recognize the irreducible multiplicity of human experience. Preference is therefore 
given to a non-objectifying form of reflection, heralded as a more authentic mode of 
understanding which is capable of appreciating the complexity and free creativity of 
la durée. And for this reason, Bergson and Marcel share a vision of a metaphysics that 
is faithful to this reality, and which encapsulates the movement and inter-connected 
nuances of temporal life by means of a more fluid expressive form. What is not so 
clear, however, is whether ȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱ
two projects: ȁ[leur] démarche est semblableȂ, Tsukada declares; ȁils sont tous les deux 
ȱȱȂ¡·ȱ·ȱȱȱ··ȱ¸ȱȂȱȱ¢·ȱȱ·ȱ
ȱ··ȱȱȂ (1995: 245) Ȯ and thusǰȱȁȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ
Ȃ··ǰȱȱȱ	ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂ (1995: 242). However, as will be seen in the 
                                                        
60 As a result, Michaud remarks that ¢ȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȂȱ




remainder of this chapter, the metaphysics underlying these two philosophies is 
actually quite different. Although Ȃȱgement with Bergson can be said to 
have instigated his own philosophical project, this project remained his own, and he 
moved forward from this point de départ in quite a different direction. Surprisingly, as 
section two will now reveal, this difference begins with their philosophies of time. The 




If, at firȱǰȱȂȱintuition ȱȂȱréflexion seconde seem to share the 
same role, the legitimacy of drawing an analogy between the two became a major 
subject of contention for Marcel, who rejected Bergsonian intuition as a viable mode of 
¢ȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȁȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻŗşŗŘǼǰȱȱ¢ȱs issue, and 
illustrates how pivotal BergȂȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ  
distinct position. ȁȱǽǾȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂ·ȱ··ȱ¥ȱȱȱȂǰȱ
ȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ-même sa 
garantie, et que seule la réflexion pouvait peut-être dans des conditions déterminées 
lui conféȱȱȂȱǻDH: 55-56), explained Marcel in the third of his William 
James Lectures ǻȁ¡ȂǼ. For Marcel, the purity of Bergsonian intuition is too 
passive, and therefore too abstract. In order to remain faithful to the reality of human 
experience, he argues, intuitionȂȱȱȱ must be conceived of in 
terms of a dialectic of reflection Ȯ that is, in terms of a constant tension between 
primary and secondary reflection (or intelligence and intuition). ȁȱȱȱ
ȂȱȱÉȱ¥ȱȱȱȱâȱȂǰȱȱ in the 
1912 articleǲȱȁȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
nécessairement nier la pensée Ȯ nier toute pensée Ȯ ȱȱȂȱ¹Ȃ (1912: 
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639). Indeed, in the 1943 essay ȁ	ȱȱȂȱMarcel affirms Ȯ again, 




·ȱȱȱȱȱȂ (1943: 37-38). As Marcel explained to Boutangǰȱȁȱȱȱ
¡ȱ¡ǰȱȂȱȂ·ȱȂȱȱȱȂ¹ǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂ¹ȂȱǻGM: 79). Thus, if the faculty of intuition is to be anything more than an 
abstract construct, it must be implicated in the struggle of existence, which constantly 
tempts us to confine our understanding to ¢ȱȂȱintellectualizing mode: 
ȁȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂ (JM: 131), he asserts in his 
diary on 14 April 1916 Ȯ for, he affirms in his next entry, ȁȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȂȱȂȱȱ¹ȱ··ǰȱ··ȂȱǻJM: 131; 4 May 1916). Marcel 
consequently rejects the Bergsonian dichotomy between intelligence and intuition, 
insisting that their conflictual relationship be taken into account.62 
 
The metaphysical differences between the two philosophers become all the more 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȂȱȮ that is, breaks in continuity Ȯ of la durée.63 For 
Marcel, these are ontologically significant, and manifest what he calls ȁȱȂȱȱ
existence, whereas for Bergson they are not representative of anything more than a 
                                                        
61 ȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ¡ȱ(1974: 94-98 
in particular) and Bars (1991: 240-45 especially). Sweetman (2008: 121-34) also discusses relations between 
Marcel and Maritain. He agrees that the most crucial difference between them ȱȁthe respective 
roles they each assigned to conceptual knowlȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱŗŘŚǼǯȱǰȱ ȱ
feels that the two philosophies still have much in common, and aims to expose these points of agreement as 
a corrective to the divisive way in which Marcel and Maritain often presented their positions. 
62 ȱȂȱǰȱȱ describes ȱȱȁȱȱȂȱǻbǱȱŗřşŜǼȱȱȁǽǾȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱȱȂȂȱǻb: 1285), he does not present it as the passive, privileged mode of 
understanding that Marcel accuses him of advocating. On the contrary, Bergson argues that intuition 
ȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǯȱ
Ȃȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻb: 1275). 
63 ȱǱȱȁ	ǯȱȱ·it surtout de Bergson par son insistance sur les ruptures de la durée ou 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşśǱȱŗŜŗǼǯ 
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lapse in our attention, where we are distracted from the reality of la durée: 
ȁȂȱ·ȱe la vie psychologique tient [...] à ce que notre attention se 
¡ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȂȱǻb: 496), he writes in Ȃ1ȱ
créatrice (1907). In the 1929 article ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ
ȱǱȱȁte urgence dramatique du problème spirituel, M. Bergson me paraît 
Ȃȱ·ȱ· [...]. La résonance tragique si constante chez un 
£ǰȱ·ȱȱȱȱ¢¸ǰȱȱȱ·Ȃ (1929b: 269-70). The tragedy 
to which Marcel is here referring is intimately connected to the dialectic of existence 
that he wishes to emphasize Ȯ a dialectic Marcel feels Bergson evades, prompting him 
to criticize Ȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȁ··ȱhic et nunc le sens de 
Ȃ·ȱ·ble dans ȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻŗşŘşb: 269). In addition 
ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȂȱ£, and 
¢ȱȂȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ¡ǰȱȱ ȱ
metaphysics to take seriously experiences such as suffering, despair, and 
bewilderment, in spite of how they decentre Ȯ that is, detemporalize Ȯ our experience 
of self and plunge us into what he calls ȁȱȱȂȱǻEAǱȱǰȱŗŖŖǼȱȱȁǽǾȱȱ
ȂȱǻJM: 230). More than mere distractions from la durée, for Marcel, these 
experiences are an integral and inevitable part of (temporal) human existence, and are 
just as instructive with respect to the human ontological condition. A continuous 
experience of any moi profond, he contends, is impossible. 
 
In En chemin Marcel recalls a revelatory moment when this disjointed reality of 
existence became clear to him: 
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ
semaines plus tard, et je me revois distinctement au cours de la longue 
ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂici-maintenant, 
ȱ·ȱȱȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱalors, 
mais sur la base de quel autre ici-maintenant? Il se présentait à moi comme 
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c·ȱȱȱȱ··ǯȱȂ·ȱ¥ȱȱÉȱȱ
mystère du temps, faut-il dire de la distorsion temporelle, dans une 
ȱȱȂ·ȱúȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱǯȱȱȱ
Ȃȱ¥ȱǰȱȂȱȱâȱȱtinuité des présents. Mais combien 
ȱȱȱǷȱȱ·ȱȂ-il pas voué par définition à la 






time is crucial to its appreciation. ȁȱȱǽ temps] comporte des 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱappelle, de façon bien significative, des temps 
ȂȱǻMT: 18), affirmed Marcel in ȁȱȱȱȂǯȱȱȂȱȁ·ȱ
ǰȱȱȂǰȱ ȱǰȱȁȱȱ³ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȂȂ (1995: 167). Indeed, Mark Muldoon notes, 
Bergson never reckons with the discordance of life revealed through the 
language in laments and other elegies of the human condition. There is no 
need for testaments of struggle and the recognition of suffering. Apart from 
his last work, the misery of time is only rejected and never confronted. In fact, 
outside of the need to refer always to duration at the expense of discontinuity, 
there is little overlapping between the modes of discourse that describe mortal 
time and duration.64 
(2006: 116) 
 




Quant à la souffrance morale, elle est au moins aussi souvent amenée par 
ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱºȱȱȱȂȱ
surexcité notre sensibilité au point de la rendre morbide: notre douleur 




Hence, for Marcel, if Bergson argues for a deeper intuition of Being, he has failed to 
engage with its immediate reality Ȯ with the complexities of its experience and, in 
particular, its tragedy. His notion of intuition can therefore only, at best, be deemed an 
                                                        
64 ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ, see also Gutting (2001: 114-15) and Hyppolite (1971: I, 452). 
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indirect presupposition of Being; it does not explore its lived nature, its actual 
temporal experience. 
 
But as Marcel stated in a William James Lecture ǻȁ¡ȂǼ, he himself did not fully 
appreciate le tragique at the time he wrote the 1912 article: ȁce qui me frappe surtout 
ȂǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱ-¹ȱȂȱȱȱ··ȱ¡ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ
était le mien Ȯ le nôtre à nous artistes, écrivains et philosophes Ȯ ne paraissaient pas 
encore sérieusement ou vitalement menacéȂȱǻDH: 56).65 Marcel first discovered its true 
extent during the First World ǱȱȁȱȂ··ȱǽȱȱȱŗŚǾǰȱȱȱȂȱ
inȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ¸ȱ·ǰȱȂȱȱȂȱǻGM: 62), he 
explained to Boutang. It is in the second part of his Journal that he decisively equates 
ȁȱȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡·Ȃ (JM: 144; 23 July 
1918), a perspective which, thereafter, he describes in terms of interrogation and 
response. ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂ¹Ȃ (PST: 78),66 
he declared in his presentation ȁȂ3ȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȮ a remark 
which, significantly, he coupled with a re-affirmation of his rejection of intuition: 
ȁȂȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂ¹ǰȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ¥ȱȱȱȂ (PST: 78).67 
 
                                                        
65 See also DH: 36; EC: 80, 201. 
66 See also DH: 57-58. 
67 This is also affirmed in the preface to Pour une sagesse tragique et son au-delà ǻŗşŜŞǼǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȂȱ·ȱȂȱȂǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
particulière ¥ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱȂEtre devant la pensée interrogative. On 
ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱ
ȱ·ȱȱȂǯȱCelui-ci se présente au cȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȂ·ȱȱ
ȱ¸ȱȱ··ȂȱǻPST: 13). Though, as mentioned above, Marcel does briefly speak of 
an ȁȱ·Ȃǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ¡Ȃǰȱ
ȁ¡ȱȂǰȱȱȁ¡ȱȂ¹ȂǯȱȱȱȱȱȁȂ3ȱȱȱ·ȱȂǰȱȱȱ
ȁ·ȱ¥ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱ·ǯȱMais ici le mot intuition peut-il encore convenir? 
ȂȱȂȱȱ ȂȱǻPST: 78). 
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If Marcel was opposed to the abstract, reflective purity of Bergsonian intuition, he also 
felt it failed to grasp human reality on a second, more fundamental level: it did not 
take into account the intersubjectivity of the human condition. ȁ£ȱǰȱȂȱȱ
âȱȱȱ·ȱȂȂȱǻGM: 61), he stated in an interview with 
Boutang. The musicality to which Marcel is referring is not simply a fluid and 
indivisible intrasubjective reality; its unity is intersubjectiveǱȱȁȱǰȱȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ
ȱȃ-ȄȱȱȂêȱȱȱ haute semblait atteindre 
ȂȱǻDH: 45), he informed his audience in his second William James Lecture 
ǻȁȂǼ. In addition to neglecting the dialectical character of experience, then, 
Marcel felt the way in which intuition presented ontology was too individualistic. In 
another William James Lecture ǻȁ¢¸ȱȂǼ, Marcel elaborated further, 
explaining how, for him, it was because of its orchestral, polyphonic nature that music 










As such, for Marcel, Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱmelody is insufficiently developed; and 
in ȁȱȱȂȱȱcriticizes it for neglecting the participatory nature of 
the musical experience, contending that the listener is involved in the creation of a 
melody (le devenir musical) in addition to the musician (EM: 36).68 As Parain-Vial 





ȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȂȱǻEA: I, 170-71). Significantly, in a 1934 footnote to this entry, Marcel 
references Bergson, again suggesting ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱùȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱ³ȱ¥ȱȱ¹ȱȂ lle 
·ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱǯȱȱȂȱ-¹ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ




·ȱȂȱȱǰȱȱe essentiellement orchestrale: esse est 
coesseȂ (1976: 192). Indeed, ȁto MarcelȂ, ȱ ǰȱȁthe reality of ǽȂǾ 
internal duration is too narrow [; he conceives it to be ...] more global and 
ȱǽǳǰǾȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱwhich prescinds from the 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻ1968: 136). Thus, despite all the 
similarities that appeared to exist between the two philosophies, Ȃȱ
understanding of Being, and of the way in which we can have access to its reality, is 
not the same as BeȂǯ As the final section of the chapter will now demonstrate, 
this difference impacts on the way Marcel speaks of eternity, in addition to time. 
 
1.3 Memory, Time, and Eternity 
 
In the second part of the Journal, in which Marcel reacts against his earlier work and 
begins to reconceive his philosophical approach, MarcelȂ move away from a 
Bergsonian model of time is much more apparent. Furthermore, it becomes 
increasingly evident that if Bergson and Marcel hold different philosophies of time, 
these are bound up with antagonistic notions of eternity. And as will now be 
suggested, the time-eternity relation that Marcel sides with in opposition to Bergson 
consolidates a potential problematic in his philosophy, whereby time and eternity 
seem to compete against one another for primacy, rendering the consistency of his 
position questionable. 
 
Discussions of time in the first part of the Journal (January-May 1914) are often 
situated in relation to an experience of eternity, and, significantly, this seems to be 
treated as a more authentic experience of Being. In an early entry (27 January 1914), 
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for example, when reflecting on how to conceive of the relation between my conscious 
self and my empirical self, Marcel describes an authentic experience of Being in terms 
of an eternal ȁ·Ȃǰȱȱȱ¡ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱǻȁȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱǻJM: 48), ȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱǻJM: ŚşǼǼȱȱ¡¢ǯȱȱȱȂȱ
belief that there are truths which can be legitimately affirmed, despite being 
objectively unverifiable in the empirical world of the spatio-temporal. He thus wishes 
ȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
justified, even if the truth of religion cannot be scientifically proven. At the same time, 
however, he wants to avoid instituting a dualism between appearance and reality Ȯ a 
difficulty Marcel ȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 48). 
The solution, he suggests, is to understand consciousness of reality as a progression: 
one that moves away from absolute dependence on the certainty of temporally-bound 
objectivity toward a (more authentic) consciousness of Being, which recognizes an 
eternal form of assurance that transcends any opposition between the objectively 






résoudrait pour qui sauraȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ-
même relatif à un moment qui ne peut à aucun degré être regardé comme 
ultime du développement de la conscience religieuse (développement que la 
pensée pose du moment où elle conçoit le saint). Dans la mesure où le 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ··ȱȂȱȱ¸ȱ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾǰȱȱ
ȱǰȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ··ȱ·ȱȂ·ǰȱ
de position existentielle qui est la tare de la religion chez le fidèle. Le croyant 




                                                        
69 This use of the saint as model is problematized in Chapter Five. See pp. 237-38. 
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The above passage thus demonstrates how, for Marcel, time is identified with 
objectivity70 Ȯ that is, with something that is opposed to the eternity of actualité and 
which must therefore be transcended. This is then re-iterated in his entry on 17 
February, which, following a similar discussion that seeks to establish grounds on 
which belief in miracles might be intelligible, argues for a transcendent eternal present 
ȁǽǾȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 83). In this entry, historical and scientific frames of 
truth (cadres de vérité) are described ȱȁȱǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱǻJM: 82). While this may seem to cohere with Ȃȱ
argument that an objective, scientific account of reality, although seductive and 
influential for our understanding of the world, fails to capture the essence of human 




présent absolu) ȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱȁ·Ȃ is 
ȱȱȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȮ ǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱȂ··ȂȱǻJM: 82). 
Strangely, then, Marcel seems to be arguing both for the necessity of engaging with 
temporal reality, as illustrated by his dismissal of the moules intemporels of science and 
history, and for the necessity of transcending the temporal in favour of eternity, so as 
to avoid conceiving of reality in (inauthentǼȱȱǱȱȁȱ·ȱȱ
ȱ¥ȱȱ·ǰȱ¥ȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱ³ȱȂȱȱȱȂȱ
(JM: 83). Is this not a contradiction? 
 
                                                        
70 Marcel also identifies time with instrumentality, with avoir as opposed to être (e.g. JM: 263). 
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Bergson too was opposed to (Cartesian) dualism;71 and yet Bergson did not feel the 
need to argue for an eternal present. Although he does accept a notion of eternity, it is 
not the immobile conception that Marcel appears to hold. For Bergson, the only notion 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǱȱȁȱ
mouvȱȱȱ··ȱ¹Ȃȱǻb: ŗřŝŞǼǰȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱ
Ȃǯȱȱȱȱȁȱ¥ȱȱ·¢Ȃ, Bergson writes of eternity: 
ȱȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱǱȱ¥ȱ
la limite serait Ȃ··ǯȱȱȱȂ··ȱǰȱȱȱȱ··ȱ
de mort, mais une éternité de vie. Eternité vivante et par conséquent 
mouvante encore, où notre durée à nous se retrouverait comme les vibrations 
dans la lumière, et qui serait la concrétion de toute durée comme matérialité 
ȱȱȂ·ǯȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ¡¹ȱȂȱȱǰȱȱ
ce mouvement est la métaphysique même.  
(b: 1419) 
 
Immobility and invariability have traditionally (since Plato) been considered more 
perfect than change and movement. But Bergson inverts this relation, analysing 
immobility as composite and relative, merely a constructed relation between 





philosophie qui commence à Platon pour aboutir à Plotin est le 
·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȱȱȱ
ȱȂǯȱǰȱȂȱȱ qui est la vérité. 
(b: 1424-25) 
 
So although we often speak of change, as Bergson insisted ȱȁȱPerception du 
ȂǰȱȁȱȂ¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱ
change, que le changement est la loi même des choses [...]; mais ce ne sont là que des 
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȂȱǻb: 
1367). Thinking of things in terms of immobility is certainly useful as far as our 
                                                        
71 ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱǻȱȱȱ ȱǰȱǯǯȱb: 161), as will be 
seen later in this sectionǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȱ
ȱȂȱǻǯǯȱb: 318, 354). 
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practical relations with the world are concerned; to apply such an understanding to 
metaphysics, however, is to falsify reality.72 Ȃȱȱȱȱ
legitimacy of any form of immobile, eternal present therefore raise questions about the 
extent to which Marcel actually engages with time Ȯ the extent to which time is of 
consequence to his philosophy. 
 
Given Ȃȱ ȱȱȱȱearly philosophy, though, which he came to 
regard as abstract and detached from existential experience, perhaps we should not be 
astonished if the significance of time is marginalized in the first part of his Journal. 
What is more crucial is the way in which time and eternity are presented from the 
second part onward. Yet, surprisingly, in spite of the evolution Marcel identifies in his 
thought, the concrete focus of which he credits Bergson for helping him to reinforce, 
the second part of the Journal continues to position time in relation to an eternal 
present. 
 
Part two of the Journal commences on 15 September 1915, and the very first question 
to be considered is that of time: 
ȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱȱǯǯǯȱȱȂȱȱȱȱdonné avant 
Ȃ¹ȱduré ǻȱȂȱȱest là ȱȂ¹ȱǼǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱǲȱȱȱla négation 
même de cela. 









·ȱȱ··ȱǰȱȱ·ǰȱȱ·ȱȱêur, des problèmes insolubles, nous fermons les 
¢¡ȱ¥ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·Ȃȱ(b: 1379). 
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In this first entry time seems to be presented in a Bergsonian manner, with its 
assertion that time is only authentically experienced in the immediate present of le 
temps duré, and its reference to the fundamental differences between time and space. 
And indeed, in his next entry (18 September 1915) ȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱ
¹ȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱȱȂǲȱȱȂȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻJM: 129). ǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱ
acknowledgement of how time and space Ȯ although different Ȯ are nevertheless used 
to symbolize ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
entangled conceptions we hold of these notions, whereby we understand time 
through spatial analogies and vice versa. Nevertheless, Marcel then reintroduces his 
conception of actualité, which, as in the first part of the Journal, seems to override the 
importance of le temps duré with respect to the authentic apprehension of ȂȱǱ73 
ȁȱȱȱ¢·ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ-même est symbolisé par 
ȂȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂȱȂactualité (correspondȱ¥ȱȂ··ǼȂȱǻJM: 129). It must be noted that 
tȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
minds, is only an abstract image of la durée (e.g. b: 79-80). However, the account of 
memory that the second part of the Journal subsequently develops is decisive in 
ȱȂs position as distinct from Bergson, and provides what is perhaps 
the most complete illustration of how time and eternity mean something different in 
the two philosophies. 
 
                                                        
73 In his ŗşŚŗȱȱȁȱȱȂ, ȱȱȱȱȱȁ·Ȃȱwith the (ontologically 





sens plus proche de Bergson Ȯ ȱȂȱȱȱȂȱǻEA: I, 123-24),74 writes 
Marcel in his diary on 10 October 1932. And, in both cases, attention paid to memory 
is motivated by a dissatisfaction with empirical reduction and Cartesian dualism. 
They part company,  ǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ that memoryȂȱ
ontological grounding is in the present rather than the past. This lays the foundations 
for his conception of an eternal present that transcends time, in opposition to 
Ȃ notion of eternity which is conceived as the movement of time itself. 
 
ȁȱ¸ȱȱȱ·ȱȱ¥ȱȱ¢¡ȱȱ¸ȱ··Ȃȱǻb: 221), writes 
Bergson in Matière et mémoire.75 Like Marcel, he also wanted to legitimize the 
empirically unverifiable, for he, too, believed this to characterize the nature of the 
human mind (esprit). This could be demonstrated, he felt, by engaging with the 
experience of memory, because memory was something that empirical examination 
was unable to fully account forǱȱȁȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱ ȱ··ǰȱȂȱǰȱȱȱ
phénomène de la mémoire, que nous devons le toucher expérimentalement. Et dès 
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
··ȱ¥ȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȂȱǻb: 220). The reason for this, Bergson 
continues, is that memory is not sim¢ȱȱȁ Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
from the present. It is of a fundamentally different nature Ȯ iȱȱǱȱȁȱ·ȱȱ
                                                        
74 ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁ	ȱȱȱ ȱȱ
memory, an awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of profound and infinite multiplicity. And this is 
ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱŗşŚǰȱǯ xvii.26). In his editorial commentary, Henry Chadwick explains: 
ȁMemoria ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȃ¢Ȅǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
doctrine of anamnesis, explaining the experience of learning as bringing to consciousness what, from an 
earlier existence, the soul already knows. But Augustine develops the notion of memory by associating it 
with the unconscious [...], with self-awareness, and so with the human yearning for true happiness found 
¢ȱȱ ȱ	ȂȱǻȱŗşşŞǱȱŗŞśǰȱȱŗŘǼǯȱȱǻŗŜřŘ-1704) famously reasserts the importance 
of memory with respect to personal awareness and identity (1997: Book II, chap. 27). 
75 Unless otherwise indicated, citations from Bergson in this section are from Matière et mémoire. 
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consiste pas du tout dans une régression du présent au passé, mais au contraire dans 
ȱ¸ȱȱ·ȱȱ·ǯȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ³ȱȂ·Ȃȱ
(b: 369). Human subjectivity cannot be objectified in the present moment because la 
durée not only relates to the instant in which I find myself, but is also layered with the 
past memories I have accumulated, any of which might be triggered in response to my 
present actions. Bergson therefore declareǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂǰȱ





is also able to suggest how the mind (of la durée) and the body (of present action) are 
related: 




une distinction spatiale nous substituons une distinction temporelle. [...] entre 
ȱ¸ȱȱȱȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ y a toutes les intensités possibles de la 
mémoire [...]. Dans la première hypothèse, celle qui exprime la distinction de 
ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ





But ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ-present dualism, criticiziȱȱȱȁ-
ȂȱȱȂȱsouvenir pur. ȁCertainement cȂȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
pas du tout mon passé qui mȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 
177), he asserts on 6 March 1919.77 According to Marcel, memories are not immanent 
and carried around in their original form as if they were, in some sense, fixed, eternal 
                                                        
76 ȁȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻb: 858). 
77 See also JM: 189. 
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ȁȂȱȱȱ. To speak in such a way, he contends, is pure abstraction. On 10 
December 1918 he writes: 
Il y a un sens où ce que nous appelons un événement est une vérité éternelle 
(un ensemble de jugements qui se croisent); et en ce sens-là il serait absurde 
ȱȱȱǯȱȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȮ de ce sur 
quoi le temps mord. [...] le souvenir immobile de Bergson est pure abstraction, il 




never experienced as such, nor for that matter ȱȱȱǻȱǼǱȱȁla 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱ·ǲȱle est tout 
imprégnée des souvenirs-ȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȂ·Ȃȱǻb: 276); and 
¢Ǳȱȁȱȱǰȱ·ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ·¸Ȃȱǻb: 276). As a 
consequence, we tend to confuse the two notions,79 conceiving of their differences in 
terms of intensity rather than nature: 
ȂȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱ
Ȃ·ǰȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱǰȱȱȱeption pure et le 
souvenir. Nos perceptions sont sans doute imprégnées de souvenirs, et 
ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱùȱȱȂ¸ǯȱȱ¡ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ
pénètrent donc toujours, échangent toujours quelque chose de leur substances 
ȱȱ·¸ȱȂǯȱǽǯǯǯȱǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ
perception plus faible, on méconnaît la différence essentielle qui sépare le 
passé du présent. 
(b: 214) 
 
This confusion iȱȱȱȁon tient la perception pour une espèce de 
ǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂȱȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
···ǱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
réel, on ne la rendȱȱ¥ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱǷȂȱǻb: 215-16). In fact, because 
we are creatures of action, our perception is necessarily motivated Ȯ that is, partial; 
                                                        
78 See also EA: I, 44, 160-61; PI: 46, 54-56 (p. 56 references Bergson). 
79 Ȃ distinction between time and space might, then, be mapped directly onto that between memory 
and perception, since ǰȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ




Ȃ¡·ȱȂȱǻb: 213). For Bergson, therefore, consciousness is in a constant 
tension between the present and the past, where our experience of la durée (the 
collective totality of our temporal life) can both contract and focus on more immediate 
concerns, and dilate, so as to reach back to moments in the past. Thus, our everyday 
experience is of neither le souvenir pur nor la perception, but rather of ȁle souvenir-
imageȂ,80 which is a mixture of (past) memories and (present) perceptions that relate to 
our actions.81 As a result, Bergson argues, the past (our memories of which accumulate 
layer upon layer) and the present co-exist in us and compete for our attention, creating 
an eternal dialectic of (temporal) movement between them.82 
 
Nevertheless, this account does not satisfy Marcel, who rejects the idea of le souvenir 
pur ȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
[...] le souvenir eȱ¥ȱǻȂȱȂȱȂȱȱǼȂȱǻJM: 130), he writes on 13 
April 1916. Marcel interprets Bergson as presenting memory as a kind of directory, 
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱ£ȱ
Bergson les souvenirs purs eux-mêmes ne tendent pas à constituer un répertoire? Tout 
ȱ¸ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ¥ȂȱǻJM: 176; 6 March 1919). He, on the other hand, 
is strictly opposed to ȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱǱȱȱ
ǰȱȂ en réalité revivre (selon certaines modalités) et non pas extraire une 
                                                        
80 See especially b: 276. 
81 Pȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȂȱǻǼȱȱȱ
the context of recollection, that is, on the interaction between present circumstances and memory traces. 
ȱǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȁȱȱȱmory at the moment one needs it, rather than merely 
ȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŗşşşǱȱŜǼǯȱȱȱȱ(1996). 
82 ȁall the doublings or dualisms in Bergson derive from the coexistence of the past with the presentȂȱǻ  
2003: 55). L ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱMatière et mémoire (on which 
it is specifically focused) that I have encountered. 
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ȂȱǻJM: 163; 22 February 1919; my emphasis).83 In fact, Marcel seems to have 
misunderstood Bergson, as Bergson explicitly rejects such a reading (e.g. b: 298-90, 
856-57). But this is not important for the purposes of this particular section (it will be 
returned to in the conclusion to Part I). What is important is to understand what 
Marcel suggests in place ȱȂȱ¢. 
 
Over and above the practical realm of action to which Bergson relates memory, 
memory, in Marcel, bears witness to values.84 Conservation of the past, argues Marcel 
in the second part of the JournalǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȂ-ce 
ȱȂ¹ȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱussi à la rigueur être conçu 
ȱ·ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȂȱȂȱȱȱȂȱ
¥ȱȱȂȱǻJM: 147; 10 December 1918). It is the act of valuing, he continues, 
 ȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȂ·ȱȱȱique celles de sauvegarde et 
ȱȂȱǻJM: 147). Rather than proposing a dialectic between (past) memory and 
(present) perception then, Marcel argues that the ontological structure of memories is 
itself dialectical, and crucially, he describes this experience in terms of a tension 
between the temporally finite and the eternal. 
 
Indeed, aspects of my life can appear to me as either finite, contingent, and fleeting, or 
as necessary and eternal: that which is inconsequential to me I view as finite and 
contingent; anything that is of genuine consequence, on the other hand, cannot be 
interpreted as such, since it continues to appear, in some sense, necessary to me. 
Objects,85 for Marcel, are not therefore Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
83 See also EA: I, 160-61; JM: 164, 176, 197, 242-44. 
84 ȁȱ·ȱȱȱǯȱ·ȱȱ·ǯȱȂȱȱȂȱȱ-elle pas 
Ȃ¹ȱȱ¹ȱȱȱ·ǵȂȱ(EA: I, 120; 7 October 1932). 
85 Or things which have been objectified. Here it is possible to relate the ontological dialectic of memory to 
the hermeneutical dialectic between (objectifying) réflexion primaire and (recuperative) réflexion seconde Ȯ for 
Marcel, the latter dialectic is instructive with respect to the former. 
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se conserve ǲȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 147). And 
this is because of their passive rigidity Ȯ a rigidity that Marcel attributes to memories 
in Bergson, and considers to be the downfall of his analysisǱȱȁȱȱȱȱ
BergȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 150; 10 December 1918). That 
which does survive in memory, however, rises above the temporal order of finitude to 
ȱȱȱ¢ǱȱȁȂ¡·ȱ·ȱȂ-t-elle pas la négation 
effectiȱȱ·ȱȱǵȂȱǻJM: 130; 2 April 1916). So, rather than interpreting 
memories as purely past, Marcel recognizes memories only insofar as they continue to 
be lived Ȯ in spite of the threat of loss Ȯ as necessary or eternal to me in the present 
(this could be either positive, as something valuable, or negative, as trauma or loss).86 
ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ¢Ȃȱ ǰȱȱ
itself in response to the obstacles that challenge it,87 in order to re-assert itself ȱȁ¢Ȃȱ
present in spite of the changing flux and finitude of time.88 
 
M¢Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ89 also has a further significance for Marcel, which is 
equally fundamental to understanding his opposition to Bergson: memory is 
identified with the affirmation of a spiritual realm: 
ȱȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǽǳǾȱ
ȱȂ¹ȱ·ǯȱȱȱȱȱǵȱ-a-t-il vraiment un 
sens où on puisse traiter le souvenir comme un élément ou un agrégat 
susceptible de ȱ·ǵȱȱȱȂȱȱÉȱȂȱ··ȱȱ




ȱ¢ȱǲȱȱȂȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱable of surviving 
loss or dispersion are communal values (and again, these may be positive or negative), 
                                                        
86 ȁȱȱȱȱȱ¡·ȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱ¢ȂȱǻJM: 149; 10 December 1918); ȁȱ·ȱȂest pas 
·ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻEA: I, 161; 7 February 1933). 
87 ȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱùȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ-
¹ȂȱǻJM: 150; 10 December 1918). 
88 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱ·ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱȱȱȂȱǻ 1973b: 376). 
89 ȁȂ·ȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǻJM: 151; 18 December 1918). 
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which ground an underlying intersubjective relation between all individuals. In order 
to be recognized as such, though, ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȂ 
threat. It is then only through a form of collective revolt that the threat of destruction 
can be overcome: ȁȱȱȱȱÉȱȮ à tort ou à raison Ȯ comme 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱǱȱȂ seulement, 
croyons-nous, communémentǰȱȱȱ³ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ·ǰȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱǻJM: 149; my emphasis).90 
Hence, Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱconfirms the importance of intersubjectivity for 
his philosophy, previously suggested by certain remarks cȱȂȱ
presentation of intuition and music. 
 
For Marcel, then, ȱȁȂȱ¡ȱȱǰȱ ȱits constant threat of loss, 
degradation, or dispersion, is an incitement for transcendence Ȯ not only of that which 
is finite and contingent, but also of the division between the self and others. And this 
then raises the dialectic of existence he affirms to another level, where its tension is 
between time and (a more essential notion of) eternity. Bergson, on the other hand, 
categorically refused any notion of going beyond the time of la durée, toward an 
eternity that was conceived to be more authentic. Hence, it seems difficult to support 
TsukadaȂȱ that the conceptions of eternity in Bergson and Marcel are 
akin,91 for although, as section one observed, Marcel appeared to agree with Bergson 
about how human existence should be characterized, his metaphysics of time has 
emerged to be quite different, and appears to interlink with a notion of eternity that 
Bergson would in fact oppose. For Bergson, time is in itself something eternal, and the 
source of authentic Being. Authenticity in Marcel, on the other hand, is always spoken 
of in terms of eternity; the (temporal) immediate is merely presented as the starting 
                                                        
90 Marcel also compares this aspect of memory with telepathy (e.g. JM: 168; EA: I, 120). 
91 See p. 33. 
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point for transcendence Ȯ that which makes us realize we are something more.92 But as 
a consequence, it has been suggested, the consistency of the position he secures 
against Bergson might be questioned: if he insists that philosophy engage with the 
temporality of the here and now, and that it recognize a tragic dialectic in the lived 
reality of existence, is he not actually contradicting his project by privileging such an 
eternal present? ȁȂ-ce qui compte premièrement et principalement pour [ce] 
ȱȱȂ¡ȂǰȱThành Tri Lê ǰȱȁȂ¡ȱȱȱȂ¡ȱ
·ȱȱȂ¹ǵȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ·Ȃȱǻ1961: 198).
                                                        
92 ȁȱ¹ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱȄȂȱǻJM: 194-95; 
4 July 1919). 
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Chapter Two: Phenomenological Time 
 
Chapter One highlighted MarcelȂȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
ȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ
 ǰȱȂȱ
philosophy emerged as very different from that of Bergson and, as such, was 
suggested to be problematic: it appeared to subordinate time to an eternal present, 
and this seemed at odds with his assertions concerning (temporal) ¡Ȃȱ
dynamic, dialectical nature. This potentially problematic relation between time and 
eternity was ideȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ Journal (January-May 1914), before 
his thought evolved in reaction against his idealist leanings. But strangely, in spite of 
his subsequent vow to ground his philosophy in concrete human reality, the 
presentation of time remained unaffected in the second half (1915-23). Although 
Ȃ encounter with Bergson had been pivotal in stimulating the reconfiguration 
of his philosophical approach, his ensuing efforts to differentiate his newly reformed 
philosophy from BȂȱȱȱ ȱed, in fact, only to reinforce his 
affirmation of an authentic eternal realm. 
 
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ
ȱȂ comparison of memory in the two philosophies, which revealed 
Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱ ȱeternal 
values that in some sense surpassed time. Marcel, here, referred to time only in terms 
of contingency and finitude; he did not understand it as the eternal motion Bergson 
proposed. And it was in relation to this contingency and finitude that he postulated an 
eternal present, allowing him to testify to foundational values, via ¢Ȃ 
dialectical experience, as well as to an underlying unity between the self and others. 
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Thus, a desire to affirm Being as intersubjective, and its temporal experience as 
dialectical, emerged as the driving force behind MȂ break from Bergson; these 
two motivations were ȱȱȂȱȱof both BergȂȱȱȱ
memory, and his (more general) description of la durée. Such points of contention 
remained central to Ȃ philosophy as he continued to shape his reappraised 
position Ȯ with intersubjectivityȂȱ, in particular, coming to the fore. This 
chapter therefore engages with Ȃs ȁȂȱch in more depth, and 
examines the way in which he defends his position in order to establish whether his 
presentation of time might still be justified. As will be seen, this raises questions about 
ȱȂȱreading of time in Marcel. The first section suggests that Ȯ contrary to 
Bergson Ȯ it is a mistake ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
terms, despite his clear interest in the metaphysics of Being. His ȁȂȱinterest in 
time is instead revealed to be phenomenological; he is not philosophizing about time 
itself. And yet, as begins ȱȱȱȱȂ second section, this argument may 
not be sufficient to absolve Marcel from ȱȂȱȱȱ¢, for a 
difficult relation nonetheless exists between his phenomenological interest in time and 
the broader ontological concern of his philosophy Ȯ a difficulty that is made 
particularly apparent in his arguments for intersubjectivity. The final section will then 
continue to debate the coherence ȱȂs overall project, and in so doing, move on 
to discuss the ethical dimension to his thought. 
 
2.1 The Irrelevance of Time? 
 
In the first part of the Journal, Marcel makes an argument that has the potential to 
exonerate him ȱȱȂȱ: his ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ. 
According to this, there can be no genuine conflict between time and eternity in his 
work because, he states, he is not actually concerned with time (or indeed eternity) as 
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such. The argument begins, on 13 January 1914, by questioning the very intelligibility 
of the idea of time Ȯ more specifically, by observing how beginnings can be attributed 
to things within time, but not, curiously, ȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱ ·ǲȱǽǳǾȱȱȱ-même, comme 
ȱ·ǰȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱǻJM: 8). One could try to make sense of this perplexity by interpreting the idea of 
time as something which exists outside of temporality; and yet, Marcel notes, such a 
ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǱȱȁȱȱ-il 
¹ȱ·ȱ·ȱȱȱ·ǵȱȱȂ·ȱ·ȱȱǰȱ·ȱȱ
ǵȂȱ(JM: 8). Thus, concludes Marcel on 14 January, we should not attempt to define 
the nature of time ȱǰȱȱǱȱȁȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǯ Instead, he states in 
Kantian fashion:1 ȁLe temps est une condition formelle sous laquelle des objets 
ȱȱ¹ȱ·ǰȱȱȂȱȱ-même un objet. Le problème est insoluble 
ȱȂȱȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 8).2 
 
Marcel further supports this conclusion by refuting both realist and idealist theories of 
time, both of which recognize a distinction between the way in which time appears to 
us in our experience and time in itself, and aim to account for this dualism. In 
realismȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱs what appears to us. Hence: ȁȱ¢ȱȱ
·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱȂȱǻJM: 8). However, Marcel observes, 
                                                        
1 In the ȁTranscendental AestheticȂ of his Critique of Pure Reasonǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱa priori formal 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱŗŜřǼȱȮ that is, a necessary condition of sensibility which, along 
with space, makes experience of the world possible in the first place, by providing a structural framework 
through which all other sensory experiences can be individuated and thus interpreted. For this reason: 
ȁȱȱȱȱȱ ȱsubsist for itself or attach to thingȱȱȱȱȂȱǻǯǼǯȱ
ȁȱȱonly of objective validity in regard to appearances, because these are already things that we take as 
objects of our senses; but it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sensibility of our intuition, thus 
from that kind of representation that is peculiar to us, and speaks of things in general. Time is therefore 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻǼȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱ
(1998: 181). 
2 See also Parain-Ȃȱȱȱȱŗşŝřȱ ȱ ȱȱand Simonne Plourde (1976: 200-01). 
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ȁon ne peut inférer directement du caractère formel du temps son caractère 
apparent [; ...] iȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱȱ·ȱu 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 9). And consequently, such a position fails to 
resolve the ȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȂȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱexperience of time and 
time itself is not immediately apparentǱȱȁȱ·ȱǻ·Ǽȱ[à ce dualisme] claire 
pour le temps est au contraire très obscure ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 9). 
Marcel thus turns to idealism to consider its alternative proposition Ȯ namely, that the 
world is, in itself, atemporal, and the experience of time simply an imperfect 
conception of such atemporality that results from ȂȱǱ 
ȱȱ¢ȱȂ·ȱȱȱÉȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
véritable est hors du temps; et que les contradictions auxquelles nous nous 
ȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ
réalité elle-même (en soi) intemporelle. La subjectivité du temps servira 
Ȃ¡ǲȱȱȱȱȂȱ¥ȱȱȱȂnfirmité de notre conscience finie 
que nous ne pouvons saisir cette réalité que temporellement. 
(JM: 9) 
 
However, this still does not elucidate the relation between the phenomenality of time 
and time itselfǱȱȁȱǽǳǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱe temps et de ce qui est 
ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȂȱȂȱȱȱ¡ȱȂȱǻJM: 
10; 15 January 1914). And so, Marcel concludes, since neither theory is capable of 
accounting for this dualism on a metaphysical level, ȁȱalisme ne doit et ne peut 
¹ȱ³ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 12). 
 
Returning to the question of the ideality of time on 16 January, Marcel therefore 
affirms that it is not his concern to philosophize about what time is: 









For this reason, Marcel situates himself in explicit opposition to Hegel (1770-1831), 
whose philosophical dialectic Ȯ he alleges Ȯ institutes a temporal hierarchy that judges 
certain historical moments as ontol¢ȱȁȂȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ
relation to historical progress as a whole. Marcel, on the other hand, has no interest in 
making such judgements about the ontological status of temporal moments; he does 
not believe it is even possible for philosophy to make this kind of judgement: 
ȱ·ȱǽǳǾȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ¥ȱ
Ȃ¢ǰȱȱ·¸ȱȱȱǰȱ mêmes inapplicables à ce 
ǯȱȱȂ··ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ
·ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǰȱȂȱȱȱǱȱles problèmes 
métaphysiques ne peuvent se poser que dans un ordre où il est fait abstraction de tout 
rapport [...] du temps. 
(JM: 12) 
 
Rather, his concern is with the way in which the possibilities of (philosophical) 
affirmation change according to point of view, and thus he is interested in 
investigating what the process of reflecting on time reveals about reflection itself: 
ȱ¸ȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱǽǳǾ pas le progrès synthétique hégelien 
ǽǳǾǰȱȂȱȱ¸ȱȂȱ·¡ȱȱȱȱȱǯ 
Alors que le progrès défini à la façon hégélienne prétend nécessairement avoir 
une signification ontologique, mais que par là même se trouve soulevée la 
ȱȱǻȱȂȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱǼȱȱȱ
réalité indépendante des moments inférieures Ȯ la dialectique telle que je la 
conçois étant purement idéale, portant exclusivement sur des modes 
Ȃǰȱȱȱ·ȱǰȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ
heurte pas à cette difficulté. 
(JM: 12-13) 
 
Here, Marcel ȱȱ ¢ȱȂȱposition; again, this is too dualistic. As he writes, 
a little later, on 13 February: 
Ȃ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȂ¡·ǰȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
fond, a ce défaut de paraître tout au moins invinciblement dualistique. Il me 
ÉȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱêtre infléchie. Il faut 
admettre que la pensée (la raison) ne se constitue comme pensée pour elle-
¹ȱȂȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¡·ǯȱȱȱȱȱ
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pas être entendu en un sens purement psychologique [...]; ceci veut dire [... 
ȂȱǾȱȱȱ·ȱ·ȱȂ¡·ȱȱȱȱ·ȱ
·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȂȱ¡·ȱúȱ
réalisée. Il faut comprendre que la pensée ne se connaît et ne se saisit que dans 




In ȱȁȱȱȂȱȱMarcel is not simply arguing, like Kant, that 
reflection relates only to things as they appear to us (phenomena), rather than to things 
in themselves (noumena).4 Marcel also believes that reflection itself has different modes, 
and that things appear differently to us according to the kind(s) of object that each 
mode of reflection is disposed to recognize. This ȁȱȂȱ·¡ȱȱ
Ȃ·¸ȱ¥ȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱ··ȂȱǻJM: 13) can still be 
instructive and allow for progress, Marcel insists, ȱȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱ
objet lui apparaît à elle-même comme différent suivant la façon dont elle conçoit 
ȂȂȱǻJM: 13). And crucially, it has the advantage of avoiding commitment to an 
appearance-reality dualismǱȱȁAlléguera-t-on enfin la difficulté de comprendre le 
rapport de la dialectique au temps? mais [sic] cette difficulté est précisément nulle, 




                                                        
3 See also JM: 105. 
4 ȱȱȱȁ·Ȃǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
transcendental sense; it is clearly not meant in the strong philosophical sense, as Marcel has just declared 
such an idealist position to be inadequate. 
5 It is not clear who Marcel is quoting here. Possibly, it is a reference to Russell (1872-1970), who, around the 
same period of time, was writing and lecturing on the irrelevance of time for philosophy and theoretical 
science (Marcel at least had some familiarity with him, as he refers to him in EA: II, 9-10 and RI: 88). In his 
ŗşŗŚȱ¢ȱȁ¢ȱȱȂǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
than theoretical, rather in relation to our desires than in relation to truth. [...] to realise the unimportance of 
ȱȱȱȱȱ ȂȱǻŗşŘśǱȱŘŗ-ŘŘǼǯȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŗśȱǼȱȱȱ
declaredǱȱȁȱȱ-embracing time, like the one all-ȱǰȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŘśǱȱŗŚŗǲȱȱȱ
ŗŜŝǼǲȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŗŘȱǼǰȱȱ ȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ
the time may be extended to all scientific laws. In fact we might interpreȱȱȃ¢ȱȱȄȱȱ
meaning just this, that no scientific law involves time as an argument, unless, of course, it is given in an 
integrated form, in which case lapse ȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ®ȂȱǻŗşŘśǱȱ
205). 
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ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȂȱȱ, then, it is as something 
understood objectively in a direct ontological sense. Passages in the Journal which 
reject time should therefore be understood as making a statement about the way in 
which it is proper to conceive of ourselves in reflection, not as claiming the ontological 
transcendence of the self over time.6 Indeed, in a diary entry on 9 January Marcel 
argues against a purely temporal understanding of self because he considers this to be 
detrimental to human action. For Marcel, to think and act for oneself requires an 
unmediated form of self-reflexivity, a relation that transcends any division between 
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱǻȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂ¹Ǽȱȱȱ¸ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻJM: 6). Thinking of oneself 
as temporally bound makes the self appear contingent and thus invites passivity, 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱǻǼȱȱȱ
causation. And this then encourages a dualistic understanding of self where matter 
and mind ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱworld 
and thereby compromising Ȃȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȁȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ
ȱǻȂ-à-dirȱȱ··ȱ¥ȱȂǼȂ, Marcel insists.7 ȁeci revient à 
dire que je dois me penser comme voulu par un acte intemporel qui est lié à moi-
¹ȱȱ·ȂǲȱȁǽȂ·ȱȱ-¹Ǿȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱ
ȂȱǻJM: 6).8 
                                                        
6 MȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŞȱ¢ȱŗşŗŚǰȱ ȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ
ȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȂ¥ȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
immédiat à une conscience (au moins posée comme possible). Comme on peut concevoir une multiplicité de 
façons dont un même objet (un même contenu) pourrait être donné à la conscience dans un rapport 
·ǰȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ
Ȃ·ȂȱǻJM: 18; see also 179-80). 
ȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
(published 1918) is likely to have consolidated his thoughts on temporal experience and intentionality, 
while reinforcing his opposition to a higher eternal reality (MR: 118-30, 229-32). 
7 See also JM: 256. Sartre (2004) also establishes the (free) self against contingency, in terms of its lived 
(phenomenological) awareness of its being in time. 
8 See also JM: 105, 108-09. Here Marcel analyses time as a mode of exteriority that compromises authentic 
self-understanding, concluding that although it is a necessary starting point for reflection, the temporal 
must be transcended for an authentic conception of self (Ȃ; la pensée pureǼǯȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱe 
ȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¸ȱȱȱ·ȱȱ
·ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱȱǯȱȱȂȱȱȱnable de concevoir au principe de la vie quelque chose qui 
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As his philosophy became more established, Marcel began to express his argument for 
the irrelevance of time in terms of a phenomenological interest. In the discussion 
following ȱŗşŜŝȱȱȁȱȱȱȂǰȱfor example, Marcel underlines his 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȱ·ȱ··Ȃȱas 
opposȱȱȁȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȂ (Hersch and Poirier 1967: 25). 
ȱȁ¢Ȃȱ ȱȱǻ¡¢Ǽȱȱ¢ȱ
ǰȱthe application of 
the term is now much wider. As Moran explains, ȁȱȱȱ
understood in its broadest terms includes not just the work of Husserl, but also the 
work of many original practitioners of phenomenology, who did not feel bound to 

Ȃȱ¢ȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŘǼǯ One such practitioner was Heidegger, who denied 
that it was possible to provide, as Husserl attempted to do, a pure (formal) description 
ȱ ȱȁȂǰȱȱȱȱȱǻWesen) or fundamental ontological categories 
underlying the experience of consciousness.9 ȁȱ¡ȱȃ¢Ȅȱ
signifies primarily a methodological conception [as opposed to a philosophy in itself]Ȃ, 
asserts Heidegger in the introduction to Being and Time (1962: 50); and ȁȱȱȱ
phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. [...] The 
phenomenology of Dasein10 is a hermeneuticȂ (1962: 61-62). Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ
(temporal) lived experience is similarly hermeneutical. ȁȱȱȂ·ǰȱȂȱȱ
·ȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂ¡·ȱȱ-entend 
ȱ³ȱȂȱȂǰȱȱexplained ȱȱȱ ȱȁȱȱȱȂ, 
adding that if he had ȱȱȱȱȁȂ-ȱȱȱǵȂ, it waȱȁparce que 






9 In Ideas I ǻŗşŗřǼǰȱ
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşřŗǱȱŚŜǼǰȱȱȱ
Draft A of his Encylopædia Britannica ǰȱȁ¢ȂȱǻŗşŘŝǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ¢ȱȱ-
reflection at its most original and its most uȂǰȱ ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȱȱ






ȱȱȂȱǻHersch and Poirier 1967: 28). In fact, one might compare HeidȂȱ
opposition to Husserl with Ȃȱȱȱȱǰȱfor this can also 
be seen to perform a Husserlian ȁȱreductionȂ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȁȂȱthe 
ȱ ¢ǰȱȁral standpointȂ of the moi superficiel, in order to gain pure 
consciousness, via a form of intuition, of the essential being of the moi profond. For 
Marcel (versus Bergson) and Heidegger (versus Husserl), on the other hand, Being 
cannot be accessed so directlyǱȱȁȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂǰȱ Heidegger 
ǻŗşŜŘǱȱŚşǼȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱto return ȱȱȁthingsȂȱȱȁ 
Ȃ (1931: 256).11 Whereas Husserlian intentionality12 analyses the object-
directedness of consciousness, Marcel (as section two will demonstrate in more detail) 
and Heidegger understand Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ to something 
broader and more existential. ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃǰȱȱ
Heidegger. ȁhese entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being 
[, ǳȱand thus ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǾȱȱȱȱȃȱȄȂȱǻŗşŜŘǱȱŜŝǼǯ For both 
Marcel and Heidegger, each of us is already in the midst of Being.13 This is the reason 
they believe an indirect, pre-ontological study of Ȃȱ¡ȱȱȱ ȱȱ
necessary for any ontology.14 As a result, their phenomenologies of time present lived 
reality as continual interpretation rather than discoverable essence,15 and, as David 
                                                        
11 See also Husserl 1931: 82-Şřǰȱȗŗşǯȱ
ǰȱȱ	ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȁȂǰȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂǯ 
12 Husserl argues that all mental acts are c£ȱ¢ȱȁ¢Ȃǰȱȱ ǻ ȱȂȱ
ȁȱ¢¢ȂǼȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱǰȱȱȱer directed toward itself, 
but is rather alwa¢ȱȱȁȂ something, that is, it is always directed toward an object in the world 
(1931: 120, §36). 
13 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȂȱ³ȱ··ǰȱà partir de lui que 
ȱȂȱǻPI: 171; 7 May 1943). 
14 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱy the primary entity to be 
interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking 
about when we ask this question. But in that case the question of Being is nothing other than the 
radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself Ȯ the pre-ontological 
ȱȱȂȱǻ
ȱŗşŜŘǱȱřśǼǯ 
15 ȁ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱtime as its 




Wood writes of Heidegger, are ȁentially participatory [, ... treating] subjects both as 
embodied Ȯ ȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȱ ȄȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱřŘŜǼǰȱȱȱ 
ȁthe most basic temporal patterns affecting us are not those that organize the 
persisting objects around us, but those that involve our actions and our self-
understaȱȱȱȂȱǻ1989: 326-27).16 
 
ȱȂȱchallenge to MarceȂȱȱ¢ thus seems misplaced. 
Although Marcel agreed with Bergson that synchrony reduced time to space, and 
thereby failed to reflect lived reality, he did not believe that Bergson was justified in 
speaking of ontology so directly. In Marcel, therefore, reflection Ȯ indeed, philosophy 
itself Ȯ is what is in motion; it is on this indirect, pre-ontological level that he wished 
to speak of time. Having now established this, section two will proceed to examine 
Ȃȱapproches concrètes in greater detail, so as to analyse his discourse on time 
further. Particular attention will be paid to his affirmation of intersubjectivity, since 
this was the other major factor motivating his break from Bergson. 
 
2.2 Approches concrètes 
 
Ȃȱapproches concrètes are pivotal to the position he establishes post-World War I, 
which aims to restore philosophical weight to human existence in all its lived 
experience.17 The ȱȁȱ¸Ȃȱs first employed in the 1933 lecture 
ȁȱȱȱ¸ȱȱ¢¸ȱȂȱȮ Ȃȱȱȱ
attempt at outlining (and in so doing, consolidating) his position following the 
                                                        






experiences can be traced in his diaries. See especially EA: I, 149; JM: 202. 
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evolution he identifies in his thought.18 Thereafter, Marcel continues to characterize 
his work in this way, and, in a 1961 William James Lecture, he describes the 1933 
ȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻDH: 94).19 It is only 
through an engagement with reality as lived, he insists, that one can begin to reveal 
the actual nature of Being. As a result, phenomenological method becomes pivotal to 
his reformed philosophy: ȁȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ le plan 
··ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ȂȱǻGM: 87), he 
remarked to Boutang in 1970.20 In one of the 1949 Gifford Lectures (ȁȂ¡ȱȱ
ȂǼǰȱtherefore, the purpose of which was to clarify the central themes and 
trajectory of his work,21 Marcel underlined the importance of situating his 
ȱȱȁȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ¸ȱ·Ȃȱ
(ME I: 49), explaining, in another ǻȁ·¡ȱȱȱ·¡ȱǱȱȱ¸ȱ
existentiȂǼ,  ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȁdes exemples les plus simples 
ȱȱȱȱȱ·¡ȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱǻME I: 91). 
Furthermore, he argued at the beginning of the 1950 Gifford ȱǻȱȁȂ-ce que 
Ȃ¹ǵȂǼ, the more ȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱ
be in a position to understand othersȂȱ: ȁȱȱȱȂ·¸ȱ¥ȱȱȱ
ȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ¡·ǰȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂ·ȱ¥ȱ
une compréheȱȱȂǰȱȱȂ¡·ȱȂȂȱǻME II: 10). This is not 
simply a matter of empathy. Rather, the more I engage with the reality of my own 
experience, the more I will recognize the absurdity of any attempt to dissociate my 
being from that of others: ȁLa croyance à la solitude est la première illusion à dissiper, 
le premier obstacle à vaincre Ȯ ȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱ¥ȱȂȱ
                                                        
18 ȁȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ
spirituelle qui se poursuit à travers le JournalȂȱǻHP: 192). 
19 See, in addition, EC: 151-52, where he states that it was also from this point onward that he came to regard 
ȱȱȱȁ¡Ȃǯ 
20 See also ME I: 70. 
21 ȱȂȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱêȱ¸re dans une 
¸ȱ·ǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȂȱ··ȂȱǻME I: 10). 
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(EA: II, 53), he stated in the 1934 lecture ȁ·¡ȱȱȱȂ; ȁéfuter [...] la position 
ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂȱǻPI: 146), he reasserts in his diary on 13 April 1943.22 
 
So, according to Marcel, my being is not only incarnate (grounded in the world) but 
also intersubjective:23 ȁȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȂȱǻGM: 
87), he affirmed in an interview with Boutang. And this inextricable link between 
myself and others ȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȱ¡Ȃǰȱhe argues, which is 
¡ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ¡ǯ As he 
declared in ȱȱȱȁȂ
ȱȱȱȱ·-supposés 
¡Ȃ (published 1968): ȁȂȱ¡ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱ¥ȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȂȱ¡ȱȂȱǻPST: 68). More 
specifically, this section will show, these structural conditions are temporal. In 
Ȃȱ¢ȱnot only is time crucial for self-understandingǲȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱdiscrete, 
isolatable entity. Before demonstrating this specifically, however, it will be necessary 
to introduce some further details concerning Ȃȱphilosophy in general. 
 
Having distinguished his position from that of Bergson, Marcel situates his reoriented 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
primary counterpoint.24 More specifically, he situates the (non-objective) indubitable 
feeling expressed by his assurance existentielle in opposition to the (objective) certainty 
of self ȱ¢ȱȂȱcogito. ȁȱȱ¹ȱȱȱǰȱȱ
puis-je être assuré que je suis? ȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ
                                                        
22 See also Marcel (1976: 17). 
23 In a diary entry dated 22 November 1928, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ·ȱȱȱȱ
·¢ȂȱǻEA: I, 11). Intersubjectivity is emphasized increasingly after this point as the full-blown 
implication of incarnation, though Marcel did not actually use this term until his Gifford Lectures (DH: 61). 
On intersubjectivity as foundation in his thought, see for example EC: 112-14. 
24 ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱǯȱ
 , this opposition becomes all the more 
pronounced once Marcel has distanced himself from Bergson. 
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naturellement, je pense que sur ce plan le cogito ȱȱȱ¹ȱȂȱȂȱ
(HP: 201-02), asserted Marcel in ȁȱȱȂ. Marcel does not object to the 
ȱȁȱȂǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȂȱȱȱ
challenges Ȯ ȱȁȂȱȱȁȂȱȱȱǯ25 For Marcel, dogmatic conclusions such 
ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȂȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ǱȱȁȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¹ȱ[sicǾȂȱǻJM: 97), he 
writes in the Journal on 20 April 1914.26 To deduce my existence so analytically Ȯ that is 
to say, impersonally Ȯ is to distance myself from the reality of my existence, the 
experience of which is nothing but personal, and thus its nature cannot be reduced to 
any (generic) universal truth. The most fundamental indubitable with which we are 
confronted, Marcel contends, is not the truth of the cogito but ȱȱǱȱȁȱ
ȱǻȱ·ǼȱȱȂȱǻJM: 131), he asserts on 4 May 1914.27 
He therefore argues that ȱȱȱȂȱ¡ȱȱfrom an 
underlying fȱȱȁȂ, as opposed to anything that can be affirmed by a 
ȱȂȱ. ȁȂȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂǰȱȱ¡ȱȱȱŗşśŖȱ	ȱ
ȱȁ¡ȱȱ¹Ȃǰ ȁȱȂexistantǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱȱȱ·ré non seulement 
en tant que corps, en tant que chose corporelle, mais en tant que mien, ou encore en 
tant que présence massive et globalement éprouvée qui ne se laisse par conséquent pas 
·ȂȱǻME II: 27; my emphasis). If Marcel opposed the way in which Descartes 
responded to his discovery of self- ȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
25 ȁJe suis; voilà une affirmation qui ne se fonde sur rien, mais qui par définition exclut tout fondement, qui, 
··ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǲȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱ-¹ȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşŝŗǱȱŗřŚǼǯ 
26 ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱmented, from the very beginning Marcel exhibited 
ȱȱȁ·ȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱȂ·ȂȱǻŗşřŗǱȱŗśř; see for example JM: 196, 215). The primacy of 
existence (in its modified sense) over objectivity can be considered the main conclusion of the Journal. 
ȁ¡ȱȱ·Ȃ then confirms the importance of this for Marcel, asserting ȁȱ·ȱȱȱ
Ȃ¡ȂȱǻJM: 319). 
27 In a 1949 Gifford Lecture ǻȁ·¡ȱȱȱ·¡ȱȂǼȱȱȱȱȱ  tempted to 
propose an alternative to the cogito: ȁsentio, ergo sumȂ. But he then retracted the suggestion, rejecting the 
¡ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȃȂ¡ȄȱȱȂȱȱ·ǲȱȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȂȱǻME I: 105). 
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the selfȂȱeality, then, his reaction was Ȯ more fundamentally Ȯ a critique of what he 
felt was a lack of engagement with Being as it is experienced and lived. 
 
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ 
ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȁȂǰ28 led him to conclude that mind and body were 
composed of two different substances Ȯ res cogitans and res extensa Ȯ that were 
absolutely distinct; the self (le moi; le je)  ȱ¢ȱȱȁȱȂȱǰȱȱ
introspection revealed this with a certainty not attributable to the body, the mind was, 
by its very nature, separate and more immediately knowable than the body. However, 
echoing an earlier argument made by Nietzsche, Marcel maintains in ȁ¡ȱȱ
·ȂȱǻŗşŘśǼȱthat ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ
ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱquelque chose ȱ¸ȱȂ¡Ǳȱȱ··ǰȱ¡ȱȱse 
¡ȱȱȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 311).29 In fact, as Marcel 
argued as early as 27 January 1914, one has only to examine the cogito itself to see that 
it is its own proof that Cartesian dualism does not accurately understand the nature of 
existence:30 
Nous avons vu que le je pense pouvait se convertir en une forme, nous avons 
même nié la légitimité de cette conversion. Mais le fait même que cette 
ȱȱȱȱȱǽǳǾǯȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ
par Ȃ·ȱȂȱ·ȱǰȱȱȱje pense et la matière 
ǰȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱȱ³ǯȱ·¥ȱȱ·ȱ
le cogito était en quelque façon transcendé. 
(JM: 43) 
 
                                                        
28 In the Discours de la méthode (1637), in which his cogito first appears, Descartes employs his famous 
ȁȱȱȂǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱ¸ȱǰȱ
ȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱ¸ ȂȱǻŗşśŗǱȱŜŗǼǯ The one thing that remains impossible to 
doubt is the existence of something Ȯ ȱȁȂ Ȯ ȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
voulais ainsi penser que tout était faux, il fallait nécessairement que moi, qui le pensais, fusse quelque 
ȂȱǻŗşśŗǱȱŜŘǼǯȱHence Descartes declares ȱȁȱ··Ǳȱje pense, donc je suis, était si ferme et si assurée 
ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȂ·Ȃǰȱȱȱ
ȁȱ la recevoir, sans scrupule, pour le premier principe de la philosophie que je cherchaisȂ (1951: 62). 
29 £ȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȂȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱǱȱȁȱȱ
ȱȱȱȃȱȄȱ ȱ ȱthink, is merely a formulation of a grammatical custom which 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻŗşŗřǱȱŚŞŚǼǯ 
30 ȁȱje suis se présente, me semble-t-ǰȱȱȱȱ·ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱ
ȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻHP: 202). 
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It is impossible for introspection to reveal my ȁȱȂȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱ ȱ
always be this transcendent spectator-thought which, dissociated from the rest of my 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ¢ȱȂȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ
 ȱȁ¢ȱȂǲȱȱȱȁȱǻqui penseǼȂȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ31 Since 
this transcendence is necessary for the affirmation of the cogito, postulating a 
straightforward dualism between the je pense (subject) and the world (the object of the 
jeȂȱǼ Ȯ that is, understanding the self in terms of objective, primary reflection 
Ȯ does not constitute a satisfactory understanding of existence because, contrary to the 
simplicity of the cogitoȂȱǰ we cannot actually grasp what such a dualism would 
consist of. ȱȱȁ1ȱȂ ȱ¸Ȃ (1940), Marcel writes: 
A vrai dire, la séduction que le cogito a exercée sur les philosophes réside 
précisément dans sa transparence au moins apparente. Mais il y aura toujours 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱprétention à la 





For Marcel, then, the inadequacy of how experience is presented to us in primary 
reflection is a negative affirmation of the need for secondary reflection. It is in light of 
this, as Herbert Spiegelberg observes, that Ȃȱȱin phenomenology has to 
be seen (1994: 460).32 
 
If secondary reflection is phenomenological, it is more frequently discussed in relation 
to the metaphysical Ȯ that is, ontological Ȯ project which Marcel has in view.33 Indeed, 
Ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
conception of subjectivity suggested by thinkers such as Descartes Ȯ and indeed, 
                                                        
31 ȁȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱǲȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 32; 26 January 1914). 
32 ȁȱ·ȱ·¢ȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ·¡ȱȱȱ·¡ȱ[primaire], 
ȱȱ·¡ȱ¥ȱȱȱȂȱǻEA: I, 147; 23 December 1932). 
33 ȁȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂ¹ȱȱȂȂȱ
(EA: I, 176; 12 March 1933). 
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Bergson. And as a result of its intersubjective emphasis, Ȃȱmetaphysics of être is 
also immediately ethical: for ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ ȱȁȂȱȱȱ
ethically detrimental, breeding ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱǻȱȱȁ¢ȂǼȱȱ
its first point of reference. ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱǰȱ
ȱ·ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ
commencé par tracer autour de soi. Ȯ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ-objet Ȯ de la 
catégorie du sujet-objet Ȯ ǽǳǾȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻEA: I, 130-31), 
he writes on 11 November 1932. True contact with reality, on the other hand, involves 
ȁȂ,34 and, as Marcel contended in a 1950 Gifford Lecture ǻȁȂ-ce que 
Ȃ¹ǵǼǰȱȱ¢ȱȁnon-optique, non-ȂȱǻME II: 18).35 An inauthentic 
ȁȱȱȂ¹ȂȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȁǽǾȱȱȱȱ·Ȃ, Parain-Vial (1966: 
72) observes; and as such, être already implies  ȱȱȱȱȁ·Ȃ (often 
translated as ȁ¢Ȃ) toward others,36 which recognizes them as subjects rather 
than objects. 
 
Crucially, though, this ethico-ontological thesis could not have been reached without 
phenomenology. It is in fact the phenomenological experience of love that, for Marcel, 
demonstrates the possibility of escaping the solipsism that a (Cartesian) subject-object 
conception of self seems to imply, and thereby refutes its ontological foundation. 
ȁȂȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱȂȱȱ¸ȱȱȂen moi et le 
devant moiȂȱǻHP: 207), he announced in ȁȱȱȂ. This importance of love 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȂs opposition to Sartre Ȯ the other major counter-point 
to his concrete philosophy. According to ǰȱȂȱ¢ȱregard excludes 
                                                        
34 ȁȱȱȂȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱ··ȱȱȂȱǻHP: 204). 
35 See also RA: 294-95. 
36 For discussion of disponibilité, see for example DH: 22; EA: I, 85-86, 90, 155; HP: 234-39; HV: 28-29, 31-32; 
Marcel (1969: 258); RI: 55-80. 
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the possibility of knowing the Other as a subject (or toi,37 in Marcellian terms) because 
of the pessimistic way in which it defines human relations.38 His outrage at this failure 
to acknowledge the positive potential of être is particularly well illustrated in his fierce 
criticism ȱȂȱ¢ Huis clos (1944): 
Ce nihilisme moral est à mon avis tout à fait apparent dans Huis clos; il me 
paraît éȱȱȂǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȂȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ
escȱ¢·ȱȱȁȂ véritable qui est ȱȱȂȱȱȱ
Ȃ·ǯ 
(1958: 47) 
For Marcel, love and friendship are what reveal the fundamental inadequacy of 
subject-object dualism. Philosophy should therefore seek to determine the ontological 
conditions that make such experiences possible.39 
 
Love and friendship are of course difficult to characterize; but this is pivotal to their 
transcendent status with respect to primary reflection.40 ȁȱǱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ¸ȱȱȂȱ·ǵȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȂ¢ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱ
ȱȂȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻHP: 208), pronounced Marcel in ȁȱȱ
Ȃ.41 ȁȱ¸Ȃǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱthe diary entries of Être et 
avoir, in preparation for the ŗşřřȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ
                                                        
37 ȱȂȱ¢ǰȱȱtoi is encountered by the moi as an other with whom a real, concrete relation 
can be established, rather than as a third-person lui or elle who lacks presence for the moi. This is achieved 
through the moiȂȱȱtoiȂȱȱdisponibilité for one another. Thus, for Marcel, the other does not 
inevitably reinforce individual alienation, but may also provide a glimpse of a richer mode of Being. This 
may then stimulate further reflective transcendence, which extends beyond the individual nous experience 
and opens the subject up to the intersubjectivity of human Being as a whole. 




masochiste. ǽǳȱǾȱȱȱȂ-·ȂȱǻME II: 12-13). See also Marcel (1976: 10-11; 1981). 
It is mainly on the basis of La Nausée (1938), and the sections concerning le regard and les relations concrètes 
avec autrui in Ȃ3ȱȱȱ· (1943), that Marcel forms his juȱȱȂȱ¢ǯȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȂȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ3ȱȱȱ·, 
ȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱǯȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱtand the 
exposure of bad faith; and secondly, if Sartre is dualistic, his dualism is of a different, more nuanced nature 
from that of Descartes. 
39 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ··ȱȱ¥ȱȱ
ȂȱȱȂ·ȱȱ·ȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȂȂȱǻJM: 294; 5 March 1923). 
40 ȁȂ· est trahie dans son essence mêȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻDH: 9). 
41 See also JM: 157-58, 215, 226-28. 
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trouve tout entier devant moi, mais que je puis par là mêȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 
146; 23 December 1932). But, he insists, human affairs are not of the same order as 
ȱȁȂǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱthrough the 
implementation of a certain device or procedure. It is thus inappropriate to conceive 
of them in such terms, Marcel argues; they should instead ȱȱȱȁȱ
¢¸Ȃǰ42 defined ȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱmoi-même engagé [...]. Au lieu 
Ȃȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱe appropriée en 
fonction de laquelle il se définit, un mystère transcende par définition toute technique 
ȂȱǻEA: I, 146; my emphasis).43 
 
Accepting the reali¢ȱȱȁȱ¢¸Ȃȱǻȱȁȱ··Ȃǰȱȱȱȱȱ
to it)44 does not mean that we must resign ourselves to being left in the dark about 
how to understand or approach the question of Being (DH: 113). Rather, it means that 
we must refrain from thinking of human existence ȱȱȁizaȂȱȱȱ
objectifying, primary reflection, which treat the question in complete isolation from 
our own existential situation:45 ȁȱ¸ȱ-ȱȱ¥ȱȂȱȱǵȱLa 
ȱ¹ȱȂ¸ȱȱȱ·ȱǯȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱ
Ȃȱ·ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ·ȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱ³ȂȱǻEA: I, 125), he 
writes in his diary on 22 October 1932. Only the indirect (phenomenological) mode of 
secondary reflection can recover the concreteness of experience that is filtered out by 
primary reflection (or indeed, by Bergsonian intuition), and thereby approach, 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱǻrecueillement) ȱȁȂȱǻréflexion 
                                                        
42 ȁȱȃ¸ȱȱȂ¹ȄȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ¢¸ȂȱǻEA: I, 




44 Especially in the diary entries published in Être et avoir, e.g. EA: I, 128, 140, 142, 151. 
45 ȁȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȮ ȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃ¡·ȱ·ȱȱ·ǰȱȂȱǽǳǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
paradoxale qui non seulement est la mienne, mais me fait moiȂ (RI: 39). 
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récupératriceǼǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁ¢¢Ȃȱȱ ȱȱ always already 
embedded.46 
 
Attempting better to illustrate the difference between problem and mystery in his 
1933 lecture, Marcel discussed what it was like to experience a significant Ȯ perhaps 
spiritual Ȯ encounter with another,47 and highlighted the impossibility of objectively 
accounting for such a feeling:48 
Vous faites une rencontre qui se trouvera avoir sur votre vie un 
ȱǰȱ·ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǰȱȁȱ£ȱ·ȱ
ȱȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱ¹ȱ¢ȱȱȱ
ou que sa ·ȱȂȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱ-¹Ȃǰȱȱ
voit aussitôt que la réponse est inexistante. Il y a à Florence ou en Engadine en 
même temps que moi une foule de personnes qui sont censées partager mes 
úǲȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ où je me soigne un nombre considérable de 
malades atteints de la même affection que moiǯȱȱȂ·ȱ··ȱȱȱ
goût ou de cette affection ne nous rapproche pas, au sens réel du mot; elle est 
ȱȱȱȂ·ȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ
ȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ¢¸ǰȱȂ-à-ǰȱȂȱ··ȱȱȱ
racines plongent au-delà de ce qui est à proprement parler problématique. [...] 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱe ne peux 
ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ³ȱ




Nevertheless, the specificity of love and friendship is related to a certain experience of 
ȁȂ ȱȂȱȱ,49 defined in ȁȱ··ȱ·Ȃ 
(1940) as ȁȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱǽȱȂǾȱȱavec ȂȱǻRI: 201),50 and 
which, as Marcel noted in a 1961 William James Lecture ǻȁ··ȂǼ, ȁȱȱ¹ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ
··ȱȂ¥ȱȱȱȂ¡·ȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻDH: 94).51 ȁȱ·ȱ




amené à reconnaître que dans sa vie il y a des présences et des fidélités qui diffèrent radicalement des 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻDH: 95). 
48 See also EC: 111, 198-99. 
49 Note, here, how the affirmation of the oȂȱ¡ȱs analogous to that of the self. 
50 In ȁȱȱȂǰȱȱ£ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱǻHP: 233). 




est une réalité, un certain influx; il dépend de nous de rester ou non perméables à cet 
¡ȂȱǻHP: 231), stated Marcel in 1933, before explaining that it waȱȁȱ··ȱǽǯǯǯȱǾȱ
ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ··ȂȱǻHP: 232). As will now be 
seen, it is the way in which the fidelity of love and friendship perpetuates presence52 
that makes visible the lȱ ȱȂȱapproches concrètes and his engagement 
with human time. 
 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱcommitment; and 




qȂȱȂȱǻDH: 103). Marcel even goes so far as to present this form of commitment 
ȱȱȱ¢Ǳȱȁȱȱ¹ǰȱȂȱǱȱȃǰȱȱȱȱȄȂȱǻHV: 194), 
he affirmed ȱȱŗşŚřȱȱȁȱȱ·Ȃǯ53 As he explains in the essay ȁȱ
··ȱ·Ȃ, ȁȱ¸ȱȱȱȱÊȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱ
plus aigu, au plus paradoxal de lui-¹ǯȱȂ¸ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱ
fidélité, appréhendée dans son essence métaphysique, peut nous apparaître comme le 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻRI: 199).54 
For Marcel then, time and mortality are identified with conditionality; true value on 
the other hand, he insists iȱȁȱȱ·Ȃǰȱȁȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱme 
··ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱ···ȱ¥ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȂȱǻHV: 211).55 
Because of this, he believes ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ death, 
                                                                                                                                                  
le dedans, et mȱǰȱȂ¥ȱȱȱǰȱ·ǯȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
¸ȱȱ¢¸ȂȱǻDH: 8). See also DH: 15. 
52 ȁȱ··ȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱ··ȂȱǻHP: 229). See also DH: 94. 
53 Here, Marcel is citing a line from one of his plays (La Mort de demain; Marcel 1931: 161). 
54 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ··ȂȱǻEA: I, 14; 28 February 1929). 
55 ȁȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȱǱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱfait de sentir un autre 
ȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 292; 1 March 1923). 
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because those who have had true influence on me, in some sense, continue to be with 
me and impact on my worldly experience whether or not they are (or even can be) 
present in the flesh.56 In a 1950 Gifford Lecture ǻȁ¡ȱȱ¹ȂǼ, Marcel therefore 
rejected any analogy between a person who has died (he uses the examples of Victor 

ȱȱ·ǼȱȱȁǽǾȱȱǽǾȱȱȱȂȱǻME II: 28). ȁȱȱ
considérons concrètement ȱ
ȱȱ·ǰȱȂ-à-dire si nous ne pratiquons 
ȱǽǾȱ¸ȱ·Ȃǰȱȱdǰȱȁǽȱȱȱ¡ ȂǾȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱȂ¡ȱȂȱǻME II: 28-29; 
my emphasis). And this is because such a question relates to the mystery of Being, not 
to a determinable problem.57 
 
So, just as Marcel rejects the idea that life is simply a linear time-line of events, he 
refuses an (objective) temporal understanding of love and introduces, instead, a 
(transcendent) ȱȱ¢Ǳȱȁȱ··ȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱe transcendante à toute explication, à toute 
réduction. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱȂ¥ȱȱȱȱ
·ȂȱǻJM: 63), he writes on 7 February 1914. Notice, however, that Marcel qualifies 
ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȁȱȱȂǯȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ(in a 
Heideggerian sense) Ȯ that is, hermeneutical; he is not referring to eternity as 
something ontological. This is reaffirmed on 7 March 1929, where, after writing in his 
diary that ȁon commet une grave erreur en traitant le temps comme mode 
Ȃ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 19), he then explains that this is not a question of grounding 
                                                        
56 ȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
the annihilation of being, then value becomes meaningless, reality becomes empty, and human communion 
is broken at its very core. Love, the ȃȱȱȱȱ¢Ȅǰȱȱȃȱȱȱȱ
Ȅȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ
ȄȂȱǻŗşŜřǱȱŞŜǼǯ 
57 ȁ¸ȱȱȱùȱȱ¢ȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱ-¥ȱȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 143; 18 December 
1932). 
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the self in an eternal, unchanging whole (totum simul), but merely of transcending a 
representational understanding ȱȂȱǻǼȱ as linear succession: 
ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱǽǳǾȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱtotum simul Ȯ ȱȱȂȱȱȱ¡·ǰȱȱȱȱȱ
même se trouve en quelque façon dévitalisée Ȯ ȱȱȂȱ³ȱȱ
pȱȱȱȱǽǳǾǲȱȱȂȱǰȱȂ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱùȱȱ
succession apparaît comme de moins en moins donnée, où une représentation 
ǽǳǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱ¹ȱ¥ȱȱȱȂ¹ȱǯ 
 
(EA: I, 19-20) 
 
Yet, as I will now demonstrate, MȂȱization of loveȂȱ¢, although 
phenomenological, is nevertheless linked to his more general position concerning 
human ontology. This is what complicates any attempt to interpret time in his 
philosophy. 
 
In the diary entries published in Être et avoir ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂ¹ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ··ȂȱǻEA: I, 49; undated, but c. 1930),58 and sees this as a way of 
ȱȱȱǻȁ¸ȱ¥ȱȂȂȱǻEA: I, 49)). On 6 November 1930 he 
also identifies the structure of the promise as metaphysically significant (EA: I, 49),59 
and equates this question of personal engagement with the question of fidelity (EA: I, 
51). Continuing to emphasize ¢Ȃȱȱ (EA: I, 52, 117-18, 149), he 
links this act of faith with time,60 ȱȱȱȁ ³ȱȱȱȱȂ 
ȱȁȱ··ȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻEA: I, 57; 8 
November 1930). Although reflection on a promise he himself has made causes him to 
question the unconditionality he wishes to accord the promise (EA: I, 57-60; undated), 
                                                        
58 ȁ¥ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ·ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşřŖȱ
ou peut-être avant, ce thème de fidélité prend pour moi une valeur centrale, comme en témoigne cette note 
ȱ·ȱȂEtre et AvoirǱȱȃȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ··ȄȂȱǻDH: 91). 
59 êȱȱȱȱȁȂ¡·ȱ¸ȱȱ¹ȱȱ¹ȱǽȱǾȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱŗśŝǼǯ 
60 This is prefigured in the Journalǰȱ ǰȱȱŘŘȱ¢ȱŗşŗşǰȱȱ ǱȱȁȱȱȂȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ··ȱ·ȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱ
Si donc par mon passé on entend le passé que je suis ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂai, il 
faut dire que ce passé-là ne saurait en aucune manière être pensé sous forme de collection, mais au contraire 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻJM: 163-64). 
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and to debate the legitimacy of an act of faith in general (EA: I, 60-69; undated),61 
Marcel decides that these difficulties can be avoided if fidelity is conceived not as 
fidelity to a certain future state that I desire, but as fidelity to an underlying unity that 
grounds my being:62 ȁȱ··ȱȱȱȂȱȂȱǻEA: I, 118), 
he writes on 5 October 1932. 
 
In keeping with his argument concerning the intersubjectivity of Being, Marcel insists 
that the promise of love or fidelity can never simply be confined to an isolatable dyad, 
but extends far beyond this, expressing fidelity to a broader, inter-connected 
community. Thus after asserting, in his lȱȁȱȱ·ȂǰȱȱȁȱȂ¢ȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ¢¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱ
ȱȂ·ȂȱǻHV: 212), for example, Marcel qualified this by adding: 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¢¸ȱǰȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱȂȱ¡ȱ
au fond, pour être pleinement lui-même, une communion universelle hors de 
laquelle il ne peut se satisfaire, et est voué en fin de compte à se corrompre et 
à se perdre.63 
(HV: 212) 
 
This fidelity and disponibilité64 to a wider, intersubjective community is also (more 
frequently) discussed in relation to an attitude of hope, where, as Marcel stated in his 
ŗşŚŘȱȱȁȱȂȱ··ȱȱȂȱ·¢ȱȱȂ·Ȃǰȱ
                                                        




lui-même qui se nie et prétend se dépasser? Comment ne pas voir là un arrangement suspect, et qui du 





un même et unique principe Ȯ forme ou réalité Ȯ qui exige sa propre permanence. Fidélité non plus à un 
ǰȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱ¥ȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱǯȱ
Ȃ·ȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȂȱȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 63-64; 
undated). 
63 See also ME II: 156. 
64 ȁȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻHP: 234). 
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ȁȂ¸ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻHV: 81).65 Since Ȃȱȱȱȱin fact 
provide the most developed illustrations of how time and eternity relate to his 
ontological arguments,66 it is to this theme I now turn. 
 
As with love, ȱȂȱȱ¡ȱȱ, time is associated 
with reductive objectification that does not even allow for ȂȱǻǼ possibility, 
whereas eternity signifies a récollection,67 a more global appreciation of human reality 
capable of recognizing the unconditional values that ground such a disposition.68 
When referring to time and eternity ex¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
reflections are restricted to the phenomenological. Similar to his discussion in ȁȱ
temps ȱȂǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
succession can lead to despair, while a mode of understanding that transcends this 
limited view encourages a more hopeful outlook. In a diary entry on 15 March 1931, 
for example, he identifies a certain experience of temporality Ȯ ȁȂȱȱse sentir 
·ȱȱȂȱȮ with ȁȂȱȱȁȂȱǻEA: I, 91; my emphasis),69 whereas he 
ȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱune certaine affirmation de Ȃ··ȱ
(EA: I, 94; my emphasis).70 And in his 1942 lecture he explained  ȱȁȱ·ǰȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱla conscience du temps clos, ou plus exactement encore, du 
temps comme Ȃǰȱ ǰȱȁȂ·ȱse présente comme percée à travers le temps; 
tout se passe alors comme si le temps, au lieu de se refermer sur la conscience, laissait 
ȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǻHV: 71; my emphasis).71 However, these analyses 
                                                        




67 ȁȱȱȱȱȱessence séparation et comme perpétuelle disjonction de soi par rapport à soi-même, 
Ȃ·ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ·ǰȱ¥ȱȱ·ǰȱ¥ȱȱ·ȂȱǻHV: 72). 
68 ȁǽȂ·ǾȱȱȂȱȱȂ··ǰȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 93; 13 March 1931). 
69 ȱ¡ȱȱȁȂ¡ȱǽǾȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱ
¢ȂȱǻEA: I, 91). 
70 ȁȱȱȱùȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ-¹ȱ¥ȱȂȂȱǻHV: 
62). 
71 See also HV: 80. 
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of hope are also used to ground MaȂȱ¢ȱȱ. Indeed, the fact that 
hope is possible, for Marcel, tells us something about human ontology.72 Furthermore, 
ȱŗŝȱȱŗşřŗȱȱȱȱȱȁȂ·ȱ¹ȱȱȱ¦ȱȱȂǰȱ
ǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȁ··ȱȂȱ¹ǰȱǽȂȱǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȂ¦ȂȱǻEA: 
I, 100).73 As such, (the eternity of) hope also seems to be presented as ontologically 
authentic, whereas (the temporality of) despair is considered a treacherous temptation 
that can only blind us to this reality.74 
 
Hope and despair are not unrelated, though; on the contrary, remarked Marcel in 
ȁȱȱȂǰ ȁȱȱȱȱȱ·Ȃ. ȁȱȱȱȱ
où nous vivons permet et en quelque façon peut sembler conseiller un désespoir 
Ȃ (HP: 219), he observed in the 1933 lecture. Tȱȱȱȁ¢Ȃȱȱ¡ȱthat 
Marcel felt Bergson had failed to recognize. ȱȱȱȱȱŗşŚŗȱȱȁȱ
ȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȁ··[e]Ȃǰȱǰȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱ
·ȂȱǻHV: 28). But the tragedy of temporal existence then awakens us through the 
protestation it incites: ȁȱȱȱ·¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
rapport au réel lui apparaît [...] coȱ¸ȱȂǰȱȱ ȱȱ17 
October 1922.75 ȁȱȂȱȱse redresser ǽǳǾǯȱa métaphysique est ȱȂȱǻJM: 
279).76 
 
                                                        
72 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂȱǻEA: I, 91; 15 March 1931). 
73 Marcel anticipates this in the second part of his Journal  ȱȱ ǱȱȁȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂ¦ǰȱȱȱ¦ǯȱȱȂȱǻJM: 198; 16 October 1919). 
74 This is echoed, in a broad sense, by existentialist thinkers such as Nietzsche, Sartre, and Camus. 
75 ȱȱȱ¡ȱȁȂȱȂ¡³ȱȱȱȱȂ··ȱȮ car, malgré les 
apparences, Hegel a fait un admirable effort pour sauvegarder le primat du concret, en marquant avec la 
plus grande force que celui-ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȂȱǻHH: 8). 
76 See also HH: 119; PST: 32-33; RI: 88-89. ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱǻŗşśŗǼȱȱȱ
revolt. 
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ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻHV: 49), he re-
affirmed in ȁȱȂȱ··ȱȱȂȱ·¢ȱȱȂ·Ȃǯ77 
Time, as he ȱȱŝȱȱŗşŘşǰȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱ¹ȱȱȂ·Ȃȱ
(EA: I, 19).78 And hope itself, as Marcel explained in ȁȱȂȱ··ȇ, 
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ǰȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ
mais constitue une véritable réponse ȱȂ¹ȂȱǻHV: 40)79 Ȯ an ontological response that 





Nȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȁtoute une gamme [de modalités de 
conscieǾȂȱǻPI: 171; 6 May 1943), then; it is also concerned with different, but 
nevertheless related, ȁȱȂ¹ȂȱǻDH: 93). Time stands for what Marcel terms, in 
ȱȁȱȂȱ··ȱȱȂȂȱǻŗşřřǼǰȱȁȱ·ȱȂȱǻEA: 
I, 219-20) and is associated with brute objective existence Ȯ that which must be 
transcended.80 Eternity, on the other hand, is identified with the plenitude of authentic 
Being. As such, time and eternity map onto a distinction Marcel draws between 
                                                        
77 See also EA: I, 92; RI: 100. 
78 ȁȱȂ¢ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ·ȱ
entre ce ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 228-ŘşǲȱŘśȱ¢ȱŗşŘŖǼǲȱȁȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¡ȱȱȂ¡ȱȂȱ¹ȱȂȱǻ JM: 
231; 29 February 1920). 
79 This is suggesteȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱJournal. ȱŜȱȱŗşŗşȱȱ ǱȱȁȂ¹ȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡·ȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱÊtre, ai-ȱȱȂȱ
·ȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 179-80; see also 181, 198-99). 
80 See also JM: 264-65, and (especially) 284-85. 
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existence and être,81 of which he gave his most developed explanation in the second of 
his 1950 Gifford Lectureȱǻȁ¡ȱȱ¹ȂǼǱ 
ȱȱȱȱǽȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȂȱȁȂ¡ȂǾȱȱȱȱ
étions en présence de quelque chose qui est sur une pente et qui tend à glisser 
en bas de cette pente Ȯ mais qui en même temps est comme faiblement retenu, 
peut-être comme par une ficelle, [...] en sorte que cette chose est malgré tout 
susceptible de remonter la pente. [...] nous sommes spontanément portés à 
traȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¹ȱ¥ȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȂ¡ȱȮ ȱǱȱȱ¹ȱȱȂȱ
existe, la perspective change [...]. 
(ME II: 29) 
 
Insofar as we understand our existence as a (mǰȱǼȱȁȂǰ Marcel 
arguedǰȱ ȱȱȱȁǽǾȱȱȱȱǽȱ¥ȱȱǾȱȱȱ¥ȱ
ÉȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ·ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǻME 
II: 31), and slide down the ȱȱȂ¡e toward non-being. However if, through 
our freedom, we undertake a secondary reflection and are able to appreciate 
ȱȱȂȱǻǼȱȱȱȱ, then the hope and 
faith this incites will allow us to climb the pente toward ontological authenticity or être 
(see Figure 1 for a more detailed illustration).82 It is not only my perspective that 
changes when I cease to focus my attention on the simple tempȱȁfactȂ of my 
existence; according to Marcel, my very mode of being also changes such that I 
progress, up this pente, from mere existence toward être Ȯ Being proper. Does this not, 
therefore, mean that Marcel has failed to restrict his examinations of time and eternity 
to phenomenology, because of how his phenomenological observations slide onto the 
ontological plane? 
                                                        
81 ȁȱȱȱ	ȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ǰȱ-ci 
·ȱǰȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¹ȂȱǻParain-Vial 1985b: 480, note 1). 
82 ȁȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻPST: 12). 
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Figure 1: La Pente de l'existence 
 
 
2.3 Phenomenology, Ontology, and Ǳȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ
Philosophy 
 
ȱ Ȃȱ¡ȱȱȂȱapproches concrètes revealed the importance of 
phenomenology for Marcel, and showed how his explicit discussions of time and 
eternity conform consistently to this hermeneutical interest, in keeping with his 
argument for the irrelevance of time. The temporality of existence is characterized by 
Marcel in terms of several possible perspectives: it can be understood in objective, 
ȱȱǻ ȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȂǼǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ
contingent and Ȯ owing to tiȂȱȱȮ inconsequential; or it can be understood as 
something more fluid, which is linked to the lives of others and carries a notion of 
ȱǻȁ··ȂǼǯ But as the end of section two reminded us, Marcel does not only 
speak of human existence, but also of être. Moreover, être is contrasted with existence; it 
is allegedly more authentic. This discourse then seems to cause Marcel to revert to his 
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¢ȱȱȱȱȱȁ¡Ȃ ǻȱȱȁ¡ȱȱ·ȂǼ, where it is 
identifed solely with objectivity and contingency, not with ȁȱȱȂesprit doit 
ÉȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: xi); and as a consequence, a rigid 
binary is instituted between the ontologically authentic and inauthentic, to which 
Marcel relates (with equal consistency) eternity and time respectively. 
 
In practice, then, phenomenology and ontology are not so distinct.83 Time and eternity 
both do, and do not, relate to ontology in his writings Ȯ and thus the question of the 
significance of time is raised again. ȱȱȁȱȂȱȱs ontological 
discussions finds Marcel guilty of a severe lack of philosophical rigour, owing to his 
use of (non-temporal) temporal terms. Or, through his distinction between existence 
and être, Marcel institutes an ontological division between an eternal and a temporal 
realm, and in so doing contradicts his position on two counts: first, with respect to his 
argument for the irrelevance of time; and second, by privileging eternity, for this then 
undermines the alleged importance of time in his philosophy. 
 
Interestingly, Marcel himself struggles to understand what he means by existence and 
être, describing their relatȱȱȁ·ȱȂÊ·Ȃ(ME II: 35).84 His discussions 
of time and eternity were not, in principle, supposed to relate to an ontological 
hierarchy, but rather to different understandings of Being. For this reason, existence 
                                                        
83 VigoritoȂ investigation of time in Ȃȱ¢ȱfails to confront this difficulty. Vigorito considers 
the conflȱ ȱȂȱ and accentuation of time to be a terminological difficulty, 
which, he claims, ȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȱ ȱȱ ȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ (1984: 414, note 1). In effect, then, he defends Marcel in 
accordance with the argument for the irrelevance of time, attributing this ȱȱȱȂȱ
synonymous use of the ȱȁȂȱȱȁ¢ȂǱ ȁȱȱ ȱ ȱȱǽ¢ȱ¢Ȃȱ
distinction between these two terms]Ȃǰȱȱ , ȁsince he never confuses his own questions concerning 
¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȂǰȱalthough he uses the terms interchangeably (ibid.). What he 
ȱȱǰȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
dimension of objectivity which warrants discussion of time in addition to temporality, and thereby 
transforms Ȃȱ¢¢ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȁ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱ
to the simple desire for linguistic variety. 
84 See also EA: I, 44-45. 
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and être should not in fact be so separate Ȯ and Marcel, on occasion, agreesǱȱȁit does 
not make sense to claim that existence is different from beingȂȱǻSchilpp and Hahn 1984: 
122), he acknowledges in reply to a 1968 article by Sam Keen. Nevertheless, he 
continues to employ the binary existence/être when speaking of human ontological 
potential, especially in relation to intersubjectivity. In so doing, he forcibly separates 
out the two terms, and time and eternity along with them. Thus, the difficult relation 
between existence and être can be seen as manifesting a deeper tension between the 
temporal and the eternal; and the reason this remains unresolved, it might be 
suggested, is because Marcel has introduced, and yet neglected to consider, time and 
eternity on an ontological level. 
 
Such a problematic is highlighted in a dialogue between Marcel and Parain-Vial at a 
1973 symposium in Dijon, when Parain-Vial asked Marcel whether dualism (which, in 
ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱ
of itself, because of how human beings are presented as both mortal (temporal) and, in 
some sense, immortal (eternal): 
ȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȂt dire aussi que nous sommes mortels. 
Toujours donc, pèse sur nous la conscience de nos limites [...]. Mais alors, 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȂǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ
ne se dessine-t-ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¦ȱortelle et le corps 
périssable? 
(Marcel 1974: 385) 
 
Marcel is clearly uncomfortable with the question, but Parain-Vial does not allow it to 




(1974: 391). In response, Parain-ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱ
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·ȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ-¹ȱ¡ȱȂȱ
·Ȃ (1974: 391). Marcel seems more satisifed with this analysis Ȯ but he 
nonetheless fails to address the central thrust of her enquiry, since a question still 
remains as to whether unity exists, and if so, in what sense. 
 
The eternal value of Being that Marcel wishes to affirm through his approches concrètes 









ǱȱȁȂǰȱȂȱȂȱȮ ȱȂȱȱȂȱǻHH: 12). Ȃȱapproches 
concrètes therefore appear to set the (eternal) unity of love up as the model for 
intersubjectivity,86 over and above other more asymmetrical, (temporally) conditional 
interpersonal relations that nevertheless Ȯ one might argue Ȯ still legitimize an 
intersubjective ontology through the relational space they create (not to mention the 
question as to whether love itself is ever entirely symmetrical or unconditional).87 
Ȃȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱune pente and the conversation with 
Parain-Vial mentioned above, however, seem to admit that a certain gradation must 
be recognized,88 in which case a strict opposition between time (fragmentation, 
                                                        
85 ȱȱȁȱȱǽǾȂȱǻǯǯȱEA: I, 118, 149). 
86 ȁȱnexus ùȱȱ¡ȱȱǰȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȂȂȱǻEC: 286). See also DH: 110, 195; HV: 
212; JM: 199, 206. 






Ȃmbiance Ȯ ȱȂȱ-¹ȂȱǻRI: 25). 
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conditionality) and eternity (unity, unconditional value) need no longer be maintained. 
Occasionally Marcel does consider other, more intermediate intersubjective relations: 
in a William James Lecture ǻȁ¡ȂǼ, for example, he discussed the 
phenomenology of experiences such as asking someone for directions in the street, 
making an enquiry in a shop, having a banal conversation, and being with others in 
the sense of spatial proximity (DH: 60-62).89 ȱ¢ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱ
remains that of love, for all these relations are interpreted in terms of a progression 
toward itǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ
possible, whether être can actually be achieved. Ȃȱȱȱȱ-cut 
dualism between existence and être, and acknowledgement of the need to postulate 
dynamic degrees of Being,90 suggest such an idea to be crude and misleadingly 
abstract. ȁȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡·ǲȱȱȂȱ
en rien assimilable à une donnée opaque et constante [...]. La ·¢ȱȂȱ
imaginée comme ·ȱȱȱȱȂ¡·ȱȱ¥ȱùȱ-ci est arbitrairement 
·ȂȱǻPI: 146), he writes on 17 April 1943. But the all-or-nothing terminology he 
employs then negates this assertion, for unity and eternity can never be partial. 
 
The intersubjectivity Marcel embraces in opposition to Bergson thus threatens to come 
into ȱ ȱȂ second reason for refusing his philosophy Ȯ namely, his 
insistence that ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȂȱ
phenomenological ontology does not, as Wood writes of Heidegger, ȱȱ ȱȁȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱ
(1989: 327).91 And this question, Marcel seemed to suggest contra Bergson, is 
                                                        
89 See also DH: 94-95, 110; ME I: 153-60. 
90 ȁȱ¢ȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¹ȂȱǻPI: 140; 13 April 1943). 
91 In ȁȱȱ
ȂȱMarcel writes: ȁle Dasein est un existant doȱȂ¹ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ
en question. Il lui est essentiel de se dépasser lui-¹ǰȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱ¡ǯȱǽǳǾȱ
Ȃȱ·ȱǽǳǾȱȂ¡ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ  lui 
convient est sursum, et non sumȂȱ(1945: 90-91; ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂ in HV: 32). 
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necessarily hermeneutical (a constant dialectic between primary and secondary 
reflection), because Ȃȱ¢¢, into which we are always already thrown,92 
prevents us from approaching it as one might a determinate problem. But if Marcel is 
then willing to draw definitive conclusions about être, does this not simply 
problematize his ontological method (in the Marcellian sense), such that it becomes a 
question of what the ȱȁȂȱȱȁȱȂǰȱand thereby negates the indirect approach 
he claimed to adopt as a corrective to Bergson? 
 
Marcel also felt that his early idealist tendencies had prevented him from engaging 
ȱȱȱ¢ǱȱȁȱȂȱȱȱȂ·ǰȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱ
Ȃ·ȱȱ¸ȱȱȱǯȱȂȱȱǰȱȱȂ rends 
ǰȱȱ·ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¹ȂȱǻEA: I, 34), he 
writes in his diary on 17 July 1929.93 His expressed opposition to Hegel in the 
argument for the irrelevance of time is representative of such dissatisfaction with 
post-Kantian idealism. Philosophers such as Schelling and Hegel, he maintained, went 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ
Ȃȱ
case, the historical collective), neglecting concrete, individual experience in favour of 
the wider whole. Yet although Marcel explicitly opposes Hegel, the philosophical 
position he proceeds to establish is, in certain important respects, very similar. Like 
Hegel Marcel also believed that the reality of Being manifests itself concretely in the 
phenomenal world. He did not regard metaphysics to be impossible as Kant did, and 
thus reacted against the break between epistemology and ontology (phenomena and 
noumena), seeking to revive metaphysics, to affirm that some form of knowledge of 
                                                        
92 ȱȱȂȱȱȱle mystère descibes human persons as (always already) inextricably involved in 
ǰȱ
ȱǻŗşŜŘǼȱȱȱȱȁ Ȃȱȱȱǻliterally ȁ-ȂǱȱda-sein), where the 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȁȂȱȱȱ ǯ 
93 See also EA: I, 145. 
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Being itself was possible.94 Like Hegel, Marcel attempted to reconcile his faith in 
metaphysics with what Kant (1998)  ȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
insoluble antinomies for itself. And again, like Hegel, MarȂȱȱȱȱ
problem was to regard dialectical process as phenomenally real (as opposed to 
confused, subjective illusion), and grounded in the constant flux of time. Marcel may 
have been more concerned with individual spiritual progress than with the progress 
of the collective, but crucially, as far as time and eternity are concerned, 
Ȃȱ
ȁȂȱǻGeistǼȱȱȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȂȱêtre: both transcend time, and it 
is in this absolute (omni-temporal) presence that the unity of Being is grounded.95 As 
such, both their philosophies appear, in effect, to negate the movement and 
development (through conflict) of becoming, condemning this to relative unreality 
because it falls short of their absolute (eternal) standard for existential authenticity Ȯ in 
Ȃ case, that of intersubjective presence. 
 
ȱȂȱdiscourse on time and eternity, in particular, suggests that his approches 
concrètes might still be guided by certain idealist assumptions Ȯ especially that of the 
unity of Being Ȯ in spite of the experiential dialectic he discovers as a result of his 
phenomenological investigations. It is therefore not clear that Marcel does take the 
phenomenality of individual experience seriously, leading critics such as Spiegelberg 
to conclude that ȁMarcel had little interest in pheno¢ȱȱȂ (1994: 466), for 
ȁȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱordinate to his major [ontological] 
Ȃ (1994: 460). There is considerable ȱȱȂȱ ȱto support 
                                                        
94 ȁȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ
means follows that they must be ours merely and not also characteristics of the objects. Kant however 
confines them to the subject-ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱǻ
ȱŗşŝśǱȱŝŖǰȱ
§42z). ȱȁ£ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻZusatz). These were added by Leopold Henning, 




its pure Notion, i.e. it has not annulled Time. It is the outer, intuited pure Self which is not grasped by the 
Self, the merely intuited Notion; when this latter grasps itself it sets aside its Time-form [...]. Time, therefore, 
appears as the destiny and necessity of Spȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱŚŞŝǰȱȗŞŖŗǼǯ 
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Ȃȱ: on 13 October 1933, for example, Marcel describes 
¢ȱȱ¢ȱȁȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ¢ȱ·ȱȱȂ¹Ȃȱ
(EA: I, 189); and in ȱȁ1ȱȂȱȱ¸Ȃȱ(1940) Marcel makes the 
ȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂ¢ȱ
ȱȱǽ··ǾȱȃȱȄǯ96 [...] toute philosophie authentique est 
Ȃȱnégation ȱȃȱȄȂȱǻRI: 107; my emphasis). The 1944 work Homo viator 
then seems to confirm this marginalization of phenomenology in practice. Although 




 ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂ (1994: 458).97 Indeed, surely if 
phenomenology were so important for Marcel, he would have devoted more time to 
explaining why and Ȯ more crucially still Ȯ how it allows for (ontological) 
metaphysical discoveries, as opposed to bypassing this and focusing primarily on 
metaphysics? 
 
Marcel is clearly aware that (at least in some respects) he is straddling the two fields: 
the central essay in Homo viator (a published lecture, in fact), for example, is boldly 
ȱȁȱȂȱ··ȱȱȂȱ·¢ȱȱȂ·Ȃǯȱ, 
how phenomenology and metaphysics actually relate is never explained,98 and in 
most instances Marcel focuses on either one or the other, so that the need to explain 
their relation can be avoided. Exceptionally, in a diary entry dated 11 November 1932, 
                                                        
96 ȁȱȂȱȱȱexperiential appearances that phenomenology seeks to take seriously. 
97 ȁȱ·¸ǰȱȂȱȂ¹ȱ¸ȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 202; 17 October 1919). 
98 Gallagher comments: ȁȱȱȱȃȱȄȱȱȱȱ¢¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
most unambiguously announces its references to transcendence. So much is this true that a 
phenomenological analysis of hope passes almost immediately into an elucidation of its hyper-
phenomenological roots; the transcendent vector seems to be not eventual but dominant from the 
Ȃȱ(1962: 73). 
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Marcel does acknowledge that the shift from phenomenology to metaphysics might be 
problematic. The issue is raised in specific relation to the difference between treating 
another as toi as opposed to lui, and Marcel attempts to legitimize the metaphysical 
distinction he draws between these two modes by suggesting that it is not simply a 
question of private phenomenological experience. Rather, he argues, how I conceive 
of things directly affects my interactions with others and the world, and for this 
reason the purely phenomenological is surpassed: 
ȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱon du toi et du lui ne porte que sur des 
attitudes mentales; elle est phénoménologique au sens le plus restrictif. 
Prétendez-vous fonder cette distinction métaphysique, conférer au toi une 
·ȱ·¢ǵȂ 
ȱȱ··ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱn qui est extrêmement obscur 
et difficile à élucider. Tentons de la formuler plus clairement; par exemple de 
la façon suivante: 
Lorsque je traite un autre comme un toi et non plus comme un lui, 
cette différence de traitement ne qualifie-t-elle que moi-même, mon attitude 
envers cet autre, ou bien puis-ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·¸ȱ
ȱȱȱǰȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱǵ 
 
(EA: I, 131-32) 
 
Intersubjectivity thus appears to be the key to defending MarcelȂs position. But this 
matter is not pursued in any further depth, and Marcel does not develop or clarify this 
argument in subsequent works. At the ¢ȱǰȱǰȱȂȱȱȱ
his philosophy of intersubjectivity is incomplete. But more seriously, as the above 
discussion has suggested, it seems that (as Wood, again, observes with respect to 
Heidegger) the existential temporality in Marcel 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱǽǳǾȱȱ
pervasive distinction betweeȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǳǾȱ
ultimately serve[s] to redefine and re-establish notions like personal identity 







                                                        
99 ǰȱȱȂȱǰȱȱ ǯ 
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In so doing, Marcel appears to subordinate temporal change and flux to an eternal 
constant, and the tâtonnement of his indirect approaches to (the alleged mystery of) 
Being to the comfortable certainty of direct affirmation. 
 
However, the fact that Marcel himself questions the status of his conclusions makes it 
ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȂȱȱ
uncertainty concerning the relation between existence and être is the most frequent 
example of this. But on 7 March 1929 Marcel even questions the meaning of eternity in 
his philosophy. Aȱȱȱȁȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȂÉȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻcoaevus universo)ǰȱȂ-à-ȱȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 21), he 
Ǳȱȁǰȱde quel ordre est cette appréhension de soi comme éternel? Là est, 
ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻEA: I, 21-22). Instances such as these lead one to 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱsions are 




appears fairly non-committal, and could conceivably be interpreted as referring only 
to the phenomenological.101 ȁ¡ȱȂǰȱ ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ
more univocal term, which can be related only to ontology. Confusingly, though, the 
two terms seem to be used interchangeably (although an article will often employ one 
                                                        
100 As Plourde comments: ȁ·ȱȱ¸ȱ, la philosophie de G. Marcel prend pour point 
de départ certaines assurances fondamentales. Sa méthode philosophique (réflexion seconde) lui permet de 
ȃȱȱȱ¡ȱǰȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾȄȂȱǻŗşŞśǱ 
77). 
101 This is how Henri Gouhier might understand it (EAGM: 41). 
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or the other), in spite of the different senses one might be tempted to assign them. And 
yet, Marcel does provide us with some justification for wanting to distinguish 
between them: one cȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȁ¡ȱ
Ȃǲȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱa 1973 symposium Marcel 
ȱȁȱ¡Ȃȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱonly to the purely 
phenomenological (EAGM: 86). Is there a reason why Marcel employs two distinct 
terms? If so, what determines his usage of one over the other, and what justifies their 
synonymous treatment in certain circumstances? 
 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱhilosophy is the 
ethical concern that his arguments also appear to convey. As êȱȱȱȱ
1975 conference paperǱȱȁȱȱéthique est inséparable de la description 
phénoménologique et de son intention purement épistémologique. Gabriel Marcel ne 
ȱ··ȱȱȂȂ (1976a: 66). Indeed, in conversation with Monestier in 
ŗşŝŖǰȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȂȱ
(1999b);102 and as stated at the end of the Journal, Marcel believed that his focus on 
experiences such as presence had uncovered a way in which he could legitimately 
move from metaphysics to ethics. Aȱȱȱȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 
292; 1 March 1923), he begins to wonder 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱ¥ȱȱǯȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȂ-ce pas ce qui accroît en nous le sentiment de la 




pâle, plus hésitante. 
(JM: 306; 24 May 1923) 
 
                                                        
102 See also EA: I, 29. 
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Nȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢, 
then; it serves as the foundation for his ethical conclusions as well.103 ȁe mot de vérité 
doit être pris ici dans une acception à quelque degré normative. Nous pourrions 
ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻPST: 60), he declared in his 
ȱȁȂ
ȱȱȱȱé-supposés existentielsȂ. But similar to the 
difficulty concerning phenomenology and ontology, Marcel does not explain what the 
relation between the ontological and the ethical is. ȱȁȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱȱȱ
makes this the case? 
 
In fact, the relation between ontology and ethics is all the more obscure than that 
between ontology and phenomenology, because the two seem to be situated on the 
same plane (phenomenology, on the other hand, appears subordinate to ontology). As 
Gillman therefore remarks, there appear ȱȱ ȱȁȂȱȱȱȂȱ
work. First is the search for an indubitable point of departure for philosophical 
exploration, as illustrated, in particular, by the privileging of sensation in ȁExistence et 
·ȂǯȱȱȱȂȱupation with the increasing functionalization of 
humanity, the emergence of which Gillman relates to ȁȱȱȂ, and 
which seems to gain ever increasing importance thereafter (1980: 173). Again, Ȃs 
thesis of ontological intersubjectivity is responsible. As ȱǱȱȁȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ (2006a: 87). Indeed, in Les Hommes 
ȱȂ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȂȱ ȱȱ
philosophical thought and socio-political life (HH: 7),104 and proceeds to identify love 
with peace, over and against social conflict or war (HH: 9, 13, 118). However, these 
                                                        
103 êȱǻŗşŞşǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ
feels is manifest, in particular, in the notion of disponibilité. 
104 See also EC: 243. 
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arguments are more polemical than they are demonstrative. Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱ
accurate ȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱological foundation of intersubjectivity coincides 
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱr 
implied. In practice, ¢Ȃȱȱ simply seems to grant Marcel a 
licence to discuss the ontology and ethics of intersubjectivity simultaneously, making 
it almost impossible to separate the two and leaving one to wonder whether Marcel 
does not, at times, simply confuse or conflate the two issues. How, for example, 
should one understand references to MarcelȂȱȁ·ȱȂ·Ȃ (1969: 257; 
EC: 133) ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂ (1965: 49-50; 1969: 259; 
EC: 150), when in other contexts Marcel asserts that the role of philosophy is one of 
ȁ¡Ȃ (1937: 180)? 
 
Time and eternity are not exempt from such difficulties. In addition to its function as 
the symbol of ontological tragedy, time is referred to ȱȱȱȱȁntationȂ (e.g. EA: I, 
27) Ȯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȱȱ¢¸ȱȱ¸Ȃȱ
(e.g. EA: I, 125). Eternity, on the other hand, is equated with ethical harmony and 
virtue, in addition to the ontological mystery. On 7 November 1932, for example, 
Marcel defines le métaproblématique as ȁȱ¡ȱȱȱȱǰȱȂ··Ȃȱ
(EA: I, 128). And André Devaux describes how Du Bos, Maritain, and Marcel were all 
in absolute agreement 
ȱȂéternité ȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱǯȱȱ
ȱ·ȱȂȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱétermina, par 
exemple, leur commune attitude face à la crise internationale de Munich, en 
ŗşřŞǰȱȱȱȱȱȁla volonté de paix a prévalue sur la volonté de 




                                                        
105 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱCommentaires (1946), and the second citation 
references a phrase used by Maritain. ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱEC: 171 
and Rémond (1989: 36). 
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When confronted with these alternative characterizations of time and eternity, then, 
how is one to interpret Ȃȱargument for the transcendence of time in favour of 
eternity? Does Marcel reject time for eternity on the basis of this ethical judgement (in 
which case, are Ȃȱȱ rhetorical than philosophical), or on the 
basis of something relating to ontology, which is never quite made clear? 
 
It therefore seems that, as êȱȱin 1973ǰȱȁȱé fondamentale, avec 
ȱȂȱ¡ȱȱ	ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂ¡ǰȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ··Ȃ (1976b: 70). êȱȱȱȁǽȱ
Ǿȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱêȱǽȱǾȱ¹Ȃǰ namely in secondary 
reflection, which, by definition, cannot be definitively characterized without 
collapsing into primary reflection (1976b: 72-73)ǯȱǰȱȂȱ¢ȱ
lacks rigour,106 obscuring matters further than is warranted; and is particularly 
nebulous where time and eternity are concerned. Although it is evident that Marcel 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
human intersubjectivity, neither his own position, nor his method, is justified in any 
satisfactory manner Ȯ indeed, the domain in which he seeks to legitimize his position 
is not even clear, for his arguments for intersubjectivity span the phenomenological, 
the ontological, and the ethical, without offering any explanation as to how transitions 
between these fields are possible. It therefore seems ironic that Marcel declared his 
interest in time to concern ȁȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱȂ (Hersch and 
                                                        
106 This is ȱȱȱ ¢ȱêȱǻ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱǼȱȱ ¢ȱȱȂȱ
 ǯȱȁȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȂ·ǰȱȱȱ·ǰȱ
du problématique; il lui faut prendre appȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
(1976b: 73), he contends in ŗşŝřǯȱȱȱŗşşśȱ ȱȱȱ¡Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱâȱȱȱȂȱȱǰȱ
£ȱǰȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşśǱȱŚřǼǯȱGallagher (1962) too criticizes Marcel for the mutually 
exclusive relationship he establishes between objective knowledge and metaphysical knowledge. See also 
Blundell (2003). 
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Poirier 1967: 28), for it is precisely his failure to consider the manner in which he 
himself talks about time that renders his philosophy so problematic.
 96 
Conclusion to Part One: Metaphysics and Presence 
 
If, as a result of his attempt to draw ontological conclusions from phenomenology, 
one is tempted to accuse Marcel of philosophical inconsistency, it should be noted that 
this is not, in fact, so unusual; phenomenology in general has been criticized for this. 
Wood explains: ȁ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
descriptions of the structures of consciousness had a value that went beyond their 
being an accurate account of subjective phenomena. That value lay in what was 
always assumed to be the epistemological and ultimately ontological significance of 
Ȃ (1989: 324-25).1 Indeed, in theory, phenomenology was to offer a 
radically new kind of metaphysics, free from prejudice or dependence on previous 
philosophies. But as Derrida has argued (with respect to Husserl in particular), the 
metaphysics proposed by phenomenology still remains within the sphere of 
traditional metaphysics, because it continues to privilege the mode of presence in its 
affirmations. In La Voix et le Phénomène (1967) he writes of Husserl: 
ȱ·ȱȂ ·ȱǽǳǾȱsont, dit-ǰȱȁ·¢ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
connaissance ultime de Ȃ¹ȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱ·¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱ
rien moins que de la métaphysique au sens habituel du terme; cette 
·¢ȱ····ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
¥ȱȂȱȱȱelle a été originellement fondée en tant que philosophie 
première ǽǳǾȂǯȱȱȱȱÉȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
toutes les fautes et de toutes les perversions que Husserl dénonce dans la 
·¢ȱȁ····ȂȱǽǯǯǯǾǱȱȂȱjours une cécité devant le mode 








                                                        
1 Accordingly, Widmer writes of Marcel: ȁȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ··ȱȱ
ȱȱȱ·ȱȱ¸ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱȂ¹ǰȱ
une structure qui permet seule de donner aux descriptions phénoménologiques leur pleine signification et 
ȱȱȂȱ(1971: 119). 
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Ȃidentité de sa présence [...].2 
(1967a: 4) 
 
According to Derrida, then, there has only ever been one kind of metaphysics in the 
¢ȱȱȱ¢Ǳȱȱȁ¢ ȱȂǱȱȁȱ·ȱ¥ȱ
ǰȱ
ȱ¸ȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱ··ȱȱȱǯȱ[...] La non-présence est 
toujours pensée dans la forme de la présence [...] ou comme modalisation de la 
présence. Le passé et le futur sont toujours déterminés comme présents passés ou 
·ȱȂȱǻŗşŝśǱȱřŜ-37), he assertȱȱȁȱȱ¸ȂȱǻŗşŜŞǼǯ At the heart of 
this metaphysics, as Wolfgang ȱ¡ǰȱȱȁthe teaching that the presence to 
being is ȱ¢ȱȂ (1976: 5). More precisely, the metaphysics of 
presence assumes that the notion of Being as it is in itself coincides with the notion of 
absolute presence. The living present, where Being can be present as either subject, 
object, or as their unity, is therefore treated as the ultimate foundation of (and also 
epistemological point of access to) ontology. As such, the conception of (authentic) 
Being in Western metaphysics excludes the (nominally inauthentic) notions of 
temporality, incompleteness, and absence; and thus a binary opposition between the 
authentic and the inauthentic comes to structure the whole of Western philosophy, 
with presence as the figurehead of authenticity.3 Each side of this binary, Derrida 
argues, tends to be considered as pure and independent of the other. Furthermore, the 
binary is only a binary insofar as the second term is understood as a negation of the 
                                                        
2 Scholars such as Wood (1989) have since defended Husserl (or at least questioned the purported distance 
 ȱȂȱȱȱ
ȂǼǰȱȱȱHusserl does not always give primacy to presence, 
but in some instances (intentionally or not), demonstrates the co-primordiality of absence. See also Fuchs 
(1976); Dostal (2006); Held (2007)ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱȱon-
metaphysical, concerned more with its metaphilosophical or methodological conditions of possibility, than 
with substantial claims about the ontological nature of the world (Carr 1999; Crowell 2001). But as Zahavi 
writes: ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱint and something quite different to claim that phenomenology has no 
¢ȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱȱ
actual existing world from consideration, and that it is concerned with meaning ȱȱ ȱǵȂȱ
(2003: 11-12). 
3 To this we can relate more specific binaries such as the opposition between good and evil, truth and 
falsity, or sameness and difference: one can be in the presence of Good, Truth, or the Same, or encounter a 
lack of goodness, truthfulness, or sameness (evil, falsity, difference). 
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first.4 Thus, the positivity of presence is considered primary, whereas absence (non-
being; nothingness) is treated as a derivative (and therefore inferior) category, because 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǯȱBut for Derrida, the idea of such 
ontological purity and of such a reassuringly stable foundation is a myth. His method 
of deconstruction therefore aims to think against Western meta¢Ȃȱ-cut 
opposition between (the foundation of) presence and (the non-foundation of) absence, 
ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ ȱǯ Presence is always 




ȱȱǰȱt is no 
less relevant to Marcel. µLa phénoménologie nous paraît tourmentée sinon contestée 
ȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱemporalisation et de 
la constitution ȱȂ·Ȃ, writes Derrida (1967a: 5) in La Voix et le 
Phénomène Ȯ ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ Ȃȱȱȱ
Ȃȱapproches concrètes. As did Husserl, Marcel wished to break from the 
traditional, logocentric conception of ontology proposed by Western philosophy. But 
as Chapter Two has demonstrated, Marcel also privileged presence in his 
characterization of authentic (intersubjective) temporality, and, by means of his 
separation of (temporal) existence and (the eternal presence of) être, seemed to found 
his metaphysics on a binary opposition, which in turn appeared to confound his plans 
to reconceive ontology. The error, Chapter Two suggested, lay in the decision to treat 
phenomenology as ontologically instructive: ȁa ressource de la critique 





continûment avec une non-présence et une non-perception [...]. Ces non-ȱȱȂt pas, 
Ȃȱȱéventuellement le maintenant actuellement perçu, elles participent indispensablement et 
ȱ¥ȱȱ·ȂȱǻȱŗşŜŝǱȱŝŘǼǯ 
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phénoménologique est le projet métaphysique lui-¹Ȃǰȱȱȱ(1967a: 3) in 
La Voix et le Phénomène. And this temptation, Derrida ȱȱȁȱȱ¸Ȃ, can 
be symbolized by the desire to link phenomenological time with time as such: 
le concept de temps appartient de part en part à la métaphysique et il nomme 
la domination de la présence. Il faut donc en conclure que tout le système des 
concepts métaphysiques, à travers toute leur histoire, développe la dite 
ȁ·ȂȱȱȱȱǽǳǾǰȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱautre 
concept du temps, puisque le temps en général appartient à la conceptualité 
métaphysique. 
(1975: 73; my emphasis) 
 
In other words, Derrida is claiming that to philosophize about time is, in itself, to be 
complicit with the metaphysics of presence, because to conceptualize time is already 
to postulate a metaphysics, and, he insists, there can be no conception of metaphysics 
other than one of presence Ȯ precisely because of its conceptual nature, which aims to 
expose the true character of Being, to present Being as it is. Time itself is therefore in 
need of deconstruction. 
 
If Derrida is right, then there is ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱidance 
of the ontology of time. Indeed, it is significant Ȯ and arguably commendable Ȯ that he 
explicitly refused to relate phenomenological time with ontological time. Nevertheless, 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ-edged, for if this is true, the consistency of his 
concrete investigations of human Being is only called into question all the more. Just 
as for Heidegger, ȱȱȂȱ that Ȯ as Wood writes Ȯ the dialectical experience 
of ȱȱȁwill provide him with a horizon (the horizon, he claims) [... which will] 
open up the possibility of thinking Being itselfȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱŗřŞǼ. ȁIn principleȂ, Wood 
observes, ȁthe question of Time seems subservient to the question of BeingȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱŗřŞǼǲ 
and accordingly, Marcel does not elevate its status to the same level. ȁButȂǰȱhe 
continues, ȁit soon becomes clear that thȱ ȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱŗ39). 
This last remark is especially pertinent with respect to Marcel, for although his 
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philosophical approach can be compared with Heidegger, unlike Heidegger he does 
not link (ontological) Being and time, but instead attempts to confine his discussion of 
time to the phenomenological. Yet, it does not, in fact, seem possible to isolate the two 
ǰȱȱȂȱal analyses of time prove inextricably bound to 
his ontological conclusions. Ȃȱȱis therefore his failure to recognize the 
intimate link between the question of time and the question of Being. Time may not 
exist as an entirely separate ontological and epistemological object from human reality 
(MarcelȂ irrelevance of time argument), but this does not mean that it can be 
considered without reference to ontology. ȱǰȱȂȱ¢ȱ (in the 
discussion following ȁȱȱȱȂǼ for avoiding the questȱȁȂ-ce que le 
tempsȂ, in favour of an investigation into its phenomenological experience, waȱȁȱ
ȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ¹ȱ¥ȱ
lui donner un sens [ontologiquement, en lui-même]Ȃ (Hersch and Poirier 1967: 28). Is 
ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱǵ 
 
The question remains, however, as to whether Derrida is right to declare that any 
notion of time is inherently metaphysical, or to assume (as he seems to) that there can 
be no form of metaphysics other than a metaphysics of presence. LawlorȂ (2003) 
radical (Deleuzian, post-structuralist) reading of Bergson would suggest the contrary, 
arguing that Bergson succeeds in challenging phenomenology and the metaphysics of 
presence for two main reasons: first, because his metaphysics equates Being with 
memory Ȯ that is, it defines Being in terms of what is past, as opposed to what is 
ǲȱȱǰȱǰȱ ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱǻȱ
ȱȁȂǼǰȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ-totalizing conception of presence, where 
presence is not yet presence to consciousness, but remains a non-representational 
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experience of the vital movement between the objective (matter, extension) and the 
subjective (mind, spirit).6 
 
For Bergson, time is not internal to consciousness; rather, consciousness is internal to 
time. This is crucial to the non-totalizing character of his philosophy: because time 
ȱȱȁȂȱ ȱǰȱȱcannot be presentified and 
philosophized about unproblematically. In fact, because our lives are predominantly 
past,7 it is Ȯ if anything Ȯ what we conserve of the past (memory) ȱȁȂȱȱ
content of the present moment (Lawlor 2003: 46). FurthermoǰȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ
memory (and of presence to consciousness in general) is non-representational, and 
thus is not concerned with objects. Rather, in Matière et mémoire (1896) Bergson defines 
ȱȱȱȱȁȂǱ ȁȱ¸ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȃȄǯȱȱ
ȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱ
appelle une représentation, mais moins que ce que le réaliste appelle une chose Ȯ une 
existence à mi-ȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȃ·ȄȂȱǻb: ŗŜŗǼǯȱȁȱ··ȱȱ
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ·ȱȱ·ǱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ
¸ȱȱȱȱȱÉȱ¹Ȃȱǻb: 219), Bergson proceeds to argue. 
The significance of le souvenir-image (see Chapter One) now becomes clear. Just as my 
perceptions are images, reflective of the possibles of action I might intend, memories 
are also images, which, through a dilation of my awareness away from the 
simultaneity of the present instant and into the layers of my past experience, come to 
inter-penetrate and inform my present experience, directed by my projects of action. 
Tǰȱ ȱ¡ǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
6 A direct link to Deleuze can be made here. See Rodowick (1997: chap. 2). 
7 ȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ¹ǰȱȱȂȱȱǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
existant, il est déjà passé. Que si, au contraire, vous considérez le présent concret et réellement vécu par la 
conscience, on peut dire que ce présent consiste en grande partie dans le passé immédiat. [...] Nous ne 
percevons, pratiquement, que le passéǰȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱ¸ȱȱ·ȱȱȂȂȱ
(b: 291). 
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selection of images from the whole of images called matter [...]. Insofar as 
consciousness is the selection from the whole of images called matter, Bergson does 
not define consciousness as consciousness of something; rather consciousness is 
Ȃ (2003: 27; my emphasis). 
 
So Bergson is not content to talk about what presently exists; or rather, if existence is 
anything, it is not fixed in any present Ȯ be it objective or subjective. Instead, the 
present of Being is the realm of action, flux, and change. ȁȱ·£ȱ
arbitrairement le présent ce qui est, alors que le présent est simplement ce qui se faitȂȱǻb: 
291), he writes. In the present moment, the (present, objective) materiality of the world 
collides with the (past, subjective) memory of my life. But only for an instant, because, 
ȱǰȱȁȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱ¹Ȃȱǻb: 281) means that 
matter Ȯ and therefore my relation to matter Ȯ ȱ¢ȱǯȱȁ¢ȱ
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱ ǰȱȁȱȱȱȱ
conceiving time in terms of the present, since the present is nothing more than a 
ȃ-ȱȱȱȱȄǯȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ (2003: 
49). So, unlike traditional metaphysics, ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
to consciousness. Being may be defined in terms of time, but Being-in-time is never 
stable. Instead, it oscillates between the past and the dynamic present, between 
contemplation and future-ȱǲȱȱǰȱȱ ǰȱȱȁ ȱȂȱ
of Platonism and the metaphysics of presence it instituted (2003: ix-x). 
 
If Lawlor is right, it is all the more ironic that, in seeking to distance himself from 
Bergson, Marcel consolidated his subservience to a philosophical tradition which he 
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thought Ȯ thanks to Bergson Ȯ he had succeeded in escaping. Bergson appears to hold 
the key to a radical new ontology that breaks free from the metaphysics of presence, a 
metaphysics that Marcel too wished to reject. One therefore recalls with pathos how 
adamantly Marcel ȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
conception, for this is emblematic of MarcelȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
idealism, not to dismiss it as he intended. Indeed, as Deleuze (1925-1995) has 
Ǳȱȁ nous avons tant de difficulté à penser une survivance en soi du passé, 
Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱǰȱȂȱȱ·ȱȂ¹ǯȱȱȱ
ȱȂ3ȱȱȂ¹-présent. Pourtant [pour Bergson] le présent Ȃȱ, il serait 
âȱȱȂ (2004: 49). It seems that Marcel experiences precisely this difficulty. 
 
Bergson is certainly more rigorous than Marcel, then; but the interpretative difficulties 
that the third section of Chapter Two drew to our attention continue to make any 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
with ontology, in the traditional sense, he can indeed be accused of philosophical 
inconsistency. However, although Marcel clearly states that his preoccupation to be 
ontological,8 it is not obvious that his understanding of ontology is the same as what is 
ordinarily understood by the term. In fact, in a 1970 interview with Boutang he stated: 
ȁȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȂȱ
(GM: 63). I want to suggest, therefore, that Marcel may still have challenged 
traditional metaphysics on some level Ȯ albeit using a highly clumsy and confusing 
vocabulary. Even if he  ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
philosophy was offering, he might still choose to take issue with the direct nature of 
ȂȱǯȱIndeed, in the interview with Boutang cited above, Marcel defined 
his conception of ȁ¢Ȃȱas something indirect and inescapably hermeneutical: 




ȁȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȂǰȱȱȱǰȱȂȱ·¡ȱȱce que nous voulons 
dire ȱȱȱȱȂ¹ȂȱǻGM: 63; my emphasis). So, given the difficulties 
Part One has exposed, both in declaring Ȃ interest to be unambiguously 
ontological, and in restricting a reading of his philosophy to the phenomenological, 
might a thoroughly hermeneutical interpretation in fact prove more fruitful?
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Part Two: Time and the Problem of Hermeneutics 
Chapter Three: Narrative Time 
 
Part One ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ
problematic, for although he plainly declares his disinterest in its ontology, he 
nevertheless is concerned with human Being. Owing to the temporal character of 
human existence, time is thus necessarily bound up with MarceȂ ontological 
investigations. The conclusions he draws from his phenomenological approches 
concrètes, which make reference to both an experience of finitude and of eternity, 
therefore (indirectly) reify what Marcel only intended to be a phenomenological 
distinction between time and eternity. As such, Ȃȱ¢ȱȱtime emerges 
as paradoxically concerned, and unconcerned, with both ontology and 
phenomenology; and in seeming contradiction  ȱȂȱ¢ȱrealist (as 
opposed to idealist) project, time risks becoming subordinate to eternity. 
 
Ȃȱȱȱize a dialectical experience of both time and eternity, and 
his efforts to relate and reconcile the two existentially Ȯ albeit on an indeterminate 
level of analysis Ȯ are reminiscent of Saint AugustineȂ (354-430 CE) account of time in 
Book XI of his Confessions (397-400 CE). Here, Augustine also comes to understand the 
temporal notions of past, present, and future as a distension of a (more authentic) 
eternal present. The contrast between temporal fragmentation and this foundational 
unity then causes the absence of eternity to be experienced as a lack, analogous to 
Ȃȱexigence ontologique. Furthermore, the status of time with respect to ontology 
is just as puzzling in Augustine as it is in Marcel. As Garrett DeWeese notes: 
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱng idealist about time; time 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃ (2004: 120). But it is nevertheless the 
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phenomenological character of time that is emphasized in Augustine, leaving us to 
wonder how exactly our human consciousness and experience of time relates to 
ontology. 
 
However, such a discussion of time and eternity is considered important ¢ȱêǰȱ
who, in Temps et récit (1983-5), proposes a reading of Augustine that makes this 
tension between the phenomenological and the ontological intellǯȱȂȱ
reflections draw êȂȱȱto what he calls ȁǽǾȱ¸ȱaporétique de la 
spéculation sur le temps [sic]Ȃ (TR III: 19), which renders reflection about its nature 
forcibly inconclusive.1 As Muldoon explains, ȱêǰȱȁthere is no one time that can 
adequately account for both ordinary [ontological/cosmological] time and a purely 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃ Ȅȱ¡ȱȂ (2006: 29); 
and this is because ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȂnstant) sans 
ȱȱȱȱ··ȱǻȱ·Ǽȱȱ·Ȃȱ
(TR III: 177). Yet, continues ê in Temps et récit III (1985): 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂȱ
pas renier la ȱȱȱ·ǯȱȂǰȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱ
un premier exemple, ce trait fort singulier de la théorie du temps, que tout 
progrès obtenu par la phénoménologie de la temporalité doit payer son 
avancée du prix chaque fois plus él·ȱȂe aporicité croissante. 
 
(TR III: 19-20) 
 
ȱêȱȱnot accuse Augustine of failure, but instead points to how 
Ȃȱȱȱȱnding of the experience of time, and, 
drawing further evidence from his detailed analyses of Aristotle, Husserl, Kant, and 
Heidegger, proceeds to generalize his suspicion that no pure theory of time is 
ascertainable, whether it be ontological or phenomenological. Rather, the aporias that 
arise from such attempts to think time (directly) can only be untangled through the 
                                                        
1 ȁȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻTR I: 24). 
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mediation of narrative,2 the mode in which Ȯ êȱȱȮ human time is (always) 
conceived and articulated, for it enables one to make impersonal ontological time 
Ȃ own, and thereby bridge the gulf separating phenomenological and 
cosmological time: ȁLe temps raconté est comme un pont jeté par-dessus la brèche que 
la spéculation ne cesse de creuser entre le temps phénoménologique et le temps 
ȂȱǻTR III: 439). Through its constant, creative, and indeed personal 
mediation of the tension between the phenomenological and the ontological, therefore, 
narrative time both recognizes, and (furthermore) renders productive, tȂ apparent 
inscrutability. 
 
The similarities between the presentation of time in Marcel and Augustine open up 
the possibility of a parallel resolution of the tensiȱȱȂȱǯȱȱ  of 
this thesis will thus ¡ȱȱȱȱȱêȱding of time in Marcel, 
seeking to establish whether, by means of such a hermeneutical interpretation, a more 
coherent analysis of his philosophy is possible. The first section of this chapter begins 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱstudy of time in the Confessions,3 and 
describing the way êr responds to this. It then explains how AuguȂȱ¢ 
of time may be usefully compared to Ȃ, and  ȱêȂȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ
therefore be seen as relevant and illuminating with respect to the difficulties Part One 
ȱȱȂȱ¢ǯ Section two then reveals that narrative time is in 
fact ȱȱȂȱ¡ȱ, suggesting a êȱ of time in 
Marcel to be particularly pertinent. And section three examines the relationship 
between narrative time, ontology, and ethics, in an attempt to shed further light on 
                                                        
2 ȁȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ··ǰȱȱt le 
·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻTR III: 435). 
3 Book XI of the Confessions ȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱ h the nature of time. For 
consideration of time in his other works, see Sorabji (1983: 31-32); Leftow (1991: 73-111); DeWeese (2004: 
126). 
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what Pedro Adams refers to as the ȁȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢Ȃ 
(1966: 183) ȱȂȱ¢ǯ 
 
3.1 Time, Eternity, and Narrative: Augustine ȱê 
 
ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱConfessions famously commence 
 ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǰȱand a simultaneous confession of ignorance 
regarding its nature: 
What is time? Who can explain this easily and briefly? Who can comprehend 
this even in thought so as to articulate the answer in words? Yet what do we 
speak of, in our familiar everyday conversation, more than of time? We surely 
know what we mean when we speak of it. We also know what is meant when 
we hear someone else talking about it. What then is time? Provided that no 
one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know. 
 
(1998: 230, XI. xiv.17) 
 
Although Augustine does appear to make some progress in the detailed reflections 
that follow these remarks, it is significant that he never answers the question. 
Moreover, the question that is being asked is actually rather difficult to determine, so 
it is unclear whether Augustine is conducting an enquiry into the nature of time itself, 
or simply its psychological apprehension.4 It is this interpretative difficulty that 
interests êǯ 
 
Augustine begins his examination of time by observing the paradox of its existence. 
While intuitively one feels that time must exist, once a philosophical explication of its 
nature is attempted it appears that it cannot, since none of its parts Ȯ the past, the 
present, and the future Ȯ can truly be said to exist:5 
ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱǯȱ
 ȱȱ¢ȱȁȂȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
now present and the future is not yet present? Yet if the present were always 
present, it would not pass into the past: it would not be time but eternity. If 
                                                        
4 See DeWeese (2004: 112). 
5 This paradox was originally ȱȱȂȱPhysics (350 BCE). See Aristotle (1994: Book IV, parts 10-
11; parts 12-ŗŚȱȱȂȱȱȱȱǼǯ 
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then, in order to be time at all, the present is so made that it passes into the 
ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂǵȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
will cease to be. So indeed we cannot truly say that time exists except in the 
sense that it tends towards non-existence. 
(1998: 231, XI. xiv.17) 
 
On this analysis (and just as in Marcel)ǰȱȁȱȂȱȱȁ ȱȂǲȱȱ¢ǰȱ
Augustine insists, wherever the past and future exist, they too must exist as present, 
otherwise the paradox of their non-existence will reoccur: 
If future and past events exist, I want to know where they are. If I have not the 
strength to discover the answer, at least I know that wherever they are, they 
are not there as future or past, but as present. For if there also they are future, 
they will not yet be there. If there also they are past, they are no longer there. 
Therefore, wherever they are, whatever they are, they do not exist except in 
the present. 
(1998: 233-34, XI. xviii.23) 
 
His solution, therefore, is to postulate a three-fold present: if the past, present, and 
future cannot be located outside the mind and said to exist as such, they must instead 
be considered qualities of the mind, which all exist within ȱȂȱǱ 
What is by now evident and clear is that neither future nor past exists, and it 
is inexact language to speak of three times Ȯ past, present, and future. Perhaps 
it would be exact to say: there are three times, a present of things past, a 
present of things present, a present of things to come. In the soul there are 
these three aspects of time, and I do not see them anywhere else. The present 
considering the past is memory, the present considering the present is 
immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation. 
 
(1998: 235, XI. xx.26) 
 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱ ȱ
vexes him as a result of his reflections on Ȃ paradoxical non-existence.6 Indeed, 
we seem to be able to measure time, and frequently speak of periods past, present, 
and future as differing in length. But if the past, present, and future do not exist to be 
measured, what is it that we are measuring when we speak of and compare varying 
periods of time? AuguȂȱ-fold present leads him to conclude that 
it is in you, my mind, that I measure periods of time. [...] That present 
consciousness is what I am measuring, not the stream of past events which 
                                                        
6 See Augustine (1998: 231-33, XI. xv-xvi; 235-42, XI. xxi-xxvii). 
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have caused it. When I measure periods of time, that is what I am actually 
measuring. Therefore, either this is what time is, or time is not what I am 
measuring. 
(1998: 242, XI. xxvii.36) 
 
ȱȱȁpurifies the present from being anything remotely instantaneousȂǰȱ
Muldoon explains; ȁit is extended rather, in relation to certain intentions (intentio). The 
mind distends itself (distentio) actively between present attention, past memory, and 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂ (2006: 
33). More specifically, distentio denotes the dispersal and fragmentation of the self over 
ȱȱȱǱȱȁȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ
ȁȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȂǰȱȱ(1998: 243-44, XI. 
xxix.39) proclaims. Intentio, on the other hand, denotes the concentration and 
unification of the self when it is focused toward the true present of Being: 	Ȃȱ
eternal simultaneity. 
 
ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱConfessions is often interpreted as an argument 
for Ȃȱ¢ǰ7 where time is understood as a psychological construct that 
exists only in human minds, and acts as a fragmentation of and distraction from the 
eternal reality of GodȂȱ. Closer examination of his text, however, shows that 
Augustine recognizes time as something objective,8 this being most evident when 
Augustine rejects the definition of time as the movement of the heavenly bodies: ȁȱ
heard a learned person say that the movements of sun, moon, and stars in themselves 
constitute ǯȱȱȱȱȱȂ (1998: 237, XI. xxiii.29), he writes. If these 
¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ, 
Augustine suggests, wish to say that there was no time by which one could measure 
                                                        
7 ǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŗǱȱřśřǼǯ 
8 As Sorabji notes, ȱȱȱȁ ȱȱsay that time is unreal: he finds it, with its distractions, all 
ȱȂȱǻŗşŞřǱȱřŖǼǯȱȱ Wetzel (1995); Quinn (1999: 834 especially); DeWeese (2004: 112, 126). 
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the revolutions of the wheel (1998: 237, XI. xxiii.29); and if the sun completed its circuit 
from east to west in the space of one hour instead of twenty four, we would not wish 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱhe movements of heavenly 
bodiesȂȱ(1998: 238, XI. xxiii.30), he concludesǲȱȁȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȂ (1998: 239, XI. xxiv.31). For Augustine, then, 
objects in the external world exist independently of what is thought about them, so 
the movement of objects themselves cannot be time; time is something independent.9 
 
And yet, Augustine then seems to argue that time is mind-dependent, associating its 
extension with the extension of the mind as opposed to anything external, and thereby 
presenting time as a purely phenomenological phenomenon. It is at this point that it 




mean when we speak of time (and measurements thereof),10 the answer to which 
cannot be assumed to be the same as the answer to the former. ȱȱ ȱêȱ
notices, and in Temps et récit III he responds: 
ȱȱ·ȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱùȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
seule distension ȱȂȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȂ¡ȱȱe la mesure du 
ǯȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂȱȱ
vacillé dans la conviction que la mesure est une propriété authentique du 
temps [...]. Pour Augustin, la division du temps en jours et années, ainsi que la 
                                                        
9  ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁǰȱǰȱȱtical time, of 
itself, and from its own nature flows equably without regard to anything external, and by another name is 
called duration: relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or 
unequable) measure of duration, by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; 
such as an hour, a day, a month, a ¢ȂȱǻŗŞŚŜǱȱŝŝǲȱ76 according to online numbering). Previously, motion 
had actually been considered more fundamental than time. Augustine is thus one of the first thinkers to 
separate the two decisively. For discussion of how our modern conception of time developed, see Turetzky 
(1998: especially chaps 5-6). 
10 It is interesting to note that both of these questions are ȱȱȂȱȱession of 
questions about time. See above. 
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capacité, familière à tout rhétoricien antique, de comparer entre elles syllabes 
longues et brèves, désignent des propriétés du temps lui-même. 
 
(TR III: 21-22) 
 
ê, then, ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȮ the 
phenomenological time of the three-fold present, and a cosmological time that is 
distinct from and envelopes all wordly objects11 Ȯ and declares that these are 
incommensurable. Furthermore, he contends, it is never possible to delineate a purely 
phenomenological time of the self because, as Ȃȱȱȱ
demonstrate, phenomenological time and cosmological time mutually contaminate 
each other: 
Ȃ·ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱ




à leur insupportable dissentiment. 
(TR III: 21) 
 
To support his thesis furtherǰȱêȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǯȱFirstǰȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱȱ·n le changement physique qui 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǵȂȱ(TR I: 48). Indeed, surely expectation 
and memory cannot exist without reference to physical change outside the mind, that 
is, without some form of cosmological reference point? ȁuel accès indépendant 
avons-ȱ¥ȱȂ¡ȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱpurement ȃȄȱ
ȂǵȂ (TR I: 48)ǰȱȱǯȱȱȁȂ·ȱȱȱ··Ȃǰȱȱȱ
êǰȱȁǽǾȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ la mesure est 
ȃ·ȄȱȱǱȱȱȂâme ȱȃȄȱ¥ȱȱȂȱ ȃȄȂȱǻTR I: 48; 
my emphasis). ȱêǰȱȂȱ-fold present does not solve the problem 
of time, but merely displaces it, creating an internal problem instead of an external 
                                                        
11 ȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşşŞǱȱŘřŞǰȱǯ xxiv.31). 
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one. ȁȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ-being in the sense of external 
¢ȱȂǰȱwrites ȱ¢ǰȱȁȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ




du passé, et le présent du présent. Ainsi voit-il la discordance naître et renaître 
de la concordance ¹ȱȱ·ȱȱȂǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ǯ 
 
(TR I: 49) 
 
ȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱ ǰȱ ȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱtuation in relation to eternity, for this is what provides the 
possibility of unity and stability: ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱplénier de la 
distentio animiǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ··ȱȂȱǻTR I: 50), êȱremarks. 
But as Kearney notes, ȁȱǰȱ¡¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
character of the eternal Word that we fully realize just how distended and scattered 
ȱȱȱȂ (2005: 149)ǯȱǰȱêȱǰȱȂȱȱȱ
eternity only intensify the human experience of time, and call for an internal 
hierarchization of the soul, which layers its temporal experience in an effort to bridge 
the gap between the distended present and the eternal present (TR I: 50-51). The 
ȱȱȂȱcity has therefore been replaced with a new problem for 
personal identity: the different levels of this reconceived notion of temporalization 
fracture the self in order to accommodate a unified conception of time. Hence, 
Augustine cannot even be said to provide a satisfactory phenomenology of time,12 
because of the further contradictions his theory creates for personal identity. The only 
way of resolving these tensions, ê argues, is to recognize both the reciprocity of 
the phenomenological and the cosmological and their radical difference, and to seek a 
                                                        
12 ȁȱȂ¢ȱȱǰȱ£ȱǰȱȱ··ȱȱȱȂȱǻTR I: 23). 
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poetic (rather than theoretical) solution to the aporias these create13 Ȯ namely through 
the mediation of narrativǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱùȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȱȱȂȱ(TR I: 105), he asserts. 
 
Marcel of course differs from Augustine in that he does not intend to reconcile the 
paradoxes of time itself; he considers such an endeavour to be misguided Ȯ 
illegitimate even Ȯ as testified to by the antinomies of time themselves. The difficulty 
in Marcel is in fact the reverȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂ attempt to 
reconcile (ontologically) the dichotomy between the subject and the object (primarily 
in opposition to Descartes) succeeds only in displacing the problem, creating, as 
Chapter Two proposed, an external tension between time and eternity where an inner 
conflict existed before. This external division between the temporal and the eternal is 
the dilemma that ends up troubling Marcel, manifesting itself in the difficult relation 
between existence and être. And yet this divide should never have been instituted in 
the first place, because Marcel only intended to engage with time on a 
phenomenological level. It therefore seems that, in spite of himself, Marcel has not 
been able to help but refer to time on a cosmological or ontological level, thereby 
ȱêȂȱ¢ȱȱcosmological and phenomenological time 
mutually affirm and occlude one another: neither can be substituted for, nor derived 
or analysed in isolation from, the other without generating irresolvable aporias; they 
are incommensurable. ȁȂȱȱȱ·, à laquelle répond de diverses 
¸ȱȂ·ȱǰȱȱ··ȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ¥ȱȱ
les deux bouȱȱȱÉǱȱȱȱȱȂ¦ȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱêȱȱ
Temps et récit III. ȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȱ
Ȃȱ·ȱ¢ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂ 
                                                        
13 ȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ	ȱpoiesis, which signifies the activity of creating or 
making. 
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réciproquement, dans la mesure même où elles Ȃ ȂȱȂȂȱ(TR III: 24-
25). If Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱêȂȱ
argument concerning the incommensurability of phenomenological and ontological 
time and the consequent importance of narrative, then, so in fact ȱȂǯ 
 
3.2 Narrative Time and IdentityǱȱȱȱê 
 
Not only do similarities between Augustine and Marcel enable links to be made with 
narrative time ȱȱ¢ȱêǲȱas the remainder of this chapter demonstrates, 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱ,14 suggesting a êȱ
reading of Marcel to be all the more legitimate as an approach to interpreting time in 
his philosophy. As will be seen, narrative time is in fact the underlying structure of 
ȱǻǼȱȱȱȱȱȱêǲȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱ visible in 
the form of his philosophy as well as its content, owing to his distinctive first-person 
style. 
 
Following his detailed study of the temporal dimension of human existence in Temps 
et récitǰȱêȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
only as regards the human understanding of time, but with respect to the very 
constitution of the self. Narrative identity in Temps et récit, ȱêȱȱSoi-
même comme un autre (1990), 
·ȱ¥ȱȱȱ·ǱȱȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱ¥ȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ¡ȱȱ
ȱȱȂ¡·ȱȱȂ·ȱȱux grandes classes de récits. 
                                                        
14 êȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱtoward a poetic 
resolution of its aporias in its fusion of philosophical argument and hymn Ȯ an interpretation which would 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱǰȱȱ-même oriente vers 
ȱ·ȱȱȱȱǽ·ǾǱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂ¢ȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ
XI [...] laisse déjà entendre que seule une transfiguration poétique, non seulement de la solution, mais de la 
question elle-¹ǰȱ¸ȱȂȱȱ-ȱȂȱâȂȱǻTR I: 24). However, critics such as Protevi 
(1999) have objected to such a reading, contending that it misrepresenȱȂȱǯȱȱȱ
¢ȱȱȱêȱȱȱȱȱȱl will be evaluated further in Chapter Five. 
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Ȃȱ·ȱȱȂ¢¸ȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ
recherché de ce chiasme entre histoire et fiction. 
(SA: 138, note 1) 
 
Indeed, here, êȱȱ history was never concerned with ȁȂȱ
cosmological time directly, nor fiction ever completely dechronologized, so that it 
bore no relation to the real world. Rather, the time of fiction and history stemmed 
from the same configuring operation Ȯ the narrative function Ȯ so that the 
understanding both modes reached was structured in an analogous way. Furthermore, 
their temporal reconfigurations always involved a reciprocal interweaving of the 
historical and the fictional: historical accounts always depended on creative 
imagination (that of the historian, when connecting the facts, but also that of the 
reader), inscribing phenomenological time into the cosmological time it sought to 
narrate; and fictional narratives were historical to the extent that the (unreal) events 
they presented were neveȱȁȱȂȱǻfaits passés) for the narrative voice, 
thereby inscribing cosmological time into the phenomenological (TR III: 344-45). But 
what these analyses lacked, ê realized, was ȁȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
est en jeu dans la questȱ¹ȱȱȂ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȱȱȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱ
·ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻSA: 138, note 1). ǰȱê 
refocuses and modifies his argument so as to emphasize that: (i) personal identity 
itself ȁȱȱ··ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱ
ȂȱǻSA: 138); and (ii) the configuration of (temporal) personal identity also 
involves a reciprocal interweaving of the phenomenological and the cosmological. 
Narrative time, he therefore concludes, is central to the development of a conception 
of self.15 
 
                                                        
15 Other scholars who argue for a narrative understanding of self include MacIntyre (1985), Taylor (1989), 
Dennett (1992), and Schechtman (1996; 2007). 
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The specific difficulty êȱȱȱȱtheory of (temporal) identity can help 
to untangle is ȱȱ¢Ȃȱ¢ (SA: 12). Positioning himself against the 
reductive simplicity of Ȃ notion of self, êȱȱ confront (and in so 
doing, affirm the reality of) this ambiguity, and, using the Latin distinction between 
idem and ipse, he argues for a distinction to be made between two different kinds of 
identity Ȯ idem-identity and ipse-identity Ȯ both of which need to be recognized when 
considering the lived reality of human time.16 Idem-identity refers to that which 
remains the sȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱpermanence dans le temps constitue le 
·ȱȱȱ··ȱǽȱȂ·ȱȱȱ·¢·ȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ
ȂidemǾǰȱ¥ȱȱȂȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȂȱǻSA: 12-13). On 
this level of identification, there is essentially no difference between persons and 
things, because idem-identity is only concerned with static, objective similarity, such as 
numerical or qualitative identity. By definition then, idem-identity is not affected by 
timȂȱ; it is an eternal constant. Ipse-¢ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȁȂȱ
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ·Ȃȱ
(SA: 13).17 Instead, it is grounded in the reflexive structure of human identity, and 
expresses a self-relatedness that does not rely on observable identity detectable 
through conscious (objectifying) reflection. It is only on the level of ipse-identity that 
the question qui suis-je? can arise. Whereas time was irrelevant for idem-identity, time 
is fundamental to ipse-identity, for the question qui suis-je? can relate only to 
                                                        
16 Schechtman (2007) argues similarly in her ȱȱ Ȃȱ(2005) critique of the narrative 
conception of self, which contends that we do not conceive of ourselves in accordance with one single, 
continuous narratǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱêǰȱ
Schechtman also considers it necessary to disentangle two different kinds of identity, and argues for a 
ȱȱȱȱ ȱȁȂȱȱȁȂǯȱȱȱȱnstitute oneself as a person, one need 
¢ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ-narratives, and thus it is not contradictory to 




ȃȄǯȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȃ¹Ȅȱȱ¢·ȱȱȱȱȂȱcomparaison; il a pour 
contraires: autre, contraire, distinct, divers, inégal, inverse. Le poids de cet usage comparatif du terme 
ȃ¹ȄȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ¹·ȱȱ¢¢ȱȱȂ·-idem et que je 
ȱȱȂ··ȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂ·-ipseȂȱǻSA: 13). 
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individuals, the distinctive identity of which emanates from the unique track they 
carve through time, reflecting their different Ȯ and indeed, ever-changing Ȯ temporal 
situations and experiences. 
 
Although radically different kinds of identity, the eternity of idem-identity and the 
temporality of ipse-identity are nevertheless related, in that both orders of identity are 
lived by the self. In Soi-même êȱ Ǳ 
Parlant de nous-mêmes, nous disposons en fait de deux modèles de 
permanence dans le temps que je résume par deux termes à la fois descriptifs 
et emblématiques: le caractère ǽȂidem; le que] et la parole tenue ǽȂipse; le qui]. En 
Ȃun et en lȂautre, nous reconnaissons volontiers une permanence que nous 
disons être de nous-mêmes. 
(SA: 143) 
 
Moreover, he ǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂidem de la personne sans 
ȂipseȂǰȱ ȁȱ¸ǰȱȂȱ·ȱȱȃȄȱȱȃȄȂȱǻSA: 147). An 
understanding of personal identity therefore demands an appreciation of both time 
and eternity. While idem-identity founds ȱȂ sense of spatio-temporal 
permanence and eternity of its character (e.g. firmly established dispositions or habits), 
it is from ipse-identity that the self draws an assurance that it can initiate something 
new and other, against the objective sameness of the idem (le que), and that it can 
nevertheless remain constant as a subject (qui) while undergoing such change Ȯ hence, 
 ¢ȱêȱntifies its form of temporal ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
word (see the citation above). ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱêȱȱȱ
the lived certainty of personal identity is not demonstrable through empirical 
verification, but is instead affirmed through an existential feeling of belief or 
confidence which ȱȱȁȂǯ18 ǰȱêȱȱȱȱȂȱ
                                                        
18 ȁȂȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱ¢¡ȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȂ·ǯȱǽǳǾȱȂȱ
fondaȱ¥ȱȱȱȂépistèmè, de science, prise au sens de savoir dernier et autofondateur, que 
ȂȱȂǯȱǽǳǾȱȂǰȱȱǰȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻSA: 33). 
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testimony to a certainty of self entirely,19 but he believes self-assurance to be 
characterized by a certain fr¢ȱȱ¢ǱȱȁȂȱȱǽǳȱǾȱ
ȱȱȂ¢ȱǽǰȱlui ·ȱǳǾȱȱ·ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȂȱ
ȱ··ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ (SA: 34). Ipse-
identity, therefore, ȁmet eȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂ··ȱȱ
de la mêmeté, à savoir la dialectique du soi ȱȱȂautre que soiȂȱǻSA: 13); and for 
êǰȱonly a narrative model of personal identity can mediate such a dialectic.20 
 
While Cartesian identity affirms the self in the present eternal ǻȁȱsuisȂǼ, narrative 
identity ȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȂ¹ ȂȱǻSA: 32); it is not 
static, but always in motion. Only by constantly relating difference (over time) to the 
same (the eternal), and marrying them in the story itself, can narrative introduce a 
dimension of unity.21 Through this continuous, yet open-ended, action of unification 
narrative identity then attests to the selȂȱȁ·Ȃȱȱȱȱiduality, in 
its ability to act while remaining a constant subject through time and change (ipse-
identity), as well as to endure in a more objective sense (idem-identity). ȁa créance [de 
ȂǾȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ¸ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǱȱȂȱȱȱ
attestation de soiȂȱǻSA: 34), writes êȱin Soi-même. But at the same time, he argues, 
ȁette confiance sera tour à tour confiance dans le pouvoir de dire, dans le pouvoir de 
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱÉȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻSA: 34). Thus, much 
more complex than Cartesian identity, êȂȱconfiance en soi Ȯ ȁȱȱȱȱ
Éȱȱȱ·Ȃǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱas 
                                                        
19 ǰȱêȱȱȱȱȁȂhumiliation [de Descartes] £ȱ£ȱȱȱȂȱǻSA: 33); 
some form of certainty, he believes, can still be affirmed (SA: 34-35, 347). 
20 ȁȱȱ·ȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱ·¸ǰȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ··ȱȱ
de ȱ¹·ȂȱǻSA: 167). 





someone Ȯ is not something that can be possessed or definitively stated, but is instead 
a dynamic constancy that is dependent on this saying and doing and on their 
continuation. David Carr explains: ȁȱ, dans ce sens, [...] Ȃ¡ȱȱ
·ȱȂȱȱȱȱ·¸ȱȱȱ··ȱȂǯȱ
ȂȱȂ¡ȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱ qui lui donne 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ·ȱȱ¡·ȂȱǻŗşşŗǱȱŘŗŖ-
11); ȁest personnage celui ȱȱȂ ȱȱ·ȂȱǻSA: 170; my emphasis), declares 
Riêȱin Soi-même. 
 
Although not explicitly presented as such, close inspection of Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ¡ȱȮ what it means to 
ȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱt oneself into 
the future Ȯ reveal narrative to be the underlying model upon which Ȃs account 





169).23 In fact, he continuedǰȱȁȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȃȱȄȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȱ
ȂȱǻME I: 169). However, he then proceeds to illustrate the extent to which any 
ȁ¢ of my lifeȂ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱ¡Ǳȱȱ
premières années ont été tǰȱȂ·ȱȱȱȮ Ȃinterprète ȱȱȱȂȱ
peut-être pas du tout été donné sous cette forme. Ai-je eu seulement conscience à cette 
                                                        
22 ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
êȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ǯ 
23 See also EC: 15. 
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·ȱȂ¹ȱǵȱȱȱ¡ȂȱǻME I: 170; my emphasis). He therefore 
declares: 
Tout se passe comme si rétrospectivement je répandais une certaine couleur 
ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȂÉȱȱ
ǰȱ¥ȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ
probablement impossible Ȯ et cela par définition Ȯ de prétendre que je raconte 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ǯȱȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱÊȱȱȱȱȱ
formons, un récit ne peut en aucune façon être une reproduction de la vie.24 
 
(ME I: 170) 
 
But if, here, Marcel rejects narrative as a way of (au¢Ǽȱȱȁ¢ȱ
Ȃǰȱ, I suggest, is because Marcel has misunderstood ȱȱȁȂǰȱ
interpreting it as meaning simply a story, as opposed to the ȁ ȱȂȱthat 
êȱ(1980: 178) understands it to be Ȯ which includes not only the story, but also 
the act of its configuration. ȁSo many authors have hastily identified narrative time 
and chronological time [...] because they have neglected a fundamental feature of a 
ȂȱȱȂǰȱê (1980: 177) writeȱȱȱȱȁȱȂȱ
(1980).25 In fact, what one must recognize is that 
every narrative combines two dimensions in various proportions, one 
chronological [or temporal] and the other nonchronological [or eternal]. The 
first may be called the episodic dimension, which characterizes the story as 
made out of events. The second is the configurational dimension, according to 
which the plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events. [...] To tell 
and to follow a story is already to reflect upon events in order to encompass 
them in successive wholes. [...] the humblest narrative is always more than a 
chronological series of events.26 
(1980: 178; my emphasis) 
 
Cȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ¡, however, actually reveals his description of the 
structure of self-¡ȱȱȱ ȱêȂ. This is what allows his notion 
                                                        
24 See also JM: 267. 
25 As far as I am aware, there is no original French version of this article. 
26 See also TR I: 291-92. 
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of personal identity to be interpreted as ǻêǼȱnarrative identity, in spite of his 
explicit rejection of narrative as a mode of self-understanding.27 
 
As early as 23 ¢ȱŗşŗŞǰȱȱ£ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȁǵȂ, 
ȱȱȱȁǵȂǰȱȱȱȱȱan abstract conception of self: 
le je correspond précisément à ce refus de poser la question quiǰȱȱȂȁil 
Ȃ¢ȱȱȱȂ. Seule une r·¡ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱ
même de cette ordre [...]. Mais il est [...] impossible de ne pas poser la question 




The answer to the question qui suis-je?, as Marcel later argues, lies in the past that I 
cȱȱȱȱȁ¢ȱȂȱȮ ȁȱȂ·ȱȱȱȂȱǻME I: 170), 
as he stated in his lecture ȁȱȂ. Part One has already shown memory to be 
ȱȱȂȱnderstanding of subjectivity, although the dialectic between 
time and eternity that his account involved appeared ǯȱȱȱȱȂȱ
philosophy is understood as narrative time, however, a much more fruitful Ȯ and 
crucially, more coherent Ȯ reading becomes possible. As Chapter One explained, 
Marcel refuses to conceive of memories as conserved ȁȂȱȱȱǯȱǰȱ
memories testify to the indeterminacy of meaning in general. For Marcel, the 
significance of my past is not directly knowable (as a que). A passive, impersonal 
record of my encounters, thoughts, and actions over time Ȯ that is, my past grasped 
through primary reflection Ȯ does not therefore ¡ȱȁ¢Ȃȱǰȱȱ¢ȱife is always 
                                                        
27 ȱȱǰȱȁȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ
ȃ¢ȱȄȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻŗşşśǱȱŗŝŞǼǯȱBut, Busch feels, 
secondary reflection is actually characterized positively when Marcel introduces the notion of 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ(1995: 181). As a consequence, he suggests, secondary reflection is an 
ȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ ǰȱcan be seen 
to prefigure êȂȱȱȱǻŗşşśǱȱŗŞŖǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱȱ
argument, it must be noted that this is not how Marcel understands narrative. On the contrary, his explicit 
discussions of narrative present narrative form as reductive and essentially negative. Busch does not 
acknowledge this complexity. 
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experienced as: as individual to me, as persȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂǯ28 
ȁȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱ·¹ȱȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǻME I: 177), he argued in 
ȁȱȂ.29 Thus, for a past truly to ȱȁ¢Ȃ past, its que must continue to hold meaning 
for me in the present. It is for this reason that Marcel describes a meaningful grasp of 
¢ȱȱȱȱȁȱȂ· ȱȱȂ.30 
 
ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȂȱȱȱȱȱȮ the fact that conservation 
of the past is also a personal and creative act of valuation:31 ȁȱȂ¢ȱȱrvation que 
ȱȂȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱvaut (la conservation impliquant la 
ȱȱȱȱǼȂȱǻJM: 151), writes Marcel in his diary on 10 December 
1918. Memory thus becomes the focal point of the continuity I experience in myself, 
the locus of personal identity, for to value (positively or negatively) is, at the same 
time, to assume myself, my individuality, because anything that is of true 
consequence to me has an impact in spite of the threat of temporal dispersion. For 
better or for worse, through the act of remembering (valuing), I actively choose and 
create myself (as a subject, qui): ȁȱȱsuis que dans la mesure où il y a des choses, 
ȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 224), Marcel declares on 17 December 
1919 Ȯ a statement which might also be said of ipse-identity, since êȱmodels this 
on fidelity to others. 
 
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȁȱȂȱȱȱ
clear that, for Marcel, if the experience of human existence is tensed, the structure of 
                                                        
28 ȁȱǰȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȱǻJM: 227; 23 February 1920). 
29 ȁȱȱ¡ȱȱ·ȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ-même, peut-être mieux vaudrait-il 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱ-¹ȂȱǻPST: 175). 
30 Marcel identifies his position with ȂȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡·ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȂêȱȱȂȱǻME I: 170-71). For a comparison of memory in 




our tensed experience is not objectively given. Instead, I structure my experience, 
interpreting it in accordance with what is significant, valuable, or felt (eternally) to be 
necessary to me,32 in dialectical relation with the (temporal) threat of change and 
dispersion. It is in so doing that I create my individual identity. Personal identity in 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱêǰ33 for narrative 
identity, as a poetic rather than a theoretical solution to the aporetic of time,34 relies on 
the productive imagination and therefore, as with Marcel, creatively re-figures time 
for me. ȁ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱȱȱ
·ǾǰȱȂest examiner les ressources de création ȱȱȂ·ȱȱ·ȱ
ȱȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻTR III: 12; my emphasis), writes 
êȱȱTemps et récit III. And as he notes in Soi-mêmeǱȱȁȱȱmédiatrice que 
lȂ·ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱâȱȱȱ¹·ȱȱȱȂ··ȱ
est essentiellement attestée par les variations imaginatives auxquelles le récit soumet 
ȱ·ǯȱǽǳǾȱȱǰȱȱ·ȱǽǳǾȱȱǯȱǽǳǾ Ȃȱ mise au 
ȱȱȂȱǻSA: 176). So, whereas Cartesian identity is straightforwardly 
ǰȱȂȱȱêȂȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ-constructed Ȯ or 
rather self-constructing: always in process, always becoming. Creativity, for both, 
manifests the irreducible quality of human Being. It is this that they feel the cogitoȂȱ
self-evidence threatens.35 
 
Such an interpretation is further confirmed by arguments made in another ȱȂȱ
1949 Gifford Lectures: ȁȱȱȱȃȱȄ: identité et prȂǯȱIn this lecture, 
Marcel addressed ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱ¡ȱȱǰȱ
                                                        
32 CǯȱêǱȱȁȂêȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱvoir notre praxis comme...ȂȱǻTR I: 155). 
33 ȁWithout life-values and the temporal action of which they are part, personal identity could not and 
would not be narratively structured; with such life-values, it necessarily isȂȱǻȱŗşŞśǱȱŜśǼǯ 
34 ȁȱǽȂ·ȱǾȱȱ·ȱǽȱȱ ǾǰȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ-théorique du 
ȂȱǻTR I: 24). 
35 Cf. also Bergson, who defines life as ȁ··ȱ·ǰȱ·ȱ·ȱ·Ȃȱǻb: 
ŜŚŜǼǲȱȁȱ··ǰȱ··ȱȂǰȱȱ·Ȃȱǻb: 1275). 
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and introduced the ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ
identity as ephemeral succession and discontinuity, and my identity experienced as a 
unity.36 This profondeur already resembles êȂȱȱ¢ in that it acts as 
a transcendent mediator between the tensions of unity and difference (eternity and 
time) that I experience in myself. However, the parallel extends further to include the 
ǰȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱêȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢, and 
which we saw Marcel stress in relation to memory. ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ
showed that my past is always experienced asǰȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱprofondeur 
shows that the same applies for my identity in general.37 My identity, as meaningful 
for me, relates to my past, present, and future together, all of which present 
themselves to me as mine in light of what I value. As with the past, a future can only 
ȱȁ¢Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱtoward it, devoted to it in accordance 
with my values (here the link with ipse-¢ȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱ
clearer). But configuring my present in such a way requires genuine will and creative 
action on my part Ȯ and ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ··ȱ·Ȃǰȱ
ȁȱ··ȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 119; 7 October 1932). Experiencing 
both my past and future (in my present) as affirming the same set of values is what 
then allows my life to appear unified,38 and enables me to experience the profondeur of 
my identity. And when this happens, explained Marcel ȁȱȱȱȃȱȄȂ, 
Ȃȱȱȱ¢·ȱȱȱȱsé.39 On dirait, si 
ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
36 Marcel first discusses la profondeur in his diary notes from January 1938 (PI: 37-45). 
37 ȁȱ··ȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ·ȱque je suis ȱ¹ȱȱ¥ȱȱ¸ȱȱȂ·ȱȱ
ȂȱǻME I: 210). 
38 ȁȱȱȱ·ȱdans et tendu vers. Engagé dans quoi [quel passé]? Tendu vers quoi [quel futur]? il 
[sic] Ȃȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱùȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȂȱǻPI: 47; 24 April 1939). 
39 Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ǯȱȱȱȂȱa of the future as pure novelty, affirming instead a future (where it is 
authentically experienced) that is in some way recognizable as part of the essence of my individuality. In 
ȁȱȱȱȃȱȄȂȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
perspective être conçu ou représenté comme simple innovation. Ȃȱȱȱue tout neuf peut être 
ȱ¢ȱȱȂȱǱȱȱȂȱúȱȱ··ȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱȱ




maintenant et le alors tendent à se confondre, [...] ne peut être que ce que nous 
ȱȂ··ǯ 
(ME I: 209) 
 
ȂȱȁȱȱLe Discours cohérent ȱȱȂȱǻŗŜȱȱŗşřŖǼ shed 




than asserting such an extreme opposition between infinity (or eternity) and time, 
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁǽǾȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǲȱncore que dans un 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻEA: I, 73). In order to illustrate his 
argument, he draws an analogy with the structure of a book: 




ȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȱise en pages. Et ceci ne veut pourtant 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂǯ 
(EA: I, 73) 
 
The pagination of the book, as a means of successive ordering, can be compared to 
chronology; and if the analogy is followed through, we can conclude that, for Marcel, 
temporal order, legitimate as it is, is nevertheless only one form of order, which 
should not be understood as contradicting other more fluid, global (and according to 
ǰȱȁȂǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱty.40 ȁȱ
·ȱȱȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ-
                                                                                                                                                  
is discussed in relation to his metapsychical experiences as well (EC: 107; Marcel (1999c)). The relation 
between the metapsychical and the future are discussed more generally in  EC: 109-10 and JM: 263. 
40 ǯȱȂȱmoi superficiel and moi profond. 
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¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱ··ȂȱǻEA: I, 74), 
insists Marcel. 
 
ǰȱȱêǰȱȱȱȱȱ necessity or eternity, which 
ȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱȱȂ ȁ£ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯȱǾȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȱȂ (ME I: 209). Indeed, the individual elements in 
any narrative are contingent; all of these (incidents, speech events, interactions) could 
have been different, or indeed might not have happened at all. However, once 
emplotted Ȯ that is, structured as a narrative Ȯ these elements become necessary to the 
Ȃȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱhe layers of internal significance 
that hold the narrative together.41 ȁȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ
observes êȱȱSoi-mêmeǰȱȁȱȂȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
qui aurait pu arriver autrement ou ne pas arriver du tout, eȱȂȱȱȱ
³ȱ¥ȱȂȱȱ··ȱȱȱ·ǰȱ¡·ȱȱȂȱȂȱǻSA: 169-
70).42 ȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ ȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
eternity, it can nevertheless be reconciled, namely through the intermediary mode of 
narrative. ȁȂȱ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȱ
ȱȱȂ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȃ¸ȱȱȄȂȱǻTR I: ŗřŗǼǰȱ ȱêȱȱTemps et récit I (ŗşŞřǼǲȱȁn lisant la fin 
dans le commencement et le commencement dans la fin, nous apprenons aussi à lire le 
temps lui-même à rebours [...]. ȱȂȱȱǰȱ··ȱȱȂȱȱȱ
                                                        
41 This act of emplotment ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱêȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ
Mimesis I refers to the pre-narrative structure (our pre-understanding ) of the world: the network of human 
capacities (the ability to structure, temporalize, and symbolize action using signs, rules, and norms) and 
practical forms of understanding (concepts such as agency, intention, circumstance, and consequence) 
which ground the possibility of narrative in the first place. Mimesis II is the creative configuration of events 
into an emplotted series Ȯ an imaginative composition or story. And mimesis III refers to the experiential 
impact of reading this story: by recognizing it as a representative form and integrating it (or at least a 
response to it) ȱȂȱg, the structure of the story is completed, and a connection is thus 
established between its text and the world (TR I: chap. 3). 
42 Recall that, for Marcel, contingency is identified with temporality. Thus the necessity-contingency 
dialectic can be identified with the dialectic of time and eternity. 
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une histoire, rend productifs les paradoxes qui ont inquiété AugustinȂȱ(TR I: 131). 
Hence, ȱêǰȱȱ ȱȂȱȱȱprofondeur, narratives come to signify a 
non-linear mingling of the past, present, and future.43 It is this Ȯ not chronology Ȯ that 




approfondir la temporalité. La chronologie Ȯ ou la chronographie Ȯ Ȃȱȱȱ
ȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¸ǯȱȱȱǰȱȂȱ
la temporalité elle-même.  
(TR I: 65) 
 
Thus, if we interpret the presentation of ete¢ȱȱȱȱȱêȱǰȱȱ
need not be conceived of as the static, isolated notion we saw Bergson criticize in 
Chapter One; it need not be understood in (ontological) opposition to time. On this 
phenomenologico-hermeneutic reading, time and eternity are both part of the 
structure of human temporality. This then allows for an experience of la durée which is 
ȁrupturedȂ and yet still continuous, and also manifests the creative possibilities of 
human understanding (mimesis I) and action. Indeed, fȱȱȱȱêǰȱȱ
is a mistake to conceive of (any single mode of) reflection as positing the subject 
directly, on an ontological level (as do Ȃȱcogito ȱȂȱ). 
Rather, reflection continues to create the subject through its engagement with, and 
transcendence of, chron¢Ȃȱȱdeterminations, thereby affirming a certain 
ontological foundation (through its reference to cosmological time), while, at the same 
time, placing the possibility of individual action at the centre of personal identity 
(through its concurrent relation to personal, phenomenological time).44 ȁȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱ
philosophie ou de vie philosophique sans une sorte de constante réinterprétation qui 
Ȃ¡ȱȂȱȱȱȱ··ȱ contenu fondamental: mais cette 
                                                        
43 See also Rêȱ(1980: 174). 
44 ȁȂ¹ȱȱȱ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻDH: 107). See also JM: 
180; PST: 84-85; RI: 150. 
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inaltérabilité reste plutôt visée et comme pressentie ȱȱ¡Ȃȱ
(DH: 11), declared Marcel in the first of his 1961 William James Lectures ǻȁȱȱ
·ȂǼ. 
 
However, time is not yet mine until I read and identify with the narrative I create: 
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȃȄȱǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȃȱ Ȅȱȱȱ
ȃȄȱȂǰ writes êȱ(1980: 178) ȱȁȱȂ. This dynamic, creative 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱnotion of secondary 
reflection must perform (it is even described as ȁrecollectionȂ),45 in order for it to be 
possible to grasp the significance of my life over and above chronology, over and 
above my life as understood through primary reflection. Indeed, as Marcel argues in 
ȁȱȂ, were I to have documented my every thought and move in a diary, it does 
not follow that, upon re-reading the diary, every entry will continue to hold 
significance for me. Indeed, I may have forgotten much of its content, and think 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ (ME I: 171-73). As ȱêȱ
and Marcel argue, therefore, the narrative act does not end at the stage of emplotment 
(mimesis II); I must be able to re-read, synthesize, and identify with the narrative on a 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȁ¢Ȃȱ¢ (mimesis III), if the 
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ¢Ȃȱ.46 
 
                                                        
45 êȂȱȱȱȱȱȁrȂȱȱȁȂȱȱȁȱȂȱȱȱ to the 
Heideggerian notions Rechnung and Gedenken. H ǰȱêȱȱalso ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ
relation to mimesis III (e.g. TR I: 131). 
46 ȱǰȱȁǽǾȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱection is the single most important characteristic 
ȱêȱȱȱȱȱǽ	ȱǾǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ
 ȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱêȱȱȃȄȱǰ  but it 
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱşŘǼǯȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱêǰȱȱIhde (1971: 8-9); Spiegelberg (1994: 590-91); êȱ(1995: 21, 35, 41-45); Dosse (1997: chap. 2 
especially). Other critics wȱȱêȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşşśǼȱȱBusch 
(1995). 
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Thus, although Marcel does not present personal identity as narrative identity himself, 
narrative Ȯ ȱȱêȱȱȱȱȱȮ nevertheless seems to be the 
underlying structure of personal identity in his philosophy. It is therefore possible to 
understand the ȁȂȱǻȱȱ ȱǼȱ¡ȱȱla durée that 
Marcel argued for over and against Bergson in terms of the dialectic of narrative 
identity Ȯ which must constantly mediate difference and sameness, time and eternity, 
contingency and necessity Ȯ rather than in the (direct) ontological terms that 
generated such a problematic in Part One. 
 
Interestingly, if ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ (implicitly) presents narrative as 
the key to constituting and conceiving a unified notion of identity over time, the first-
person ȱȱȂȱ ȱalso mirrors the structure of narrative identity as 
ȱ¢ȱêǯȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱ¡ȱȱerstanding of time and eternity. The 
remainder of this section provides an introduction to the significance of the narrative 
ȱȱȂȱ . Section three then further engages with this, in order to 




narrative conception of personal identity, the form of his texts also corroborates such a 
theory, for his philosophical trajectory over time is constituted by a range of different 
ȁȂ, the relation between which he narrates in order to maintain the cohesion and 
coherence of his philosophical identity. Indeed, Ȃȱ project, though 
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objectifiable as an investigation into human subjectivity,47 is also continually re-
examined and re-considered, often being cast in a different light as Marcel approaches 
this question from new angles, and in relation to different situations.48 Frequently, he 
also voices his difficulty in identifying with his earlier work, which appears to him as 
if it were written by another (e.g. EC: 80; FP: 5),49 causing him to ask the question qui? 
Thus, in the case of Ȃȱȱway from idealism emerge a number of distinct 
selves: his idealist, pre-World War I self; his transitional World War I self, who, 
confronted with the tragedy of existence, develops a concern for human individuality; 
and his ȁnon-idealistȂ, post-World War I self, who decides to embrace a more concrete 
approach to philosophy.50 Each self is discontinuous with respect to characteristics of 
the other selves, but at the same time continues ȱȱȂȱȱ
philosophical concern with the nature of human subjectivity. One can therefore 
¢ȱȂȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱêȂȱidem-identity, in that it 
represents a constant in his philosophical identityǯȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǰȱ
ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱêȂȱipse-identity, for this dimension of 
Ȃȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ¡ȱȂȱȱ
identity in its various human contexts, in the form of these different philosophical 
selves. And crucially, it is only through the overarching narrative of his break with 
idealism that Marcel is able to mediate ȱȁȂȱ¡ȱȱȱ ȱ
                                                        
47 In a diary entry dated 23 December 1932, Marcel declares that the question que suis-je? ȁȂȱȱǻEA: 
ǰȱŗŚŜǼǰȱȱȱȱŗşřŝȱ¢ȱȁȱȱȂȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱȱ¸ȱ·¢ȱȂǱȱȱ
suis-ǵȂȱ(PI: 28-29). See also DH: 31-32. While many critics have commented on the primacy of this concern 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǰ none have related it to the form of his writings. 
48 ȁ ǰȱȂȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǳǾǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
mindless reiterating of the same, it is rather a deliberate return to the central regions of ontology and a 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşŞşǱȱŚŝǼǯ 
49 Jeanne Hersch Ǳȱȁǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱ
bioǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ·ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃ¹Ȃȱǻ·ǰȱǰȱȱêȱŗşŝŜǱȱŝǼǯ 
50 Other philosophical shifts narrated by Marcel include ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ¢¸ȱȱȂȱo an 
ȱȱȁȱ¢¸ȱȱȂȂȱǻȱ1999: I, interview 3), a growing concern with justice and socio-
political affairs (Lhoste 1999: II, interview 8), and a later reluctance to characterize his notion of participation 
positively (PST: 279). 
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philosophical self: iȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ second (reformed) part of the 
Journal (1915-23) ȁȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ
ȱȱ¸Ȃǰ he still states that the two parts cannot be dissociated (JM: x). In this 
way, a meta-¢ȱȱȱȂȱ Ǳȱȱȱȱȱ
investigation of the self Ȯ which is itself explored through the lens of his own self, his 
individual (phenomenological) experience Ȯ is also narrated. This then rescues what 
may be seen as incoherence and fragmentation in his work (the two parts of his Journal 
ǰȱȱǰȱȁȱȂȱǻJM: ix)), reconfiguring it as a wider narrative project. 
 
In the words of Cain, therefore, ȁȱȃ ¢Ȅȱȱȱȃ ȄȱȱȂȱ are 
ȱȂȱǻŗşŜřǱȱŗŚ) Ȯ except that the scope of this observation is much greater 
than he, or indeed many other commentators have recognized. Troisfontaines, for 
example, states that, for Marcel, the question que suis-je? ȁȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȂêtre et sur 
le jeȂȱǻ1953: I, 223). However, he fails to notice that if Marcel examines the general 
ȱȱȱǻȱ¢ȱȁȂǼ when pondering the question que suis-je?, these 
difficȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȁȂȱȮ 
the double subject of his philosophical writings. Indeed, one might say Ȯ in keeping 
with his own philosophical language Ȯ that Marcel goes beyond a surface examination 
of Being that is based around le problème, in order to explore ȱ¢¸ȱȱȂ¹ ȁen quoi 
je suis moi-¹ȱ·Ȃ (EA: I, 146). As he stresses in En chemin (1971), ȱȱȁà partir 
de mon expérience ǽȱȱȱȱ·ǾȂ (ECǱȱŗřǼǲȱȁȂȱeu vraiment 
ȱȂ¹ȱ·ȱȱȱȱùȱȱȂȱȱ-même se 
ȱ·ȂȱǻEC: 22). Thus, Ȃȱautobiographical identity is inextricable 
from his philosophical identity.51 This is what provides the experiential basis for his 
                                                        
51 ȁWhen it comes to autobiography, narrative and identity are so intimately linked that each constantly and 
properly gravitates into the conceptual field of the other. Thus, narrative is not merely a literary form but a 
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approchès concrètes,52 and is also Ȯ as section three now demonstrates Ȯ crucial to 
appreciate when considering ȱȱ ȱȂ ontology and ethics. 
 
3.3 Being-with-Others: Narrative Time, Ontology, and Ethics 
 
One might protest, at this point, that sectiȱ Ȃ êȱȱȱidentity in 
Marcel seems primarily concerned with the question qui suis-je? Ȯ that is, with how I 
experience and understand my life as mine Ȯ whereas Marcel explicitly describes his 
philosophy in terms of a preoccupation with the question que suis-je?, suggesting that 
he seeks to establish a more general, ontological foundation for ǻȱȁȂȱ
experience of) temporal human identity. Indeed, as well as being instructive with 
respect to the qui of my ident¢ǰȱȂȱȱ profondeur also relates to a 
(universal) que. In his diary notes from January 1938, for example, where he first 
reflects on the significance of la profondeur, Marcel declares ȱȁȱȱȱ
remarques [...] pointe [...] vers uȱ·¢ȱȱȂȂȱǻPI: 44). And in Les 

ȱȱȂ
 (1951) he asserts: 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱùȱȱȱȱ¹ȱ
effectivement réalisée; elle ne le sera jamais ni entre les individus centrés sur 
eux-mêmes, eȱȱ·ȱ··ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂ·ȱȱ
ǯȱȱȱȂ-subjectivité sur laquelle repose mon dernier ouvrage 




Can a êȱȱaccount for this ontological thesis as well? 
 
Yes, is the answer, for as Dan Zahavi Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
to be understood as an epistemological thesis. [...] narratives do not merely capture 
                                                                                                                                                  
mode of phenomenological and cognitive self-experience, while self Ȯ the self of autobiographical discourse 
Ȯ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşşşǱȱŗŖŖǼǯ 
52 ȁ¢ȱȱ	ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ  
autobiographical. To many of his critics this evidences a contamination with the singular which precludes 
his work from achieving the status of a philosophy. In the Marcelian context, however, it is a healthy sign 
since philosophical meanings are grasped not by abstraction from the singular but through a reflection 
ȱȱȱȂȱǻȱ1987: 1). 
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aspects of an already existing self, since there is no such thing as a pre-existing self, 
ȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȂȱǻŘŖŖŝǱȱŗŞŖǼǯȱêȂȱnarrative identity 
combines both an epistemological and an ontological thesis, as it mediates between 
the phenomenological and the cosmologicalǱȱȁa compréhension [narrative] de soi 
égale à la constitution de soi. ȂȱȱȂ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
manière constitutivȱȱȱ¹Ȃǰȱȱ¡ (1991: 209). ǰȱȱǰȱȁ 
conception [...] ne veut pas dire que le sujet se crée ex nihiloȂǲȱȁȱȱȃ¹·ȄȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ
ȱȱȱ·¥ȱȱǰȱǽȱǯǯǯǾȱȂȱ¥ȱȱȱȱǽǾȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŗǱȱŘŗŗǼǯȱIn addition to reconciling my identity with the 
otherness of myself, then, narrative identity emphasizes the connection between my 
identity and that of others. IȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ
ȱȂȱ¢ȱequally intersects with the identity of other characters, and 
thus the Ȃȱȱȱ ȱ in a web of narratives, all of 
which mutually constitute and affirm one another.53 One can therefore only make 
sense of oneself through Ȃȱinvolvement with others.54 êǰȱ, affirms Being 
as intersubjective; hence, narrative time continues to be apt as an interpretation of 
time in Marcel. 
 
The narrative mode ȱȂȱȱ¡ǰ observed at the end of section two, 
makes this intersubjective foundation all the morȱ¡ǰȱ ȱȱȂȱ ȱ
active (narrational) participation in his philosophy. Thus, continuing to draw parallels 
 ȱȱȱêǰȱhis final section of this chapter will re-engage with the 




constitutive for the self. The self cannot be thought without the other. In its becoming, the self must 
encompass otherness, the dissimilar. That means Being includes passivity: all the experiences in which the 
self is forbidden to occupy the place of foundation. This is why the self can attest to itself only in a broken 
fashion [...]. The self must incorporate this other  ȱȱȂȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ
ȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȂȱ ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻȱȱ
ȱ
2002: 86). See SA: 368-69. 
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form ȱȂs writings, in order to demonstrate how his entire philosophical 
methodology acts, through narrative, to affirm an underlying ontology of 
intersubjectivity. Narrative time therefore becomes ȱȱȂȱȱ
engagement;55 and as will be seen, this proves instructive with respect to understanding 
the ethical dimension of his philosophy as well. 
 
ȱȱ ȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȱ
coherence of his philosophy actually depends ȱǰȱȱȂȱ£ǰȱ
interpretative narratives concerning his philosophical development are pivotal to 
shaping and unifying his philosophical position over time. But Marcel also uses 
narrative on a second, rhetorical level, where narrative in fact acts as the ȁȂȱ
underwriting his investigations into the nature of human experience.56 On this level, 
the narrative ȱȱȂȱ¡ provides a ground on which the narrator (Marcel) 
and the narratee (the reader or listener) can come together, drawing persuasive power 
from the possibility of identification this creates.57 As he states in the introduction to 
his Journal, his aim is ȱȁȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ-
¹ȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȂǰȱȱȱ
ȁȂȱȱ¡nces to which he testifies (JM: ix).58 Consequently, its structure can be 
said to conform ȱȂȱ(1895-1975) chronotope of the road. In general, the 
                                                        
55 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ-m¹ȂȱǻȱŗşśřǱȱŗŚǼǯ 
56 ȱȱȱȱȂȱDiscours (1637) and the diary-like style of his Méditations 
(1641; 1647), on the other hand, seem to jar with his philosophical quest for certainty. Although, in the 
Discours, Descartes explicitly states that he wishes the reader to come to their own conclusions about his 
ǰȱȂȱMéditations take the DiscoursȂȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
expound a universal Ȯ and allegedly irrefutable Ȯ philosophical method for truth, and yet still presenting his 
thought in the most subjective of ways. This renders questionable both the opening rhetoric of the Discours, 
 ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȂȱȱȁȱȂȱǻŗşśŗǱȱřŗǼǰȱǰȱȱȱsame time, 
the mode of philosophizing that underpins the allegedly universal discoveries in the Méditations, which Rée 
ȱȱȱȁȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŗǱȱŝŝǼǯȱJudovitz (1988) 






ȱȱ¡ȱȂ¡·ȂȱǻJM: ix; my emphasis). 
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chronotope of an artistic work configures a relation between the text and the world, 
by means of a spatio-temporal structure of expression that it creates.59 And ȁȱȱ
ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱThe Dialogic Imagination 
(1975)ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞŗǱȱşŞǼȱȮ 
that is, its potential for encounter. Indeed, out on the open road, any variety of reader 
or listener can encounter the narrator. Time spent together then correlates with 
ground covered, as both parties go forth, explorer-like, toward whatever discoveries 
their journey might bring. Jȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȁȂȱȱȱ
literature (1981: 98), Marcel also accorded an adventurous character to his 
philosophy,60 drawing an analogy between the structure of his philosophy and the 
image of a road or path Ȯ a rather crucial analogy it seems, for in the introductory 
session to his 1949 Gifford Lectures he insisted upon asking his audience for 
ȱȱȂȱȂȱȱǽȱȱȂȱ··ȱ





(ME I: 10) 
 
Through the use of this chronotopic first-person narration, therefore, Marcel seeks 
actively to create a spatio-temporal relation between his philosophy and the world Ȯ a 
relation where the philosophical and the literary in fact converge, demonstrating his 
rejection of systematic, presentifying modes of discourse.61 
 
                                                        
59 It ȱȱȱȁȱinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically 
¡ȱȱȂȱǻBakhtin 1981: 84). 
60 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
seulement de la répugnance qȱȂȱȱȱȱ··ȱȂ¡ȱǰȱȱȱȱ
¸ȱ¢·ǰȱ¡ȱȂȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ·¡ȱ
ȂȱǻJM: ix). 
61 ȱȂ¢ȱǱȱȁȱȂȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ	abriel Marcel in terms of a personal 
research in which the ontological status of the person undertaking it is intimately involved. At the same 
time, the concept of person itself furnishes a focus of integration for a philosophy that is admittedly 
impatient ȱ¢ȱǯȱȱ ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŜŜǱȱŝǼǯ 
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For this reason, MȂȱ¡¢ȱapproches concrètes are more evocative than 
demonstrative. Nevertheless, Marcel still believes their indirect form to be of value.62 
Like êǰȱȱ to separate truth from method, as if truth were something 
ready-made, an object that could simply be grasped.63 ȱêǰȱȱȱȱ
unreal or illusory; they project a possible world that can intersect with the world of 
the reader, proposing orientations toward others, objects, time, and space, with which 
readers can imaginatively experiment, and thereby explore their ontology. This then 
helps to inform and shape their relationship to the actual world, so their 
ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ·ȂȱǻSA: 188), writes 
ê in Soi-même. Marcel may not have made this argument in such explicit terms, 
but it is nevertheless implicit in his method, for stories provide a primary means for 
his ontological explorations. He frequently asks his readers or listeners to imagine a 
particular situation, such as: ȱȂȱ ch (e.g. JM: 140; ME I: 92), coming across 
an unknown flower and wondering what it is (ME II: 16), or being confronted with a 
dilemma dramatized in one of his plays.64 He then talks them through these examples 
Ȯ narrates these situations or experiences to his readers or listeners Ȯ so that they 
might ask themselves the same questions, encounter the same complexities, and 
¢ȱ¢ȱ ȱȂȱǯ65 
                                                        
62 Bourgeois has therefore described Marcel ȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŗşřǼǱ 
ȁȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŗşŞǼǰȱ
he argues; ȱȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
something worthwhile to say, especially when it interprets existȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŘŖśǼǯȱFreeman 
(2003) also believes that narratives are epistemologically significant. He argues for a need to rethink our 
ȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱêȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
particularly valuable for such a reconsideration. In fact, Freeman ȱȂȱbrief commentary on telling 
ȱ¢ȱȱȂȱfriends (ME I: 171) in support of his opposition to the equation of reality with the immediate 
ǻŘŖŖřǱȱŗŘřǼǯȱȁȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂǰȱhe  ǲȱȁȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
this, I believe, lies in moving beyond clock time and seeing in narrative time [...] a possible inroad into 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŗŘŚǼǯ 
63 ȁ¢ǰȱȱêǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱǻ£ȱŗşşŗǱȱŚşǼǯ 
64 Plays commonly cited include Le Palais de sable (1913), Ȃ (1923), Un homme de Dieu (1925), Le 
Monde cassé (1933), Le Dard (1936), and Ȃ1 (1945). 
65 
ȱǱȱȁ¡ȱ¢ȱȱȱsigned to conceptual thinking will naturally take the 
ȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŗşśŚǱȱŚŚŗǼǯ 
 138 
To give but one example, in the first of his ŗşśŖȱ	ȱȱǻȁȂ-ce que 
Ȃ¹ǵȂǼ, Marcel discussed ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȁ-est-ce que cette 
ǵȂǰȱwhile out on a walk with a friend. ȁȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȂǰȱ
Marcel observedǰȱȁȂȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱ¸ȱȱȱ
ȂȱȱȱȂȱ·¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱÉȂȱǻME II: 16), and 
I will be able to situate the flower within a classification system. Nevertheless, 
although this answer enables a certain amount of progress, it is not an exhaustive 
response, and is even, in a certain sense, evasive.66 ȁȱ¡ȱȱȱ¥Ȃǰȱȱ
explainedǰȱȁȂȱȱȱâ·ȱȱ·ȱ¹ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱǽǳǾȱ
comme si ma question était interprétée de la manière suivante: à quoi ȂȱȂȱ
cette fleur elle-même peut-ȱ¹ȱ·ǵȂȱ(ME II: 16). The ontological implications 
of this situation are then analysed: just as a botanical system can only classify the 
flower in accordance with characteristics possessed by flowers other than the one in 
question, any systematization of human Being is inevitably an abstraction, unable to 
express its singular experience. Furthermore, tȱȱȁȂ-ȱȱȂǵȂȱȱ
only apply to that which can be objectively designated Ȯ or so it seems, until one 
realizes that implicit in such referentiality there is always a triadic order of relations. 
Indeed, the flower does not tell me its name; my botanist friend does.67 The nominally 
objective relation between the flower and its name actually rests on the wider 
intersubjective context grounding all common understanding68 Ȯ and thus the flower 
                                                        
66 ȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ¸ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱǱȱȃȂ-ȱȱȂȱȱȱǵȄȱ
Nous voyons cependant aussitôt que même cette réponse plus scientifique qui me permet de situer la fleur 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻME II: 16). 




·ǲȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ me dit son nom par le truchement du botaniste; je serai amené à voir 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻME II: 17). 
68 ȁȱȱ·¥ȱúȱ··ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱCe que nous appelons 
·ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ·ȱǰȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻME II: 18). 
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example becomes an argument for the intersubjective community that is primary to 
Ȃȱ¢ǯ69 
 
If Marcel comes to any conclusions in this lecture, these are not reached through 
deductive analysis. Instead, their logic can be compared to that of a story. ȱêȱ
writes in Temps et récit IǱȱȁǽȱȱȂȱǾȱȂȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȱ·ȱ·ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂǰȱȂȱ
comprendre comment et pourquoi les épisodes successifs ont conduit à cette 
ǰȱǰȱȱȂ¹ȱ·ǰȱȱ¹ȱȱacceptable, comme 
ȱȱȱ·ȱ·ȂȱǻTR I: 130; my emphasis).70 Similarly, to 
ȱȂȱophy is to identify and empathize with his personal 
reflections on the nature of experience; it is, in fact, already to legitimize his 
ȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
all of these contribute to Ȯ or renȱȁȂȱȮ the broader (ontological) 
conclusions that he draws. ȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȂȱ
phenomenology. 
 
Furthermore, Ȃȱȱ¢ȱitself can be interpreted as an active affirmation 
of the intersubjective ontology to which his phenomenological studies testify. Indeed, 
in the same lecture cited above ȱȱ¢ȱȱȁle terrain sur 
ȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻME II: 12). 
Accordingly, MarcelȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ
                                                        
69 ȁȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȂ-·ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱtréfonds 
ǰȱȂȱ·ȱ·ȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ
seraient regardés comme exclusivement mythiques. [...] ȱȱȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
conscience plus ou moins distincȱȱȂ·ȱ-ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱ
[sicǾȂȱǻME II: 20). 
70 ȱȱêȱ(1980: 174); TR I: 267-68. 
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rhetoric of its narratives,71 makes an outward appeal to others and their individual 
experience, requiring the presence of a reader or listener for the completion of its 
arguments.72 The integral role played by the reader in the understanding (and 
ȱǼȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱêȱ ȱȱ£ȱ ȱ
respect to narrative (this is mimesis III)ǯȱȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱ
(published 1991), he declares: 
the process of composition, of configuration, is not completed in the text but 
in the reader and, under this condition, makes possible the reconfiguration of 
life by narrative. [...] more precisely: the sense or the significance of a 
narrative stems from the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the 





This capacity was something Marcel wished to write into his philosophy too. ȁCe qui 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¡ǰȱȂȱȱ¡ȱ¥ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻPIǱȱŘŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȂȱ
(1937), for as he explained in the 1973 paper ȁȱȱȱȂǱȱȁȂȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱ¸ǰȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȂȱȱ·Ȃ (1976: 9). 
Indeed, ȁthe time of a narrative is public timeȂǰȱwrites êȱȱȁȱȂȱȮ 
ȁbut not in the sense of ordinary time, indifferent to human beings, to their acting and 
their suffering. [...] Through its recitation, a story is incorporated into a community 
which it gathers togetherȂ (1980: 175-76). For this reason, Kevin Vanhoozer 
summarizes, ȁȱǰȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱbeing-with-
othersȂ (1991: 46). It is by means of this temporal mode that Marcel hopes his 
philosophy can make a genuine intersubjective appeal, offering Ȯ and hopefully, 
                                                        





through a process of identification, also demonstrating Ȯ the possibility of an 
encounter with others.73 The form of his philosophy is indissociable from its content. 
 
Such an undertaking, however, is easier said than done, for while to narrate is always 
to suggest how a specific sequence of events should be considered meaningful, 
meaning is not something one can ever wholly control. Marcel is painfully aware of 
this, to the extent that in the introduction to the Journal, his philosophical meta-
narrative warns of how ȱȱȱ ȱȱȁ¡Ȃȱȱȁ¡Ȃ, 
because the reader, as his compagnon de routeǰȱ ȱȱȁǽ·ȱǯǯǯǾ à mes hésitations, à 
ȱȂȱǻJM: ix). So, not only does the narraȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱ
attempt to affirm the intersubjective foundation of Being through its creation of a 
shared temporal experience between the narrator and the narratee; it equally testifies 
to the difficulties of giving voice to human experience, relating the arduous and 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ
especially the haziness, equivocity, or undesired nuances of words he committed to 
paper. ȁȂȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 123), Marcel bemoans in 
a 1914 diary entry (7 May)ǲȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ
ȂȱǻEA: I, 13), he writes in another on 29 February 1929. 
 
But this only manifests more completely ê attestation, described in Soi-même 
as ȁȂȱȂ¹ȱ-¹ȱȱȱȂȱ(SA: 35),74 and is in fact pivotal to 
                                                        
73 The significance of the form ȱȂs philosophy is also affirmed (indirectly) ȱȱȱȁȱ-
ȱȱȱȱǵȂȱǻȱŗşŜŞǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁen art, la subjectivité tend 
à se transmuer en une inter-·ȱȱ·ȱȱȂobjectivité telle que la conçoit la science, mais 
qui déborde cependant absolument les limites de la conscience individuelle réduite à elle-¹ȂȱǻPST: 20-
ŘŗǼǯȱȁȱȂǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȁȂÉȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ ce que 
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂ·ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ
Ȃ-à-ȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱǻPST: 19-20). The 
ȁȱ¡Ȃǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢Ǳȱȁȱȱ
considérations à certains égards analogues peuvent être présentées en ce qui concerne ce que nous avons le 
ȱȂȱȂ¡·ȱȂȱǻPST: 21). 
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Ȃ anti-dogmatism (anti-presentification). Indeed, for Marcel to formulate the 
experience of human subjectivity in any positive, universally valid manner is 
immediately to come into tension with his critique of objectivity, as he is forced to fix 
its nature in order to provide any positive characterization at all. As is visible in the 
meta-narrative of his narratives, Marcel struggles with this conflict of interest 
throughout his philosophical career, at once aware that he is grounding his reflections 
in his own singular experience and perspective, which he does not wish to impose on 
others, but also of a truth about subjectivity that he feels transcends his own particular 
situation.75 One thus senses a certain loneliness in his philosophical writings, 
comparable to that which Alquié portrayed in a 1956 lecture, later published as Ȃ-
ce que comprendre un philosophe. ȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂ une solitude 
ȱȂ·ȂȱǻŘŖŖśǱȱřŗǼ, Alquié declares. ȁȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȱȂ·ȱȂ¦ȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȂȱȱǯȱȱȱ
ȱǰȱȂȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·· universelles, et 
ȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱ¡ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖśǱȱŘŝ-28). 
 
However, MarcelȂ decision to publish his diary and use of the narrative form in 
general manifest his determination to resist the barrier that universal solitude 
potentially represents,76 his commitment to remain disponible to others and hope to 
ȁ£Ȃȱȱȱǯ77 ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱ
¡ȱȱǰȱȂ-à-ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱ
de façon à parvenir à un certain équilibre dont on puisse se satisfaire soi-¹Ȃ, he 




75 ȁȂȱȂailleurs bien volontiers que cette métaphysique me cause à moi-même un sentiment de malaise; 
est-ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱǵȂȱ(JM: 250; 27 October 1920). 
76 ȁǽȱǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¹ǰȱǽǯǯǯȱǾȱȱ¹ coup, il est voué à une certaine 
ǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȂǯȱȂȱ¹ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻPST: 49). 
77 See especially PI: 32-34. 
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insisted in the late lecture ȁȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
(published 1968).78 ȁȱȱȱȱâȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
charge Ȃ·ȱȱȂȱȂȱ¹ȱȂȱȱÉȱȱǰȱ
ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻPST: 40).79 And this then helps 
us to understand the ethico-¢ȱ¡ȱȱȂs philosophy presents us 
with. FȱǰȱȁȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 55; 7 November 1930). ȱȱȱȱȂȱ
philosophy into narrative form is therefore insufficient; his narratives are not 
meaningful unless they succeed in communicating something to someone else. As 
such, the other is always already invoked. Each (narrative) philosophical assertion in 
the present is at once a commitment to engage with another in time; and thus, êȱ
declares in a 1988 paper he presented ȱǰȱȁ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱ(1989: 
158). 
 
So a êȱreading of Marcel has proved not only possible, but also fruitful, for it 
has helped to reveal the significance of narrative time ȱȂȱphilosophy itself, 
and has offered an explanation as to how the ethical dimension to his philosophy can 
be related to his ontology. The question that remains is whether such a philosophy of 
                                                        




desire for a reader other than himself [...] leads Roquentin finally to opt for the novel rather than the diary: 
ȃȱǯȱEt il y aurait des gens qui liraient ce roman et qui diraient: c'est Antoine Roquentin qui l'a 
·ȄȂȱǻŗşŞřǱȱ707; for the exact context of the citation, see Sartre 1938: 250). Similarly, it is the desire for a 
reader other than himself that leads Marcel to publish his diary as a philosophical work in itself. Not only 
this: ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ££ȱȱȁȱȱȱ¢Ȃǰȱ ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȁȱȱȱǽȱ
information] as a necessary counterpart to the song [, ...] as an indispensable element in his understanding 
ȱȱȱȂȱǻ2005: 191-92). As has been seen, biographical context is an equally essential 
ȱȱȂȱȱǯȱConsequently, both Marcel and Roquentin are, as 
Jefferson writes with rȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
whereby, having understood that a certain kind of art has been made possible by a certain use of biography, 
the art in question is then permanently vitiated by this knowledȂȱǻŘŖŖśǱȱŗşŗǼǯ That is, the art becomes self-
reflexively aware of its paradoxical status as both personal and universal Ȯ ȱȱȂȱ-narrative 
on his experientially grounded reflections illustrates. 
79 See also DH: 32. 
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time still (necessarily?) condemns it to a metaphysics of presence, as Derrida has 
suggested (see Conclusion to Part I), or whether, from the perspective of this new 
interpretation, Marcel can be considered to progress in his project to reconceive 
metaphysics as something more concrete and faithful to lived experience. One might, 
prima facie, ȱȱȱȱȂȱ in the case of this hermeneutical 
recasting, since a notion of identity founded on a narrative understanding of time is 
ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȁǽǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
de se déȂȱǻTR III: 446) and thereby seems to challenge an essentializing foundation 
of presence. ȱǰȱȱêȱȱTemps et récit III, narrative identity remains 
ȱȱȁȱȱȂȱ¸ȂȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȁǽǾȱȂȱȱȱ· stable 
ȱȱȂȱǻTR III: 446). And yet such multiplicity is affirmed only, I would argue, 
ȱȱǯȱêȱȱ¢ȱous of the move to privilege eternity over 
the change, movement, and difference of time Ȯ as is manifest in his critique of Hegel 
and totalizing (historical) narratives (TR III: 349-72), and more generally when he 
insists, again in Temps et récit IIIǰȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱ·ȱȱ
sournoisement redonné vie à la prétention du sujet constituant à maîȱȱȂȱǻTN 
III: 488). Nevertheless, the ontological horizon to which his notion of narrative identity 
ultimately relates Ȯ particularly following its development in Soi-même Ȯ ȁȂǰȱ
ȱȱ ¢ȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱr language and privileges the 
 ȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŚǼǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ
interrelation between historical and fictional (re-)figurations of time, narrative identity, 
in Soi-même, becomes the model for personal identity itself, aiming to answer (or at 
ȱȱ Ǽȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȁȂǯȱȱǰȱêȱ¢ȱ
succumbs to the very temptation of which he accuses Hegel, by assuming an overly 




ȱȱȂȂȱǻTR III: 364).80 It therefore seems, as Raphaël Baroni has 
ǰȱȱȁȂ·ȱȱȱȱêȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
hiérarchisation, sur une inclusion de la discordance dans la concordance, ce qui revient 
¥ȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱŗŜǼǯ 
 
For Marcel too, as illustrated by his notion of profondeur, the plural experience of the 
self that he intended to take seriously, in the end, only proves to be problematic for his 
account of identity, a problem that must be resolved Ȯ that is, returned to the stability 
of some kind of unity, albeit one that may be continually re-created and re-affirmed. 
Appearing to engage with the multiple nature of human identity, in ȁȱȱȱȃȱ
ȄȂȱȱǱ 
il existe une multiplicité non dénombrable de présences qui interfèrent les 
unes avec les autres et qui entretiennent avec le moi agent des relations de 
¢ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȂ¥ȱȱȱȱ




(ME I: 200-01) 
 
So not only do individuals enter into external, intersubjective relations with others; 
¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱǱȱȁȂ·ȱ
affecte le sujet lui-même [; ...] le subjectif dans sa structure propre est déjà, est 
foncièrement intersubjectifȂȱǻME I: 198).81 As a result, and as Marcel acknowledged in 
the lectureǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡¢ȱǱȱȁȂ-
ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
                                                        
80 For John Caputo too, Riêǰȱȱ
ǰȱȁȂǰȱȱȱȱȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ
ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȂȱǻȱŗşşŘǱȱŗŜŖǼǯȱ¢ǰȱȱ
ȱ ȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Hegelian than his (earlier) critiques 
might lead one to expect. 
81 ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱǻȱ¢ǰȱȱǼȱȱȱȱ
and external personal relations, for reasons of clarity it is useful to make a distinction between (internal) 
intrasubjective relations, and (external) intersubjective relations. 
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ȱȱȂ·ȱǵȂȱǻME I: 201). However, Marcel believes that it is still 
ȱȱȁȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȁunité et pluralité se conjuguent au 
ȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻME I: 198). In other words, Marcel is unable to 
accept (discontinuous) plurality for itself. He feels the need to resolve this conflictual 
experience, to re-assert his identity as singular and unified Ȯ the reality of which, it is 
ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱǽȱ¹ȱǾȂǰȱhe affirms at the 








(2003: 8-9). Such an observation seems equally pertinent in the case of Marcel. Though 
ȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱȱêȱȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱ
from the threat of tension and uncertainty in favour of productive, teleological 
synthesis, as is manifest by the way in which narrative time smoothes out breaks in its 
continuity and seeks to understand them as necessary to the narrative as a whole.83 
Difference or otherness is therefore subordinated to the eternity of the narrative form 
Ȯ or, more specifically, to the eternal return to the present, in relation to which 
everything is understood. Narrative time both anticipates the future and recalls the 
past in relation to the present moment. The future and the past are thus only ever 
                                                        
82 ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱ Ǳȱȁȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱȱȱ




83 ȁêȱȱȱse the role of language, preferring instead to see it as a tool at the service of 
self-knowledge rather than as something that constitutes consciousness and is open to constant 
Ȃȱǻ ¢ȱŘŖŖřǱȱŞǼǯ 
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understood through the present; they are not significant in themselves. Hence, the 
movement and irreducible multiplicity of time, as well as the ruptures or temps morts 
that Marcel argued for (see Chapter One) are betrayed. The eternal still has the last 
word and Derrida still appears justified. Such a maîtrise of discordance is precisely 
what Lévinas has reacted against; and Lévinas has in fact singled Marcel out by name, 
as a philosopher guilty of reducing otherness to a totalizing experience of presence. 




ȱ ȱȱȱêǰȱȱ·Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȂȱǻle Moi) relation to time 
equally serves as a model for its relation to the Other (ȂȦ);1 subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity are inextricably linked. Uȱȱȱêǰȱhowever, 
(authentic) Lévinassian time is not conceived in terms of presence, but is absolutely 
Other. Rather than justifying a totalizing return to the Self, Lévinas believes that the 
paradoxes of (temporal) identity bear witness to a time that simply cannot Ȯ and 
therefore should not Ȯ be resolved. Only if such ruptures are accepted for what they 
are, he contends, can any relation with the Other be possible, a relation where the 
Other is not simply reduced to the eternal return to the Same (le Même)2 Ȯ that is, not 
simply identified with, and therefore appropriated by, the Self.3 But philosophy 
cannot help but appropriate the Other if it takes ontology to be its fundamental 
question, argues Lévinas, because of its desire to obtain a panoramic view of all things 
and relate existents to some common ontological condition or situation. For Lévinas, 
the whole of Western philosophy is therefore guilty of neglȱȱȂȱ
otherness, because it has always ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱ
ȱȱȱêȱȱȱǼ, and sought to understand Being as a whole 
from this starting point. Thus, he maintains, tȱȂȱ has only ever been 
understood in terms of the Self, reduced to the same ontological ground so that it has 
                                                        
1 When referring to Lévinassian conceptions of the Self and the Other (person Ȯ things are not absolutely 
Other for Lévinas, because they can be mastered by the Self), ȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱ·Ȃȱ
own practice. Not only does this affirm the Self and Other as absolutely distinct, but also reflects the 
transcendental character of his phenomenology, which, seeking to ascertain the conditions for the very 
possibility of subjectivity (and all aspects of its experience), entails a more abstract discussion. As will be 
seen, Lévinas later speaks of le soi, in addition to le Moi. This development remains intimately bound up 
with his thought on time, and thus engagement with the evolution of his philosophy will be important for 
this chapter. 
2 ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢¢ȱ ȱȱȁȂ (le Moi), with particular emphasis on the 
totalizing, presentifying nature of its comprehension (of its own being and actions, as well as its relation to 
others and the world). 
3 ȁȂȱ·¢ȱȱȱȂȱ··ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱǰ à tout impérialisme du 
¹ȂȱǻTI: 28). 
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never been specific to the Other as a singular individual, but has remained a Self-
centred construction.4 
 
Given that recognition of intersubjectivity and individual singularity is fundamental 
ȱȂȱprojectǰȱ·Ȃȱ of Western philosophy has the potential to 
dismantle his entire project Ȯ although, it must be said, ·Ȃȱjudgement of Marcel 
in particular is more complex than his view on Western philosophy in general. 
Lévinas has in fact ȱȂȱ ǰȱ ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ
Marcel (and also Martin Buber, whom Lévinas frequently discusses alongside Marcel 




ȂȱǻHS: 33). More specifically, writes Lévinas in Totalité et infini (1961): 
ȁ	¦ȱ¥ȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȂȱ·ȱ·ȱȱȱJournal 
Métaphysique de Gabriel Marcel et dans le Je-Tu de Buber la relation avec Autrui 
ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȂȱǻTI: 64), 
ȱȱȱȱȁǽǾȱsocialité ·ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ··ȂȱǻHS: 36), 
 ȱȁȱȱȱȂȱȂȱȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȂȱ(HS: 42). In the 
final analysis however, for Lévinas, Marcel ȱȁprofondément enraciné, malgré 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȂȂȱǻHS: 37): 
ȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ-ȱȱȱȂêtre [...]: la co-présence, 












Later in his career, however, Marcel claims that to read his philosophy alone is in fact 
to misread his philosophy, for no understanding of his philosophy is complete 
without an equal appreciation of the works he produced for the theatre.7 What 
implications, then, does thȱȱȱȱȱǵȱȱȂȱȱ
works are considered alongside his philosophical writings, is it still true to say that his 
theory of (intersubjective) time is bound to a metaphysics of presence? This is what 
Chapter Four aims to determine. The first of its three sections observes how Marcel 
himself was not entirely comfortable with (Self-centred?) narrative form, to the extent 
that he later privileges the non-narrative temporality of his theatre over and above his 
philosophy. Section two then analyses the ȱȱȱȂ theatre in detail, 
and explores how it challenges the discussion of time found in his theoretical writings, 
thereby complexifying the presentation of time in his work as a whole. Finally, section 
three will ask  ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱatre might be thought together Ȯ and, 
more specifically, whether any continuity can be found between the two which might 
offer grounds for a defence of his theory of time. 
 
                                                        
6 ȱȱǻ¢Ǽȱȱȱ·Ȃȱritique, but this, in all likelihood, is simply due to a lack of 
ȱ ȱ·Ȃȱ¢ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
seventh ȱȱȱǻȁ·ȱȂǲȱŗşŜŗǼ, where Marcel praises Totalité et infiniȂ ȁȱ
··Ȃ and, more generally, ·Ȃȱ-Hegelian interpretation of alterity. He appears surprised 
ȱ·ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȱ¹ȱ
ȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱ¹ǰȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȂǰȱ, recognizing such 
ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻDH: 170). In ȱȂ¹ 
(1974), however, Lévinas does ȱȱǯȱǰȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ¢, 
this is not to be understood as arguing for the absence of a relation between the Self and Other. 
7 ȁ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·¦ȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ
est existentielle dans la mesure même où ȱȱȱ¹ȱȱ·¦ȂȱǻEPR: 52). 
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4.1 Philosophy and Theatre, Narrative and Ethics 
If Lévinas contests the very foundation of Western metaphysics, his critique of the 
tradition is also ethical. In Totalité et infini ȱ Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱ··ȱ
ȱȱȱȱǱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱ¹ȂǯȱȱȁȂȱ
ȱ¸ȱȂȱȱ¹Ȃǰȱȱǰȱȁȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱ
du Même, qui ne se laisse pas ·ȱȱȂȂȱǻTI: 33; my emphasis). Western 
¢Ȃȱ£ȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱǰȱwhat it affirms is the 
arrogant appropriating power of the Self, which is allowed to dominate everything 
ǱȱȁȱȱǰȱȂǰȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¹ǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȂȱǻTI: 38).8 Not only, then, 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱêȂȱȱ 
accommodate otherness and time in their (ontologically-oriented) philosophies; it also 
raises the further question as to whether the precedence they both give to the 
ontological renders their narrative conceptions of (temporal) identity unethical. 
 
In this respect it is interesting to note that while, through his narrative acts of 
philosophy, Marcel seems to testify personally to the intersubjective ontology he 
wishes to affirm, the narrative act itself also troubles him, leading him to call it into 
question. In En chemin (1971), for example, Marcel describes how 
ȱȂȱǽǳǾȱ·ȱȱȱȱ·ȱ£ȱ¸ȱȱȂȱȱ






                                                        
8 In Totalité et infini ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢¢ȱ ȱȱȱǻȁȂ·ȂǼǯȱǰȱ
however, a distinction is drawn between the two, where ethics is identified with the Self-Other encounter, 
and justice with the institution of moral codes in an effort to command respect for the Other in action. In a 
ŗşŞŜȱ ȱ·ȱǱȱȁ ȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ
knowledge, and which supposes politics; it is inseparable from the political. It is something which I 
distinguish from ethics, which is primary. However, in Totality and Infinityǰȱȱ ȱȃȄȱȱȱ ȱ
ȃȄȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱǻȱȱ 1988: 171). 
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Not only was the initial formulation of narrative difficult for Marcel, then; experiences 
he ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ£ȱȱȱ¢ȱ
others. This perhaps explains whyǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ
volonté Ȃ·Ȃǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
as ontological reality (e.g. 1969: 257; EC: 133). Indeed, immediately following the 
above remarks concerning his disappointment, Marcel asks himself whether his 




bien loin de vouȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ǯȱ
ȱȂȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱǯȱȂ·-ce pas, 
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱȱȱn rencontrer chez celui ou celle à qui je 
ȱȱ·ǯȱ¸ȱǰȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱ·ǰȱȱȱ
¢ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱǰȱȱȱ





uncertainty, and of the evasive way he has reacted to such experiences, seeking, 
through acts of narrative, to remove doubt and regain security above alȱǯȱȁȂȱ
toujours, oui toujours, depuis la prime enfance, aspiré à me sentir en consonance avec 
ȂȂǰȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȂȂȱȮ the very crux of the 
matter when it comes to interpreting his philosophy (EC: 25).9 The fact that Marcel has 
not always achieved such consonance,10 seems, then, to have made him realize that he 
has possibly been too eager to affirm harmonious, intersubjective (and indeed 
intrasubjective) identification. 
 
                                                        
9 See also PI: 19. 
10 See also EC: 254. 
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In keeping with this self-evaluation, Marcel also Ȯ again in the latter part of his career, 
and especially in the 1961 William James Lectures11 Ȯ begins to rethink the status of his 
philosophy, and this leads him to emphasize the importance, if not precedence, of his 
theatre as compared with his theoretical writings.12 For many years, Marcel 
considered his theatrical creations to be a separate enterprise from his philosophical 
writing.13 Later, however, he starts to read themes and preoccupations explored in his 
dramatic works into his philosophy. As he writes in the preface to La Dignité humaine 
et ses assises existentielles, the 1964 volume in which the William James Lectures are 
published: ȁȂȱ··ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱ
¡ȱȱȱȱêȱǽle versant philosophique et le versant théâtral] qui ont 
··ȱȱȱ··ȱ·ȂȱǻDH: 8). Thus, Marcel comes to feel that his 
theatrical works ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱê;14 and because of this, many critics 
attempt to ȱȂ philosophy and theatre together. Yet, as Lazaron remarks 
in the preface to her 1978 studyǰȱȁwhilst stressing the importance of Marcel as a 
dramatist, [the works that ȱȱ ȱȱȂȱȱ ȱȱ
the last quarter century] fail to consider the plays solely as drama [, ... seeking only] to 
ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŗşŝŞǱȱŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
11 But see also EC: 82, 230-31, 247-48; EPR: 52-55, 56-58, 62-69; GM: 39, 54, 72, 93-94; Lhoste (1999: interview 




(1976: 9); and in an interview with Lhoste in 1973, Marcel also states that he would prefer to be judged by 
his theatre rather than his philosophy (Lhoste 1999: interview 4). 
13 Marcel began writing theatre years before he even began to study philosophy (this he started as a lycéen, 
in 1906; see EC: 60-61). His first (documented) play, La Duchesse de Modene (held at the Harry Ransom 
Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin), dates from 1902. Thus, as Marcel explains to 
Lhoste, his plays were ȁȱ¥ȱȱ··ȱȂȱȱǽǾȂȱǻLhoste 1999: interview 4; see 
also EC: 85; EPR: 53; Marcel (1914: 2)); ȁȱȱǽȱȱ·ȱ·¡ȱȱǾȱȂȱ
effectué dans ma pensée à une époque relativement tardive, a¡ȱȱȱŗşřŖȂȱǻRA: 297; see also Marcel 
(1969: 257)) Ȯ that is, shortly before Le Monde cassé  ȱȱȱȱŗşřřȱȱȁȱȱ
ȂǯȱHenceforth, he comments increasingly on the intimate relation between his theatre and 
philosophy (e.g. PI: 11, 17; Marcel (1952; 1966: 78-79)), stressing how his philosophy was often an 
articulation of themes he had explored earlier in his plays, and thus using certain scenes to illustrate 
philosophical ideas. However, he does not argue that his theatre is integral to his philosophy in the strong 
sense (where it is often given priority) until the William James Lectures and after. 
14 ȁȱêȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱ¸ȱ
indissolublement mes écrits philosophiquesȂȱǻDH: 18). 
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true for scholarship to date (including Hanley (1997), in addition to earlier works such 
as ChenuȂ (1948)), wȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ
his dramatic works, so that his plays (automatically) provide illustrations of (or even, 
ȱ
¢ȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȮ 
especially his affirmation of intersubjectivity. Lazaron, on the other hand, offers a very 
ȱǯȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȮ that is, as 
dramatic, performative works as opposed to philosophical mouthpieces Ȯ she 
identifies loneliness aȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗ978: 25).15 Indeed, the very 
capacity Ȃȱcharacters seem to lack is the ability to narrate experiences, in a 
manner that enables identification and understanding.16 Furthermore, the marked 





(1946: 286).17 If one wishes to take the later MaȂȱ(philosophical) preference for his 
theatre seriously, this difference must be taken into account.18 
 
                                                        
15 As Lazaron does not reflect on the philosophical implications of the aesthetic and performative 
dimensions with which she engages, however, her work fails to further enquiries into the relation between 
these two ȱȱȂȱêǯȱȱȱ¢ȂȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
shed light on what his plays bring to his philosophy, her analysis, despite being thorough and well 
observed, is more descriptive than it is critical, and mer¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȁȱ
ȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱŚřśǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
which this chapter hopes to sketch a more analytical response. 
16 Theatrical form does not, in itself, ȱȱǻȱȱ¡ȱȱǻŘŖŖŝǼǼǰȱȱȂȱ
characters find narrative problematic. 
17 ȁȱ-ȱȱȱȱȱêȱȂȱǻEAGM: 105). See also Marcel 
(1949b: 236; 1951d: 151, 154, 177); PI: 34. 




Marcelǰȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȮ to the 
extent that he presented his later preference for his plays as a kind of philosophical 
corrective. In a 1970 interview with Monestier, for example, he ȱȱȱȂȱ
ȁȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȂȱȱ··ȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşşǼ,19 and in En 
chemin he declaresǱȱȁȂȱȱȱ·¦ȱ tout, que se manifeste le caractère 
¡ȱȱȱêȂȱǻEC: 230). More specifically, he explained to Boutang in 
1970, ȁȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱ¸ȱǰȱȱȱ·¦Ȃǰȱȱȱȱ
maintained a prospective (dynamic, non-presentifying) ȱȁȱȱȱ
ȱ·ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ¡ǰȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱǽȱ·ǾȂȱǻGM: 39). ȁe 
·¦ȱȱ¡ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱǰȱ
par opposition à la pensée pens·Ȃ, he reiterated to Lhoste (1999: interview 4) in 1973.20 
 
More interestingly ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱ also appears ethical in 
motivation. In response to World War II in particular,21 Marcel became increasingly 
preoccupied with ethics. ȁȱȱȱȱ commande de plus en plus mes 
ȱȱ·ȱȱ··ȂȱǻEC: 243), he writes in En chemin.22 From the 
early 1930s onward he was gripped by a premonition of the war to come (EC: 146-47), 
causing him to become ever more anxious about the European situation,23 and inciting 
                                                        
19 See also GM: 54; Marcel (1976: 16). 
20 See also EPR: 68; GM: 39, 94; Marcel (1967b: 11-12); RA: 296. 
21 The First World War was, of course, influential; but as Marcel writes in En cheminǰȱȱȁȱ·ȱȱ
ruines laissées par la [première] guerre ne me quittait ȂȱǻECǱȱŗşǼǰȱȁȂȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱ
Ȃ·ȱ¸ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¥ȱȂ£ȱǰȱȂ·ȱȱ




22 Marcel ȱ£ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱêȱǻEPR: 96), Lhoste (1999: interview 8), and 
Boutang (GM: 94-95). When Boutang enquires as to how such a concern has impacted on his work, it is 
interesting that Marcel cites an example from his theatre rather than his philosophy. 
23 ȱȱȱȂȱŗşřřȱ¢ǰȱLe Monde cassé, testifies to this directly. ·ȱǱȱȁǽȱȱ·ȱ






greater socio-political participation on his part.24 But as Marcel writes in En chemin, his 
concern with justice did not come to its height until the years immediately following 
the war: 
toutes [les] circonstances [au cours des années qui suivirent immédiatement la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale] aiguisèrent en moi une exigence de justice qui 
avait toujours été mienne,25 mais qui se présenta à partir de cette époque avec 
ȱ¸ȱȱȱȂȱȂȱ-être pas affecté jusque-là au même 
degré. [...] depuis ce temps-¥ȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱ




Ȃ¡ȱȂȱ·Ȃǰ27 explains René Rémond (1989: 37), and as a result, 
Marcel dares to speak out forcefully against the épuration,28 and the conditions 
surrounding the trials of Pétain (although Marcel was opposed to the Vichy régime)29 
and Maurras (despite being a dreyfusard).30 These may appear strange reactions, but 
some elucidation is offered in En cheminǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ
                                                        
24 In 1934, hȱȱȂȱȱȱ	ȂȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱȱȱ
responsability of Christians at that historical moment, and rallied those who opposed the Conservative 
Right (Rémond 1989: 36). In 1937, he signed Ȯ along with Maritain, Mauriac, and Mounier Ȯ a manifesto in 
defence of the Basque people, following the bombing of Guernica and killing of noncombatants (ibid.; see 
also EC: 241-42). 25 February 1938 saw the publication of an article urging France to assume its 
responsibilities, so as not to betray the values it stood for (Marcel (1938))ǯȱȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ£ȱǻȱȁȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ
violated; breached in 1938 when Hitler invaded the Sudetenland) to be a scandal (EC: 171). And in 
ȱŗşŚŖǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȂȱ ǼȱEspritǰȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱǰȱ ǰȱȱ ǰȱȁȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȂȱ
ȱ¥ȱȂȱǻŗşŚŖc: 17). On Ȃȱ-political action and reaction, see especially Marcel 
(1983), but also EC: 98-99, 146-50, 163-66, 171-72, 177-79, 181-83, 187-89, 191, 193-97, 222-28, 241-46, 248, 259-
64. For commen¢ȱȱȂȱengagement, see Boutang (1989), Poirier (1989), Rémond (1989), and Volkoff 
(1989) (all presentations at the 1988 Marcel conference, organised by the Bibliothèque nationale and Présence de 
Gabriel Marcel). 
25 Especially since the Dreyfus affair, which, as for so many writers and intellectuals, had a significant 
impact on Marcel (EC: 40-41; EPR: 56, 97). Interestingly, Marcel states that what this event alerted him to in 
ǰȱ ȱȁȂȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ that this was exactly what his 
theatrical works were concerned to convey (EC: 40-41). So again, Ȃȱȱin dramatic, ethically 
charged situations can be related to theatrical expression. 
26 See also EPR: 99. 
27 See EC: 197. 
28 See especially Marcel (1983: 77-103) ǻȱȱȁȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱǭȱȂǰȱȱȱȱ
Canadian journal La Nouvelle Relève, 1946), but also EC: 223-24, 226; GM: 94-95. 
29 ȁȱ¸ȱ·ȱȱ·ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂomplit sa 
·ȱ¥ȱȂÉȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
¢ȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻEC: 225). See also EC: 178. 
30 At the first public meeting concerning the trial, Marcel annǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱ
mieux je me sens armé pour déclȱȂȱȱ··ȱȱȂȱ·ni de justice. [...] se montrer inique envers 









ȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱŚřǼǯȱFor Marcel, who was acutely aware of 
ambivalences and paradoxes, justice and individual circumstance took precedence 
over consistent judgement. Heǰȱ·ȱǱȱȁȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱ
¹ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂǰȱȱ
certaines surprenantes ou contradictoires, la clé me semble être dans la détestation de 
Ȃ·nce et une constante exigeȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱřŝǼǯ31 
 
Yet, Marcel did not feel that this concern was adequately communicated in his 
ȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȁȱȂȱǻǰȱŗşŜŞǼȱȱ
reprimanded himself for not sufficiently engaging with ethical questions in this 
¡Ǳȱȁȱȱ·ȱȂǰȱ¥ȱȂ¦ȱ·ȱȱȱȱǰȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱ-¹ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱȱ·ȱ




explained to Boutang Ȯ and heǰȱȁȂȱȱȱȱ·¦ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱ
                                                        
31 ȁȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱété si souvent sollicités, nous avons probablement trop 
prodigué notre signature [...]. Mais, dans bien des cas, je ne me suis pas reconnu le droit de refuser la 
ȱȱȂȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱs très général, 
je me déclare volontiers engagé Ȯ ȱ¥ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¸ȱ
ȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȂ·ȱȱ
ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱùȱȱȱȂȱǻEC: 227-28). 
32 See also EPR: 102-03. 
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·ǰȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ȂȱǻGMǱȱşŚǼǯȱȁȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱ
en tout cas à partir du Dard, et inclusivement, mes pièces ne sont pas du tout 
··Ȃǰȱ Marcel at a 1973 Cerisy-la-ȱǲȱȁȱȱ¥ȱ
ȂȱǰȱȱLe Dard [1937], le sera également dans [...] Ȃ1 [1949] 
et Le Signe de la Croix [1949]33 [..., et] aussi dans ȱȂȱȱȱ [1951], pour 
ne rien dire de Croissez et multipliez ǽŗşśśǾȂȱǻEAGM: 124).34 Indeed, all of these plays 
explore socio-political questions much more overtly and in greater depth than his 
philosophical writings and previous dramatic works (which tend to focus on 
interpersonal relations and questions of fidelity more generally),35 addressing such 
ethical issues as: anti-Semitism and genocide (Le Dard, Ȃ1, Le Signe de la croix); 
Jewish response to persecution (Le Dard, Le Signe de la croix); treachery, collaboration, 
and resistance during the French Occupation (Ȃ1); political engagement and 
patriotism in post-World War II France Ȯ including questions concerning the épuration 
and the rise of Communism (ȱȂȱȱȱ); and (a little different, but 
expressing similar social engagement) the ethico-personal implications of Catholic 
dogma for the daily lives of Church adherents Ȯ especially Catholic non-acceptance of 
birth control (Croissez et multipliez).36 
 
ǰȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȂȱǻȱ at Cerisy, 
1973) Marcel remarkedǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁǽǾȱȱȱle 
ȱȂ in his early works and onwardǱȱȁȱȱ·ȱté de dire 
                                                        
33 Republished with an epilogue in 1953. 
34 Here Marcel is reacting against Joseph ȂȱȱǻȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȂȱ
theatre, despite, in one sense, becoming more focused on the contemporary, largely transcends actuality 
(EAGM: 117). 
35 If the First World War is referenced (e.g La Chapelle ardente, Le Mort de demain, Le Regard neuf), it tends to 
be much more of a background context than the later World War II plays. The only exception is Un juste, 
which was written in 1918, and asks how a non-supporter of the war should respond to his fellow 
countrymen who are fighting on the frontline. However, Un juste was not published until 1968 (along with a 
speech Marcel made when receiving a peace prize in Frankfurt, 1964). In this respect, it can still be seen as 





Ȃȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱǻ1976: 18).37 More than simply offering an 
increased engagement with the ethical, then, one might say that for the later Marcel, 
the form of his theatre actually represents the ethical, as is equally suggested in the 
preface to La Dignité humaine  ȱȱ ǱȱȁȂ¡ȱȱȱ
¡ȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
éventuellȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱǻDH: 9) Ȯ that is, because here individual 
human subjects are treated with (respectful) openness; free from the confines of an 
overarching naǰȱȂȱidentities are approached and presented in an 
ethical manner.38 ThȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¡ȱ
over his philosophy, I therefore suggest, might be understood as setting up a debate, 
internal to his ê, concerning not only the legitimacy, but Ȯ furthermore Ȯ the 
ethics of narrative time. And, on a broader scale, this shift in the presentation of his 
position could be interpreted as a kind of Lévinassian move away from traditional, 
totalizing metaphysics, in order to engage ethically with the lived, intersubjective time 
of reality. But the extent to which Lévinassian time Ȯ with its emphasis on non-
recuperability and an ethical relation to the Other Ȯ can be read into the specifics of 
Ȃȱȱstill remains to be shown. This is ȱ¡ȱȂȱtask. 
 
4.2 The Lévinassian Time ȱȂȱ 
ȁȂ··ȱȂȱȮ son irréductibilité à Moi Ȯ ǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱ··ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ǰȱȱ·ȂȱǻTI: 33), writes Lévinas in 
Totalité et infini. And this mise en question happens during whaȱ·ȱȱȁȱ-
                                                        
37 See also EC: 198. 
38 Though of course, ȱǱȱȁȱȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱùȱȱȱȱ¸ȱ¥ȱȱ
mission de dramaturge, et ne se comporte pas comme un simple manipulateur ou comme un montreur de 




Other and realizes that, because it cannot appropriate such radical difference, its free Ȯ 
that is, Self-sufficient Ȯ attempts to understand the  ȱȱ¢Ǳȱȁȱȱ
morale accueille autrui. Ȃȱȱ··ȱȂȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
met pas, comme force plus grande, en échec, mais qui met en question le droit naïf de 
mes pouvoirs, ma glorieuse spontanéité de vivant. La morale commence lorsque la 
liberté, au lieu de se justifier par elle-¹ǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻTI: 83; my 
emphasis).39 ǰȱȁȱȂȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
··ȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻTI: 338), Lévinas continues. Metaphysical truth does not rest on 
freedom. Rather, metaphysics and truth are to be seen as anterior to freedom, as this 
ethical relation with the Other Ȯ an event that is not yet representation, nor 
objectification, narration or a return to the Self, but the pure affectivity of the Other 
which cannot be grasped, and therefore precedes all ontological theorization. This, for 
·ǰȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȁȱȱ¸ȂȱǻTI: 340). 
 
Consequently, contends Lévinas in Le Temps et lȂȱ(a compilation of four lectures 
presented 1946-47), situating the Self in the present Ȯ as narrative time does Ȯ ȁȂȱ




ȱȱùȱȱȱȂ¡ȱ¥ȱȱ¢ǵȂȱ(AE: 67). Yes, is the answer for 
Lévinas. True metaphysical time is a relation to the Other. Thus, while appreciating 
                                                        
39 Lévinas describes this situation in terms of the Self being in the accusative (e.g. AE: 31, 91, 135, 177, 233, 
239) or the vocative case (e.g DVI: 129, 131, 156; EN: 19). While useful images, both are problematic. 
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱmise en question, also carries 
the undesirable implication that the Self is an object Ȯ something that Lévinas wanted to avoid; a genuine 
encounter with the Other, despite not being freely chosen, is non-violent and non-objectifying (e.g. TI: 215-
18). The advantage of the vocative is the reverse: it highlights the non-violence of the face-à-face, but does not 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ 
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ȱȁȱȱȱȂȱȱ··ȱ·ȱȱe fusionȂ (or indeed 
a presence), Lévinas explains in Le ȱȱȂe: ȁȂȱȱ··ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȂȱȱȂǲȱ
non pas absence pure et simple, non pas absence de pur néant, mais absence dans un 
£ȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻTA: 83-84). In Totalité et infini he 
therefore insistsǱȱȁȂêȱȱȱȱ-delà de [...] la continuité de la durée. Il faut 
une rupture de la continuité et continuation à travers la rupture. Ȃȱȱȱ
consiste à être ȱȂȱǻTI: 316-17) Ȯ namely, the dramatic confrontation of the face-
à-faceǰȱ ȱȱȱȂȱ£ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Other that cannot be contained, cannot be presentified. 
 
It should be noted that the importance of ȱȱ·Ȃȱȱȱ-Other 
relations is not ubiquitously emphasized. Though in early works Ȯ especially Le Temps 
ȱȂ Ȯ alterity is described in temporal terms, these are replaced with what are 
predominantly spatial metaphors in his most famous work, Totalité et infini. Indeed, 
the subtitle to Totalité et infini ȱȁȱȱȂ¡··Ȃǰȱȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱ






·Ȃȱ¡ȱr work, ȱȂ¹, acts as corrective, however. Explicitly a 
reaction against the failings of Totalité et infiniǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȂȱ
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language,40 ȱȂ¹ȱerases the language of symmetry and asymmetry, 
interiority and exteriority Ȯ which only make sense in relation to the present.41 The 
Self-Other relation is temporal once again, described in terms of diachrony42 rather 
than synchrony,43 so that the ȱȱȁȱâȂȱǻǯǯȱAEǱȱŚŝǼȱȱȱȁȱ [que 
le Soi]Ȃ.44 Lévinas is thus able to write, in his preface to ȱȱȱȂ (not 
ȱȱŗşŝşǼǱȱȁȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ·ȱȂ·ȱȱǽȂ·ȱȱȱ¡Ǿȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
principal dont il est Ȯ au milieu de mouvements divers de la pensée Ȯ la naissance et la 






increasingly, the complexity of interpersonal relations, and to establish time as central 
to the ethical face-à-face. The following discussion now ȱȱȱȱȂȱ
theatre which traces ȱȱȱ·Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ. In so doing, it will 
                                                        
40 In the preface to the German edition of Totalité et infini (January 1987)ǰȱ·ȱǱȱȁȱȂ¹Ǳȱ
ȱȱ¥ȱȱȂȱévite déjà le langage ontologique [...] auquel Totalité et infini ȱȱȱȂȱǻTI: i-
ii). 
41 In some instances, Totalité et infini implicitly acknowledges the inadequacy of its spatial presentism. 
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȁ Ȃȱǻla demeureǱȱȱȱȁȂȱto which the Other is 
welcomed before the face-à-face, thus allowing for the possibility of a non-violent encounter with the Other) 
very much privilege presence, for example, time shows its face sporadically, as if to recognize that speaking 
of ȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¡ȱȱ(e.g. TI: 178-80). Time also seems to 
become crucial in Part III ǻȁȱȱ¡··ȂǼǯȱ
ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ
how we can understand this in the context of beingȱ ȱȱȁȱ Ȃȱǻ ȱȱȱ£ȱ¢ȱ
affirming themselves as distinct Ȯ but in a world where ontology takes precedence, so that asserting 
themselves as separate from the whole only reinforces totalization, because it remains Self-centred, rigidly 
refusing the Other), while still being in some kind of relation. Not in causal terms, he argues, for if freedom 
is understood as finite because it is subject to exterior forces it cannot control, it is not clear in what sense it 
is still free. The solution to the problem Lévinas in fact concludes, is timeǱȱȁȱȇȱȱȱ·ȱ qui 
ȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ·ȱǯȱǽǳǾȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱȱȱǽǾȱ¹ȱȮ la mortalité de cet être Ȯ est le fait originel. La liberté elle-¹ȱȂȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱȱȂȱǻTI: 247-48). 
42 ȁȱ·ȱȮ ȂȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱ
·ȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȱǰȱȂest le refus de la conjonction, le non-ȂȱǻAE: 26). 
43 ȁȱ·ȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ-pour-ȂȂȱǻAE: 127). 
44 ȱȱȂȱȁȂȱȱTotalité et infini, see for example TI: 73, 166. 
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demonstrate how a Lévinassian conception of time can be seen to resonate with the 
time of Ȃȱ¢ǯ 
 
Lévinas formulates his philosophy of time primarily in opposition to Heidegger, who, 
in Being and Time (1927), famously explored human Being as defined by temporality, 
taking time as the ultimate horizon for its understanding. The specific Heideggerian 
notion Lévinas attacks is that of Being-toward-death. If Being is time in Heidegger, 
Being is also finite, for time comes to an end with our death. Living authentically 
therefore requires that we confront this horizon, that our worldly projects recognize 
this inevitability and seek a way to assume this fate, so that death becomes 
meaningful and can be made our own. In so doing a future is opened up, and this, for 
Heidegger, constitutes genuine human time. But as Lévinas contended in a 1975 
lectureǱȱȁȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡·ȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱ
ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ·ȂȱǻDMT: 28). How, then, can 
ȱȁ-toward-ȂǰȱȱȱȂȱ ǵȱIt is impossible, Lévinas arǱȱȁȱ
ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱÉȂǲȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȁȱ
ȱȂȱȱȂȱǻTA: 59). He thus proposes, as he summarized in 1976, 
ȱȁȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȮ et non pas, comme chez Heidegger, le temps à 
ȱȱȱȂȱǻDMT: 122). 
 
Contrary to any horizon for my being, then, death in Lévinas is radically Other. He 
writes in Totalité et infini: 
ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ Ȯ ȁsurpassant notre ·Ȃ, 
comme dirait ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱ






When confronting the reality of death the Self is therefore rendered passive, for its 
objectifying projects and pretentions to certitude and control are called into question, 
ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ǯȱ¢ǰȱ	·Ȃȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱŗş11 play La Grâce seems to exemplify precisely such a relation. Up until the 
point at which he becomes conscious of death as an approaching reality, Gérard is a 
character who seeks certainty and stability in religious belief, to the extent that he 
rejects life in this world and fixes ȱȱȱȱ¢Ǳȱȁȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·Ȃǰȱȱǲȱȁȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşŗŚǱȱŞşǼǯȱȱ
he senses that death is close however, everything changes. Gérard is no longer certain; 
anxiety overwhelms him and he feels powerless in the face of his impending fate. 
ȱǰȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ	·Ȃȱǰȱȱȱȱhis former 
conviction. But it is never enough. Death is too Other for any maîtrise: 
OLIVIER: [...] rien au monde puisse être plus réel que ta croyance... qui fait 
graviter le monde autour de soi. La force de la croyance est sûrement la 
ȱȱȂ¹ǯȱ(Sentant toujours le regard qui pèse sur lui.) Cela ne suffit pas? 




 GÉRARD: Non, non... encore... 
 
ǱȱȱȱȱȂȱ··ǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·on; elle est 
Ȃ·ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱǯǯǯȱǵȱȱȱȱȱ
sur moi ton anxiété. 
 
GÉRARD, indistinctement: Et Lui? 
 
ǱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
projette... davantage encore? 
(Marcel 1914: 207-08) 
 
Importantly though, just as Lévinas will argue with respect to the human Other, my 
relation to death, though unknowable, is still a relation. As he stated ȱŗşŝśǱȱȁȱ
relation avec ma mort est non-savoir sur le mourir même Ȯ non-ȱȱȂȱȱ
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ȱȱȱȂȱǻDMT: 28). But in the face of this infinite Otherness, 
how is it possible for the Self to remain a subject, to remain in some form of personal 
relation with the Other and not simply have its subjectivity negated? One cannot start 
with the autonomous Self if one wants to recognize the true otherness of the Other, for 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱ£ȱ





The latter part of Totalité et infini (in anticipation of ȱȂ¹) addresses this 
issue in more detail than ȱȱȱȂ. 
ǰȱȱȁȱȂȱȮ in a non-possessive, 
non-dominating way Ȯ is neither to continue to act for oneȂȱȱǻpour soi), by making 
ȱȂȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ǽȱ¢ȱ
resigning oneself to fate (ultimately death). Instead, it is to recognize possibilities for-
the-Other (pour autrui). ȁȱ¹ȱ¥ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ
lui Ȯ est un êȱȂǰȱȱ·ǲ 
¥ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
¹ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȂ¹ȱ
mortel Ȯ offert à la violence Ȯ ȂȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱǰ45 ȱȱȁȱ





perpetuation of my own powers Ȯ which might, in the extreme, drive me to murder, 
                                                        
45 Death, hereǰȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱ(passivité), or the death of the Other (virilité, autarcie, impérialisme, 
égoïsme; all of these terms are used in Totalité et infini ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ appropriation and 
totalization). 
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in defence of my autocracy46 Ȯ and turned toward my responsibility for the Other, 
who in the face-à-face ǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱmeurtreȂȱǻTI: 217). So, not 
only is the face-à-face ¡ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ
transcendence; the face-à-face is also experienced positively, as this responsibility I feel 
after my Self-ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȁȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ
non pas ȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱAutre: [...] 
ȱ·ȱ·ȂȱǻTI: 217);47 and recognition of this opens up a more meaningful, 
ȱǰȱ ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȁla ·Ȃȱǻȱȱȱȁla libertéȂ) and 
defines as follows: 
La volonté, déjà trahison et aliénation de soi,48 mais qui ajourne cette trahison, 
ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȂ¢ȱ¡ǰȱȱȱtout de suite, 
ȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱmort. 
ȱ¡ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱ
personnel.49 [...] Le Désir où se dissout la volonté menacée, ne défend plus les 
ȱȂȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ-même, comme la bonté à 
laquelle la mort ne peut enlever son sens. 
(TI: 263) 
 
This new orientation requires not a concept of finite time (à la Heidegger), but one of 
ȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱfini-tude [...] the will turns [...] to a time that 
cannot be collected into a totality even aȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱ
Jeffrey Dudiak (2001: 276) Ȯ infinite, because this time, though it is related to me (and 
thus maintains my subjectivity), is not simply my own. Rather, it frees me from my 
ego by opening up a relation to the Other, a relation for the Other that, as such, cannot 
                                                        
46 ȁȱȂȱȱr mais anéantir, renoncer absolument à la compréhension. Le meurtre exerce un 
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱ·ǰȱ
ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȂ¢ȱȱ, mais paralyse le pouvoir même 
ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱǻTI: 216). 
47 See also TI: 215, 223. 
48 Because action pour soi is rejected. 
49 I am still a subject, just not a completely autonomous, Self-sufficient subject. 
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be contained within my present, but opens up future.50 ǰȱ·ȱȱȱȁȱ
··ȂǱ 
ǽȱȱȱ·ǰǾȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
quel romantisme des possibǰȱȱȂ·ȱ¥ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱ
destin [qui revendique un retour à Moi et mes possibles], et de se reprendre à 
ȂȱȱȂ¡ȱȱ¹ȱ¥ȱȂǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ¹ȱȱȂȱȱ
destin que le sien est un être fécond. 
(TI: 314) 
 
ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȮ Werner, from the 
1936 play Le Dard Ȯ exemplifies precisely such a way of assuming time. A musician 
and singer, he has left Germany because his Jewish friend and accompanist Rudolf 
was forced to flee persecution. But at the end of the play he decides he must return to 
Germany, in spite of the danger such a decision entails facing (Werner himself is 
Aryan, but having associated with and assisted Jews such as Rudolf, his status is 
compromised). Béatrice, the wife of the friend with whom Werner stays in France, 
protests that his decision is suicide. But Werner feels a responsibility toward those 
suffering in Germany, which he wishes to pursue in spite of the threat of death he 
knows faces him: 
1ǱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱǯ 
 
WERNER: Absolument pas, Béatrice, vous vous trompez. [...] Je me mets 
simplement à la disposition. 
 




(Marcel 1967b: 150) 
 
That death might encourage a sense of responsibility toward others is also suggested 
in Ȃ
£ (1945). In this play, the protagonist Germain, after his death has been 
predicted by a celebrated clairvoyant at a séance, begins to worry about what will 
                                                        
50 In ȂȱǱȱȁȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȮ to be 
addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to be prompted to act, to address myself 
elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-sufficient ȃȄȂȱǻŘŖŖśǱȱŗřŜǼǯ 
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become of his wife and two children after he is gone, and tries to arrange certain 
things in advance Ȯ most notably a second husband for Thérèse (of whom he 
approves). However here, it is suggested, Germain is acting in bad faith, for his 
actions seem more symptomatic of his allergy to change than of a genuine concern for 
ȱ¢Ȃȱ -being.51 Indeed, when Thérèse learns of the prophecy (which, 
¢ǰȱȱȱǲȱȱȱ	Ȃȱȱȱ ȱǼȱd broaches the 
subject with her husband, Germain vehemently denies that it has provoked any 
change in him. Thus, if Germain has been confronted with the Otherness of the future 
and death, and experienced a call to responsibility as a result, his response is 
ultimately a refusal of the Other. As Marcel Belay comments: 
Germain ne peut supporter un futur qui soit vraiment à venir [...]. On 
ȱ¸ȱȱȂȱȂ¥ȱȱ¢¡ȱ¹ȱȱ··ǱȱȱǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ





(Marcel 1973b: 389-90) 
 
This only damages his relationship with Thérèse, and others close to him. 
 
Such a negative argument for action pour autrui is equally manifest in the time of 
characters such as Jeanne, in Le Mort de demain (written 1919; published 1931), and 
Aline in La Chapelle ardente (1925), both of whom eternalize the death of a man very 
dear to them and, by living only for a static, constructed present, not only alienate and 
cause suffering to those around them, but damaȱȱȂȱȱ
with others as well.52 Jeanne has resigned herself in advance to the death of her 
                                                        
51 Thérèse criticizes him for his intransigence on numerous occasions. ȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯȱǾȱȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşŝřǱȱŘřřǼǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ¡ȱȱǱȱȁȱ
faut que tu voies ȱǯȱȂȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱ·ȱȱ¡·ȱȱȱȱȱ·ǲȱȱȱ
Ȃ¸ȱ¥ȱȱǯȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¹ȱǯȱǷȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱǷȂȱǻŗşŝřǱȱŘŞŝǼǯ 
52 Marcel in fact compareȱ	ȱȱǱȱȁ	ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱêȱ¹ȱȱȱǯȱ
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husband Noël, who is fighting on the frontline (World War I). Before the war, their 
married life was successful and happy. However, when Noël returns home on an 
¡ȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
causes her to receive him as a stranger, and Noël returns to the front bereft of all his 
courage and faith in victory, convinced of his inevitable death.53 Ȃȱȱ
ȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻȱindisponibilité, in Marcellian terms) has closed off 




Raymond, who was killed in battle during World War I. Preserving his memory has 
ȱȱȱǻ¢Ȃȱȱ ȱǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱ 
play with his old toys),54 and no one else, Aline frequently insinuates, has the slightest 
respect for his absence.55 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱ
death threatens, Aline tries to influence the life of ¢Ȃȱ·ȱǰ a well-
ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱ-stricken mother, and 
persuades Mireille to marry her sickly nephew André instead of Robert, a boy who 
has shown interest in her and to whom she ȱǯȱǰȱȂȱǰȱȱ
horrified by this behaviour and leaves Aline. Mireille, on the other hand, is unable to 
stand up for herself, and becomes ever more unhappy as she is denied an identity or a 
future on her own terms. 
                                                                                                                                                  




Antoine, to Jeanne at the end of the play. 
54 ȂȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱ³ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǱȱ
tu aimes mieux que tous ces jouets moisissent aȱȱȱȱ¥ȱǵȂȱǻȱŗşśŖǱȱŗŝǼǲȱȱ
¢Ȃȱ·ȱȱǱȱȁȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱúȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǻŗşśŖǱȱ
19). 




So for La Chapelle ardente, just as for the two previous plays, an understanding of 
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱdisponibilité toward 
others; and, more specifically, the time of disponibilité emerges as a time that affirms 
the alterity of death and the Other, for if these are denied, so too is any genuine future. 
Paradoxically, these plays therefore seem to suggest, it is only by accepting the 
uncertain alterity of death that my solitude can be broken, and I can enter into 
genuine relation with an Other. This echoes ·Ȃȱrefutation of HeideggerȂs view: 
ȁȱǰȱȂȱȂ·ȱȂȱȱǯȱCette approche de la mort indique que 
nous sommes en relation avec quelque chose qui est absolument autre [...]. Ma 
ȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱǻTA: 62-63), he 
states in ȱȱȱȂ. 
 
The temporal structure of fécondité also grounds the possibility of forgiveness in 
·Ȃȱ¢ǯȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ
recommencement, tout en laissant au recommencement une relation avec le passé [...]. 
ȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂ¹ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȂêȱ¹ȱȱȂȱǻTI: 315), he 
writes in Totalité et infini. The struȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱȱȂȱ
theatre, and again, it is the sȂȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
creating or denying the possibility of forgiveness. Un homme de Dieu (1922) for 
example, explores, as Jacques Francis ǰȱȁȱ-·ȱǽȱǾȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱ
242). Edmée, the wife of a pastor, Claude, has had an affair with another man twenty 
years previously, during the early days of their marriage. Claude has forgiven her, but, 
it appears, this was more out of his professional desire to embody the saintly figure 
that befits a pastor, for though Edmée is aware that Claude went through a difficult 
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period early in their marriage, she learns from his mother that this was actually before 
finding out about the affair. Af ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
suddenly feels at peace (should he not instead have been scandalised?); and this is 
ǰȱ·ȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ
but served merely to bolster his opinion of himself as virtuous. Edmée therefore 
rejects the pardon.56 It was not a relational act and was not therefore genuine; it had 
nothing to do with her.57 Claude was trying to appropriate time, single-handedly, to 
secure a certain future. But this was not a real future, only a propagation of the eternal 
Good he wished to bestow upon ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ·Ȃȱȱ
Ȃȱ and thereby refused the Other, refused time. 
 
 
Ȃȱŗşřřȱ¢ȱLe Monde cassé, on the other hand, shows the positive possibility of 
a pardon, the temporality of which is equally Lévinassian. The action also revolves 
around an unhappy married couple (Christiane and Laurent), each of whom lives 
only for themselves, shutting the other person out. Christiane is a social butterfly who 
surrounds herself with (superficial) friends and interests in an attempt to find 
ǱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȱ
projects, and is interested in musical composition. But with none of these ventures 
does she appear genuinely engaged. Rather, Christiane is merely keeping up 
appearances to impress others.58 Her husband Laurent is no better. He gains his 
pleasure from the fact that he is not like his wife, nurturing pride and a sense of 
                                                        
56 ȁȱȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȂ-ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱǵȂȱ
(CPM: 37). 
57 ȁLongtemps les philosophes ont placé toȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
·Ȃǰȱȱǲȱȁ-être oublie-t-on trop vite que les problèmes moraux sont des affaires qui 
intéressent une personne ¥ȱȂ· ȂȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱŘřŞǼǯ 
58 This is an excȱȱȱ·Ȃȱȱȱjouissance Ȯ ȁȱȱ·ÊȱȱȂȱǻTI: 96) Ȯ 
where the Self tries to lose itself in objects, to prevent the eternal return to the Self to which it is condemned 
by its egoistic projects. As Lévinas argues in ȱȱȱȂǱȱȁȂ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ
ǲȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ




¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱǰȱwhile playing the 
irreproachable husband by giving Christiane absolute freedom to do whatever she 




Christiane ǱȱȁȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱ·ǵȂȱ(CPM: 135) - une 
volonté, this play will suggest, that is Lévinassian, one of responsibility for the Other. 
 
At the end of Le Monde cassé, the audience learns of the past that Christiane has buried 
beneath her frenzied social agenda: her love for a man Ȯ Jacques Ȯ who left her to 




confessions of his love for Christiane, Christiane is finally able to have closure and 
begin to live for the future. She is therefore able to speak for the first time to her 
husband, and to recognize her responsibility for their unhappiness together. She has 
ȱȱȁȱȱȱȂȂȱǻCPM: 215), she confesses. ȁȂȱȱȱ
ȱȱǯȱȱȱ¡ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱǰȱȂȱȱǲȱȱǰȱȂȱȱ
mienȂȱǻCPM: 216). However, by ȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ











This future is necessarily uncertain ǻȁȱ ǽǯǯǯǾȱ¦ȱȱȱ·ȂǼǲȱhere is no 
guarantee that Christiane and Laurent will not simply lapse back into their old ways. 
But this is precisely because it is now relational, because it depends on both of them. 
ȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
afflueraient vers mon présent et que ȱȂǰȱwrites Lévinas in Totalité et infiniǲȱȁȱ
me vient à travers un intervalle absolu dont Autrui absolument autre [...] est seul 
ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻTI: 316). 
 
So, for Lévinas, and also Ȯ it seems Ȯ ȱȂȱǰȱȱȱencounter with the 
Other is at once a true encounter with time. Furthermore, such an event is not simply 
experienced negatively as uncertainty or as my inability to grasp the otherness of the 
Other. It is also experienced positively, as my responsibility for the Other. What 
Lévinas does not succeed in doing in Totalité et infini, however, is establishing the 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱǱȱȁȱȱȱonly be 
constituted as ethical in relation to a singular, personal Other (autrui) [; ...] a further 
condition is required to maintain the otherness of this Other, and to prevent its collapse 
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŗŖŚǼǯ59 Lévinas himself recognizes this at the 
end of Totalité et infini, when he acknowledges that infinite time cannot guarantee the 
ȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ··ȱȂȱ
ȂȱǻTI: 318). The Other is still at risk from a reduction to the Same. The indefinite, 
open fuȱ ȱȱǻȱȁȂǼȱȱȱȮ if it is not simply closed off 
again by Self-appropriation Ȯ therefore seems, at best, to postpone the ethical relation 
of responsibility for the Other, for in the moment I experience a hint of a possible 
future with the Other, I still have yet to be responsible. 
 
                                                        
59 See also Perpich (2008: chap. 3 especially). 
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ȱȂ¹ offers a solution. ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȂȱȱ
to my past, as well as (possibly) to my future, so that, because I am already marked by 
ȱȂȱ, I am also always already responsible for the Other. The ethical 
relation is thus not postponed by an indefinite, open-ended future, and it does not 
ȱȱȱȂȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
recuperated or appropriated (true time is radically Other), and which therefore forces 
the Self to respond to the Other Ȯ because it cannot do otherwise. It is in this 
¢ǰȱȱ·ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱ
positivité de [...] ȱǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȱǯȱ[...] Le 
paradoxe de cette responsabilité consiste en ce que je suis obligé sans que cette 
ȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱǻAE: 28). Indeed, in Totalité et infini the Self and the 
Other were still essentially independent, as expressed by its dualistic terminology 
which discussed the ethical relation in terms of a Moi-Autre binary. As such, Lévinas 
continued to give primacy to the Self, for as the Other was not already there, affecting 
the Self, its otherness depeȱȱȱȂȱagreement to relinquish the (apparent) 
security of its eternal present, and to let the Other in.60 ȱ ǰȱ·ȱǱȱȁȱ
·ȱȂȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻAE: 24). In Autrement 
Ȃ¹re, there is no longer a connection between the Other and my present (to be in my 
present is precisely not to be Other); and whereas before, I could conceivably have 
avoided the Other completely, ȱȂ¹Ȃ diachronic relation to the Other 
means that the Other is no longer entirely separate. If anything, the Other is too 
                                                        
60 For this reason, Derrida is right to argue that the Self-Other relation in Totalité et infini cannot escape a 
certain violence. ȁȱȱ¸ȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ-¹Ȃȱ
(Derrida 1967b: 147), he remarks. And this is necessitated by Totalité et infiniȂȱistic, and overly spatial 
(ontological) language, which only understands the Self in terms of le Moi/le Même, so that any relation 
between the Self and the Other Ȯ and Lévinas wants to argue for a relation Ȯ forcibly relates the Other to the 
Self (as Ego),  ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǱȱȁȱȱ
ȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȱÉȱȱ¹ȱǰȱȱ¹ȱ¡ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǲȱȱȱ
il y a le même et ȂǰȱȱȱȂȱȱ ¹ȱȂȱȮ du même Ȯ Ȃȱ·ȱȱ¹ȱǻȱǱȱǼȱ
ȱȱ¹ȱȱȱ¹ȱȱ¹ȱǻȱǱȱǼȱȂȱ·ȱȂȱȱȂǱȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşŜŝǱȱŗŞŞǼǯ  
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close:61 even if I choose to refuse the Other (and I can),62 I am nevertheless still 
responding to the Other (irresponsibly).63 Accordingly, Lévinas begins to describe the 
ethical in ȱȱȁ¡·Ȃǰ64 and introduces a third notion into the ethical relation: 
ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱmoi. Le sujet [...] Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ··.65 
Ȃ·ȱȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱ·ȂȱǻAE: 
29; my emphasis). The Other is now already in me (moi),66 inseparable from my past; 
the Other is inextricably bound to me, and the responsibility I have for the Other 
shapes my identity before any conscious, intentional Moi considerations even arise (in 
the present).67 Dudiak summarizes: 
From out of a time without beginning, the other calls me to responsibility in 
his regard, exceeding every present and preceding every present. Preceding in 
that, before the subject finds its feet as a constituting ego,68 it finds itself 
already in relation to that which calls to it from a profound past, [...] a past to 
which it is already in relation (in the ethical relation that Levinas refers to as 
proximity), and to which it is always already a response Ȯ before choosing to 
be so or not to be so Ȯ a response that is its subjectivity. 
(2001: 286) 
                                                        
61 êȂȱȱȱ·ǰȱ ȱȱ Lévinas has overly insularized and isolated the self (SA: 
221, 236, 387-93, 408-09), seems a legitimate response to Totalité et infini, but is less justified with respect to 
ȱȂ¹ ǻȱ ȱêȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǲȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǼǼǯȱ
As Newman writes, in ȱȂ¹ȱȁthere is no longer any need for an independent analysis of the 
phenoȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱşŚǼǰȱȱȁfrom the start Ȯ indeed before the start, before any beginning Ȯ 
[the subject is] in a relation with the OtherȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱ 93). 
62 ȁȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǯȱǽǯǯǯȱǾȱȱȱ	ȱ
commands and demands [, that he] is extremely powerful [, and that if] you try not doing what he tells you, 
he will punish you [, ...] is a very recent notion. On the contrary, the first form, the unforgettable form, in 
my opinion, is that, in the last analysis, he canȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱ
(Lévinas 1988: 169). 
63 ȱȱ¡ǰȱ·Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȁretraduction ȱȃ¢ȄȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
(1995: 39): ȁȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ[...] who in a 
certain sense remains unknown to him- or herself. If we want to continue calling ȱȱȃȄǰȱȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻ1995: 42). 
64 ȁȱ¡·ȱȮ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȄǯǯǯȱȮ ouvre la distance de la 
dia-chronie sans présent commun où la différence est passé non rattrapable, un avenir inimaginable, le non-
représentable du prochain sur lequel je suis en retard Ȯ obsédé par le prochain Ȯ mais où cette différence est 
ma non-·ȱ¥ȱȂǯȱȱ¡·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱ·Ȃȱ(AE: 142). 
65 That is to say a subject that is generalizable, ȱȱȁȂǯ 
66 ȱȱȱȱȁȂǰȱȁ-¹ȂǰȱȱȁȱseȂǱȱȁ·ȱǰȱ-un-autre Ȯ voilà [...] le sens du soi-même, 
du seȂȱǻAEǱȱŘŜǼǰȱ¡ȱ·ǲȱȁȂȱȱȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȱmène le Moi à soi en deçà de mon identité, 
plus tôt ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻAEǱȱŗŚŝǼǯȱȱ·ǰȱǱȱȁȂȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ




par la représentatȱǽǯǯǯǾǰȱȂ-à-dire incommensurable avec le présent, correspond ou répond la passivité 
inassumable du soi. [...] La réponse qui est responsabilité Ȯ responsabilité incombant pour le prochain Ȯ 
·ȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻAE: 30-31). 
68 And indeed as a constitutor of time. 
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Thus, Lévinas affirmed in a 1975 lecture: ȁȂ·ȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
Ȃ·ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȂ·ȱ·ȂȱǻDMT: 127).69 
 
Indeed, although I can contest or refuse responsibility for the Other in any particular 
situation, reject any ethical codification into a moral norm, as Diane Perpich observes: 
ȁȱmoment of normativity Ȯ that the other makes a claim on me to which I cannot be 
entirely indifferent Ȯ ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱŗŚŝ-48). This, Perpich refers to as 
ȁ¢ȱ ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱŗŘŜǼǰȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȂ¹, a moment of 
normativity that infinitely recurs.70 For now that the Other is also in my past, I am 
alr¢ȱǰȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱ¡ȱȱȱȂȱǯ71 And this is 
something that continually impacts on, and will continue to impact on, my present, 
while at the same time being irre-present-ȱǻȱȁ·Ȃǰ72 as it is often referred 
to) Ȯ unlike in Totalité et infini, where a connection between the Other and my present 
ȱǯȱ·ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȁȂȱ
me,73  ȱȱȱȱȂȱȁȂ74 ȱȱȱȱȁȂ75 Ȯ because I do not 
                                                        
69 ȁthis Levinassian disruption not only challenges a successive or uninterrupted time, but also questions the 
understanding of the subject, for the conception of time as duration attributes a continuous identity to the 
subject whereas the disjunctive time of the relation to the otȱȱȱȱȱȃconstituted in 
response to the arrival of alterityȄȂȱ(Hodge 2007: 107). 
70 ·ȱȱȱǰȱȁ·ȂǰȱȱȱȮ as Dudiak writes Ȯ ȁ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱ 
again, upon myself and beyond myself out of an ever resuming present in response to an unrepresentable 
past that demands my response in the form of responsibility, demands my passive undergoing for the sake 
of the other as patience, signifies as the very tempo£ȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŗǱȱ289). See especially AE: 162-73. 
71 ǰȱ·ȱȱȱȱȁ·ȂǱȱȁȱ·ȱȱ¡ȱ¥ȱȂǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ-été-offert-sans-
ȱùȱȂȱȱȱ-présent, le non-commencement, la non-initiative de la sensibilité Ȯ non-









·ǯȱȂȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȮ la diachronie 
insurmontable du tȂȱǻAE: 66). 
73 ȁȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱǽȱȂǾȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ¸ȱ
ȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȄȱȂȱȱȂȱȂ¡ȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱǽǯǯǯǾǱȱǽtte] anarchie est persécution. Ȃȱȱ·ȂȱǻAE: 159-60). Importantly, 
Butler explains, ȁinas is not saying that primary relations are abusive or terrible; he is simply saying that 
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choose this election to responsibility, and because I cannot escape this unplaceable 
past, prior to any and all pasts to which I can knowingly relate myself, in the same 
way as I could the infinite time of the Other as pure future. ȁ¸ȱȱ·ǰȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȱȂȱǻAE: 205), asserts Lévinas in ȱȂ¹ǰȱȱȁȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ




hint at possible (or impossible) futures, in many of these plays the past is actually the 
driving force: Jewish suffeȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
	¢ǲȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱǲȱ·ȂȱȱȱȱȂȱ
past pardon return to plague them, calling them to take responsibility for what they 
have never faced up to; and ChristianȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
motivation for marrying Laurent gnaw at her married life, creating a malaise that 
Christiane will only belatedly confront.76 ȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱǱȱȁȂȱ
principale, dans la plupart des drames marcelliens, a eu lieu avant le commencement 
ȱȱ¸ȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱşŝǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
something that precedes its beginning, a key event that happened before the play even 
started, the significance of which, however, is always equivocal or enigmatic, so that 
characters spend the duration of the play itself confused and preoccupied. The 
                                                                                                                                                  
at the most primary level we are acted upon by others in ways over which we have no say, and that this 
passivity, susceptibility, and condition of being impinged upon ȱ ȱ ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖśǱȱşŖǼǯ 
74 ȁ¹ȱȱȮ ȱȂȱȮ Ȃȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱǻAE: 185-86). 




76 The prominence of the past in ȱȂ¹ ȱȱȱ·Ȃȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
his writings on fécondité. Rather, it recognizes how the future cannot, in fact, be so clearly separated from the 
ǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱTotalité et infini and 
ȱȂ¹ Ȯ ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȁare distinguished less by a difference in 
content thȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŗǱȱŗŚŝǼǯ 
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explanation or resolution they seek never seems achievable: implications or 
consequences of the event are always left uncertain; additional questions and the 
realization of further-reaching responsibilities continue to destabilize the present. 
 
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱfrequently delayed. There is a temporal 
gap (intervalle) separating ȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱd; time is the 
otherness preventing intersubjective comprehension or unity. Sometimes this lag 
¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȂȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱr has 
always already been there and incites a response77 Ȯ only, this response is too late; the 
Self and Other can never be in synchrony.78 The best example is perhaps that of Le 
Fanal (1936), where the recent death of Madame Parmentier (which precedes the 
p¢ȂȱǼȱȱȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
relationship with her, and as a result, aspects of his life in general Ȯ because, he 
realizes, the way he had been responding to other people was in fact often another 
response to her. Most notably, Raymond re-evaluates the motivation behind his 
engagement to his fiancée Sabine, which, he now believes, was more a rebellion 
against his mother that took advantage of her waning health, than it was a positive 
affirmation of any relation with Sabine. ȁȱȂȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱ·Ȃǰȱȱ
says to Sabine: 
Moi surtout, je me méprise... [...] voilà, moi qui ne lui [ma mère] avais jamais 
ǰȱȂȱȱȱǯǯǯȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǯȱȱ·ȱ
de sa mort était là comme un fanal. Elle partie, je toucherais au port. Et toi 
aussi, tu le regardais, ce fanal. Tu évaluais, tu minutais... 
(Marcel 1936: 38-39) 
 
                                                        
77 ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȂȂǲȱȁǰȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
comme conclusion: les disparus ne viennent pas clore la pièce, mais au contraire ils resurfissent et 
ȱȂȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱŗŖřǼǯȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱŗŖŜǼǯ 
78 ȁȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱ¥ȱȂ¡¹ȱȱȱȂǯȱJe suis acc·ȱȂȱ·ȂȱǻAE: 141). 
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Now that his mother has died, however, Raymond realizes that he has not been able 




beyond his own configuration of) his past compels him to change his ways, opening 
up a future. Although Ȯ indeed, because Ȯ this remains uncertain (just like his past), 
Raymond has now been confronted with the Other, and with time. As such, Madame 
Parmentier, though dead and anterior to all the action on the stage, is arguably the 
main character,79 the Other whose call is prior to, and assumes precedence over 
¢Ȃȱǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǰ80 but their relation is one of 
diachrony rather than synchrony. 
 
In plays where a greater number of characters are involved, and therefore where it is 
less possible to isolate one-to-one Self-ȱǰȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ
conform to Lévinassian time by presenting characters who are in the situation of 
needing to respond already: to take a stance regarding the French Resistance during 
World War II, for example (Ȃ1), to respond to unexpected visits where the 
Other impacts on the self prior to any decision or anticipation (Le Mort de demain, 
Ȃ1), to act in support of something during a war despite not wanting to 
support the war itself (Un juste) Ȯ even to finish a sentence (the line ȁ ȱǷȂȱ
(or equivalent) is in almost every play).81 ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱ
Lévinas in ȱȂ¹ǯȱȁȂ·ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ
disproportionnées à tout engagement pris ou à prendre ou à tenir dans un présent. 




(Marcel 1936: 10). 
81 E.g. CPM: 201, 253; Marcel (1925: 73, 126, 138; 1950a: 39; 1951d: 31). 
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ǰȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ[...] Le prochain qui ne 
saurait me laisser ind·ȂȱǻAEǱȱŗŚŖǼǯȱǰȱȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȮ frequently with the 
challenge ȁȱȱǵȂ82 Ȯ and they experience recurring calls to normativity while 
faced with an absence of, or contradictions or ambiguities be ǰȱǯȱȱȂȱ
later, more overtly ethical plays especially, characters are called to responsibility on 
more than one count. Not only are they required to choose, they must also justify their 
(difficult) choices Ȯ something that tends to paralyse characters, for as Lévinas 
emphasizes, the face of the Other is always equivocal and enigmatic; there can be no 
certainty as to what constitutes the right response.83 On the contrary, according to 
both Lévinas and MarcelȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ84 This is well 
illustrated in ȱȂȱȱȱȱ(1951), where the protagonist Pascal, a political 
journalist, feels that he must defend his political beliefs in response to threats from 
opposing parties, and yet is also aware of his concurrent (and in this case seemingly 
conflicting) responsibility to his family and their safety. He chooses his family, and in 
fact decides to move to another country (Brazil). But this does not eradicate family 
tensions, and he continues to be plagued by the question of his loyalty to France Ȯ 
though, as the play also suggests, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what it might mean 
to ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǯȱSo hȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱ ith 
normativity without norms; and it is with respect to the infinite reach of this 
normativity Ȯ I can always do more: for one Other, for many Others Ȯ that human 
finitude is presented, not with respect to my death as Heidegger argued. 
 
                                                        
82 E.g. CPM: 229; Marcel (1949b: 64; 1951d: 133). 
83 ȁȱȱȱ-¹ȱ·ȂȱǻAE: 37). 
84 ȁȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂǰȱmoi Ȃȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȱǻAE: 
134). The use of the subjunctive here reflects the diachrony of the relation, which has its roots in an 
ȁȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ 
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The interpersonal relations drama£ȱȱȂȱǰȱǰȱ¢ȱȱ
ineffable as they are, suggest that characters are still very much in relation. However, 
as Mary observesǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱ
ǰȱȱǯȱȱȱȂpposent pas par intérêt, mais plutôt par manque 
Ȃ·ǯȱIls se cȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱşşǼǯȱȱ Lévinas, the Self-Other 
ȱȱȂȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ
(rather than a physical, power- or lust-driven) resistance. ȁȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱ
ȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻTI: 29), states Lévinas in Totalité et 
infini. ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
and foremost the exchange of information Ȯ Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ
generally too uncertain for there to be anything determinate to defend or disclose. 
Rather, discourse is (the act of) expression in the face of the Other,85 whose absolute 
alterity breaks the monopoly of meaning held by the Same, and incites a response. 
ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǱȱȁȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱǻTI: 70-71), writes Lévinas in Totalité et infiniǲȱȁȱȱȱ 
interlocuteurs, une plur·Ȃǰ ȱȁȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ·ȂȱǻTI: 70).86 
 
ȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȁȂǯȱȱ
non-narrativity favours a plurality of individual consciousnesses that are distinct, but 
which, through discourse, are in relation. And rather than understanding the ethical 
in terms of something secondary, which is merely added to a pre-established acting 
subject, it suggests that ethics is, already Ȯ an ambiguous, inter-relational web of 
interpellation, non-indifference, and responsibility in which my subjectivity is always 
already implicated, but which, in turn, is always in the making, as emphasized by the 
                                                        
85 ȁȂȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱȂȱȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȱȱ·ǯȱȱȂ¡ȱȱ¹ȱȱ·ȱ-¹ȂȱǻTI: 218). 
86 See also TI: 212. ȱȱ ȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȂȱǻŘŖ05: 84). 
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transition made between le discours ȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱȁȱȂȱ
(contrasted witȱȁȱȂǼȱȱȱȂ¹.87 ȱȂȱȱȱȱ
about themselves and, in so doing, open up the possibility of a more positive future 
with others (e.g. Christiane), this is not by virtue of a definitive resolution, or struggle 
being brought to an end. Rather, it results from entering into discourse with Others, 
ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȱǻǼȱ
responsibility pour autrui. The non-presence of characters to one another not only 
makes linguistic ȁȂȱ¢ǲȱȱȱ ȱakes such a relation meaningful and 
able to open up a time that transcends the present Ȯ unlike characters such as Aline, 
who, failing to engage in any discourse, are trapped in a present that is dislocated 
from all Other times. 
 
Furthermore, this seems to be how Marcel wishes his theatre to be understood in 
Ǳȱȱȱȁ¢ȂȱȱȱȱȁȂǯȱȁȂȱȱȂȱȱȂȱȂȱȱ
·ǰȱȂȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ·ȂȱǻŗşŚŜǱȱŘ86), he 
declares in ȁ·ȱȱȱȂêȱȂǯȱAnd this justice supérieure is, 
ȱǰȱȱȱȱȁ·ȱȂȱǻGM: 47) which, as explained to 
Boutang, the spectator themselves should (ideally) experience as they also become the 
subject of interpellation. ȁȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
ȂȱȂ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
··ȱȱȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱranquilȂȱǻEC: 
169), states Marcel in En chemin.88 As he proclaims in an  ȱ ȱǱȱȁȱ
ȱ·ȱǽȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȂ-¹ǾǰȱȂȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
87 ȁȱ·ȱȱǰȱȂȱ··ȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱǻAE: 75). Not conjugated to 
signify in a particular tense, the infinitive form of le Dire manifests how the relation spans all time. 
Ungraspable in itself, it transcends any particular moment Ȯ unlike the opposing notion le Dit, which is 
rigidly tied to the present alone. 
88 Cf. LévinasǱȱȁȱȂȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱconscience 
Ȃȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱǽǯǯǯǾǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȄȂȱǻEN: 17). 
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ǰȱȂ-à-ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȂȱ¸ȱȂȱȱȱntinue à vous habiter, 
ȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǻLhoste 1999: interview 6). 
ȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȂǰȱȱȱ
confronts the spectator with (unknowable, ambiguous) Others who infiltrate his/her 
present, and, in virtue of a diachronic relation that is created between them, continue 





ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱion seems to 
shape his dramaturgy, reinforcing the difference that, this chapter has proposed, sets 
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ǯ The question that remains, 
ǰȱȱ ȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱy Other to 
that underlying his philosophy (in which case his later preference for his theatre 
would represent a definitive break with his earlier position), or whether Chapter 
ȂȱêȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱought, 





the Lévinassian sense of proximité Ȯ an uneasy, ethically charged relation which, as 
                                                        
89 ȁȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱ·eȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱ
Ȃ¡ȱǲȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢·ȱȱȱȱȱ··ǰȱȱns 
métapsychique du mot, une hantiseǯȱȂêȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ
quelque manière après la fin du spectacle se révèlent par là même dépourvus de réalité dramatique 




inauguration into temporality itself coincides with an ineffable, yet indubitable feeling 
of non-indifference toward ǯȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱ
Ȃȱ¡¢ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǯȱ
 ǰȱȱ
in its absolute singularity, this cannot be accessed or comprehended through an 
ontological investigation of (the timeless, universal characteristics of) human existence. 
ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
through an exploration of ethical horizons and exigencies, which appear both beyond, 
and prior to, any thematization. Even positive endings (e.g. Le Monde cassé) are only 
positive by virtue of a promise of fidelity, which, as a temporally extended notion, 
remains incomplete in the present, incomplete as a conclusion. Implicating not only 
the future but also the past Ȯ as a commitment that recognizes an Other who has 
already been calling me to responsibility, from a time before any that I could ever 
configure Ȯ such fidelity at best remains in the subjunctive. Interestingly, Marcel 





engagement with interpersonal relations in his plays seems so different from in his 
philosophy, and if Marcel has acknowledged this (different) sense of proximity 
himself (though he does not relate it back to his philosophy), might his theoretical 
discussions of intersubjectivity actually overstate a position which, at root, is more 




could be seen to challenge ·Ȃȱȱȱȱ Ȯ that is, as 
suggesting genuine intersubjectivity to involve a reciprocity where self and other are 
unified in a present of love and mutual understanding. In ȁȱ··ȱ·ȂȱǻŗşŚŖǼǰȱ
ȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȁȂ¡ȱȱȂêtreȂȱȱȁȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȱȱ
singularité et en même temps atteints dans les mystérieux rapports qȱȱȂȱǻRI: 
192-şřǼǲȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȂȱȱȱ
equality, which forcefully dismiss such a relation as self-centred and rigidly totalizing, 




le mot qui exprime le plus fidèlement cette interdépendance active et même 
·ȱȂȱȱȱȱ··ǰȱȱȱȱȱ·ǯȱȱȱ¸ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ·¡ǲȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
est sans intérêt, et, ajouterai-je, sans signification. 
(1940a: 168) 
 
I may recognize myself to be inferior or superior to my brother in certain respects, 
ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŚŖǱȱ
168). ȁȱ·ȱȂȱȱȂ¥ȱȱȱȱùȱȱêtres se 
reconnaissent mutuellement comme différents, comme existant ensemble dans leur 
·ȱ¹ȂȱǻRI: 14), he writes in the introduction to ȱȱ¥ȱȂ (1940); 
ȁnȱȱ¸ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻDH: 173), he affirmed in his 
William James Lecture ȁ·ȱȂǯȱMoreover, for Marcel, thinking in terms of 
equality actually distorts our understanding of human relations Ȯ crucially, because of 
its atemporality. ȱ ǱȱȁȂȱùȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȂ··ȱȱ
un intemporel de mensonge qui dissimule aux regards [...] un processus de 
                                                        
90 ·ȱȱȱȱȱȁ·Ȃǰȱ ǰȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ
intersubjective relations (e.g. AE: 138; TI: 235). 
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·ǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ·ȂȱǻŗşŚŖǱȱŗŜşǼȱȮ a devaluation of the 
ȂȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȂ··ȱend son 
ȱȱȱȂǲ91 ¢ȱȁȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȂȂȱǻȱ1999a).92 In these 
discussions, therefore, time (and not an eternal present) emerges as pivotal to any true 
relation with another, the otherness of whom, Marcel argues, will simply be denied if 
Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱan identification with 
the self.93 
 
ǰȱȂȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ the self and 
other as distinct, while at the same time affirming their relation. Attempting to define 
his philosophical ambition in the ȱȱȱȁȂ··ȱ·Ȃ, for 
example, Marcel identified the personal experience of the universal with solitude as 
opposed to shared presence or communion, and quoted ȱȱȱȂȱ
Grandes Odes ǻŗşŗŖǼȱȱȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ
hommes comme une personne sans visage et ma / Parole sur eux sans aucun son 
ȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱǲȱǰȱȁȱȱȱque semeur de silence ou 
semeur de solitude ·ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȂ¹ȂȱǻŗşŜŚǱȱŘŖŗǼǯ Though this 
may appear in contradiction with his affirmation of intersubjectivity or fraternity, 
Marcel quickly corrected such an interpretation: 
La contȱȂǰȱȱǰȱȂǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ
implique une confusion que je crois indispensable de dénoncer. Le mot 
ȱȱǲȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱȱȂǲȱ-ci est un 




And thus, he declared in another William James Lecture ǻȁȂǼǱȱȁȂȱȱ
··ȱ¥ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȂȱȱȱ··ȱȱȂȱȱ
                                                        
91 ȁȂ··ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·-ȂȱǻDH: 172). 
92 See also Lhoste (1999: interview 8). 
93 See also HH: 28, 119-20. 
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ȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǾȱȂȱǻŗşŜŚǱȱŚśǼǯȱȂȱ
references to the universal should perhaps, therefore, be understood apart from 
totalization94 Ȯ though the two notions can of course ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱ
constant gravitation back toward ontological language demonstrates. 
 
The late lectures published in 1968, in Pour une sagesse tragique et son au-delà, also 
accentuate what may be described as Lévinassian themes, including the impossibility 
of Being-toward-death ȱȂȱȱhors-soiǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ
tendency to foreground uncertainty Ȯ sometimes even in conjunction with time. ȁȱ
ȱȃȱȱȱȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱine de la 







venir peut exercer sur moi une action pétrifiante, je suis amené à reconnaître que cette 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱȱ-¹ȂȱǻPST: 73-74) Ȯ a 
statement which echoes the above discussion of Lévinas and death, and which is 
ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱȱ
Ǳȱȁȱȱ¥ȱȂ¹-contre-la-ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȂȱ
instinct de conservation, mais bien plus profondément et intimement contre la mort 
ȱȱȂȱǰȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȂȱǰȱ
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȂ¹ȱ··ȱȱ¢·ȂȱǻPST: 309). 
                                                        
94 ȁȂ·ȱ-même ne peut être en aucune façon traitée comme une structure comparable à celle 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻME II: 109). 
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Finally, the link between Marcel, and Lévinassian time and the Other, is made 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱǱȱȁȱ·ȱȱȱ¥ȱȂǰȱ
prudemment certes, mais avec une sorte de frémissement heureux, sur les chemins 
qui conduisent, je ne dis pas hors du temps, mais hors de notre tempsȂȱǻPST: 309-10). If 
Marcel has sometimes appeared to advocate the transcendence of timeȂȱ, he 
now seems to be correcting ȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱ
as (intentionally, at least) ¢ȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱȮ as a philosophy which reacts 
against the egoism of Self-centred time, in order to open up the possibility of a 
genuine encounter with the Other, and a true encounter with time. 
 
I consequently find it difficult to agree with Treanor, who states that there is an 
impasse between Marcel and Léȱ ȱȁǰȱ ȱǰȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ£ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŜa: 
151), as it is not at all clear that Marcel and Lévinas always interpret otherness so 
differently. It should be noted that Treanor states his understanding of Lévinas to rest 
primarily on Totalité et infini, so the substantial evolution that the Self-Other encounter 
undergoes between Totalité et infini and ȱȂ¹ is excluded.95 ȁȱȱ
the other is absolutely other, while Marcel would clearly reject such a black and white 
ȂǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŜa: 121). But, I feel, the (more mature) Lévinas of 
ȱȂ¹re would equally reject such a black and white distinction; and this 
therefore undermines the strength of the contrast Treanor draws. Marcel and Lévinas 
both wish the other to be appreciated on his or her own terms, beyond the 
appropriating grasp of the self. And for neither does this entail radical separation, 
                                                        
95 ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱ
the same general thesis, Totality and Infinity ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱǻ¢ǼȱȮ 
which is our guiding question and concern Ȯ while Otherwise than Being concentrates on ethical subjectivity 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŜǱȱŘŝŚǼǯȱ·Ȃȱȱconcern does indeed remain constant, but 
Totalité et infiniȂȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
time Lévinas writes ȱȂ¹, and this shift must be taken into account. 
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understood in the sense of a non-relation Ȯ only a separation that presentifying 
knowledge cannot bridge, a temporal separation this chapter has proposed. 
 
Treanor has another argument, however, which declares the opposition between 
MarceȂȱȱ·Ȃȱ of otherness to be consolidated by the different 
 ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ£ȱȱȱǯȱȁȱ£ȱȱȱȱ
the same to the other primarily in terms of justice and responsibility, while Marcel 
describes disponibilité ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŜa: 153). Yet, again, I 
would hesitate to make such a straightforward juxtaposition, because I do not believe 
ȱȱȱȁȂȱis directly comparable. Tȱȱ ȱȱȁȱȱ
addresses both justice and love as modes of relating to the other person, and the 
attention paid to the less-emphasized mode of relation Ȯ ȱȂȱǰȱǰȱȱ
ȱȂȱǰȱȱȮ appears to moderate or otherwise introduce ambiguity into 
ȱȂȱȱȂǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
Lévinas, contends Treanor, whereas the primary sense of justice in Marcel is really an 
aspect of love Ȯ ȱȁ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃǰȱȱǰȱ
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŜaǱȱŗśŚǼǯȱȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Lévinas, Ȃȱȱ ȱbe valid. However, while Lévinas refuses to give 
love priority because he tends to understand it in the sense of the Greek eros 
(passionate, sexual love) Ȯ ǰȱ·ȱȱȱȱǰȱȁȂǰȱȱȱ
¢ȱȁȂ96 Ȯ ȱȱȁȂȱǻȂ) in Marcel are never concerned with 
the passions, nor do they offer phenomenological analyses of experiences such as the 
caress, as LévinasȂȱ. Love, in Marcel, is more akin to the Greek agape (Christian self-
                                                        
96 In ȱȱȱȂre for example, and especially Totalité et infini. ·ȂȱǻǼȱȱȱȱ
in later works, on the other hand, are decidedly distanced from eros (indeed, another striking difference 
between Totalité et infini and ȱȂ¹ is the fact that Lévinas abandons discussion of the erotic 
relation as a genuine approach to the Other); they are more akin to agape. 
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sacrificial love, often explicitly opposed to eros).97 ȁȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ
ȱȱȂ¹ȱ·ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ·ǲȱȱȱ
·ȱȱǰȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȂ¹ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻJM: 218), writes Marcel on 2 December 1919, for example.98 Instead, 
love, as a mode of être rather than avoir, is to be identified with respect (e.g. EA: I, 56), 
and it is a relation that is both beyond and prior to knowledge,99  ȱȁȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ
la libération du je ǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȂȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 217; 1 December 1919). 
ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ·Ȃǯȱȱȱ
comparable, however, is their shared suspicion of a love grounded in desire and self-
satisfaction Ȯ and for this reason ǻ¢ȱȱȂȱ¢Ǽ Ȃȱȱȱ
love and LévinȂȱȱȱȱpresent a very similar argument: both 
advocate ethical respect and responsibility for the other. 
 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȂȱ¢al of intersubjectivity 
ȱȱȱȱȱ£ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ·Ȃȱȱȱȱ
its determination to grasp and ontologize the relation with the Other for all time. 
Presence is undoubtedly the most common image used to describe this relation, as 
Chapter Two observed, and in his Journal Marcel even goes so far as to sayǱȱȁȂ¹ȱȱ
ȂȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ·ǲȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 157; 18 December 
1918ǼǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱirmation of intersubjectivity is 
motivated by his struggle to establish an individual philosophical position apart from 
ǰȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȮ a 
ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȂȱFirst World War experiences are a 
rather rude awakening to the gap between theory and experience, which he then 
                                                        
97 See for example HH: 24, 141; ME II: 110. 
98 On the opposition between desire and love see also EA: I, 190, 210. 
99 See especially Marcel (1954b), but also EA: I, 149; JM: 63-64, 226-27. 
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becomes determined to close. Could the intensity of these concerns perhaps be the 
reason why Marcel emphasizes a connection between the self and the other to such an 
extent, and why his philosophical arguments at times descend into affirmational 
hyperbole and polemic?100 ȱǰȱȂȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
with a contrast between the theoretical and the real, but also between a worrying 
contemporary situation where intersubjectivity was equally absent, and the hope for a 
ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱêȂȱȱȱȁ·ȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞşǱȱŗśŞǼȱȱȂȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱbserved; and 





ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŜa: 89-90). Nevertheless, in 
retrospect Marcel affirms that ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱêǰȱ
for example: ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱde la justice 
·ȱȂȱǻEPR: 102).102 And the fact that such emphasis on the significance of the 
ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
significance to his dramatic works Ȯ which, crucially, do engage with the temporality 
of intersubjectivity, and the temporal grounding of ethical exigency and aspiration Ȯ 
suggests that Marcel might be attempting to counteract the excesses of his earlier, 
timeless presentations of intersubjectivity.103 Interpreted in this way, the difference of 
                                                        
100 ȱ	ǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȁȱȱȱ ȱȱȃȄȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ ȱȃȄȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃ (1980: 165-66). 
101  ȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱ
specific ethical problems. Nevertheless his work is deeply ethical [...]; indeed, from one point of view, the 
whole of his thought is a sustained discussion on the issue of how to live ethically in a world that is making 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŘǱȱŘŝŗǼǯ 
102 Later, in Soi-mêmeǰȱêȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ·ȱǻȱȱȱǼȱȱȱȱȱ
their shared concern with ethics (SA: 198). 






could be understood as a reaction against a presentifying, narrative structure of time, 
 ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ
¡ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŗǱȱŚǼǯȱȂȱ¡ȱȱȱǰȱ
referenced in Chapter Three, could still, then, be taken seriously, with Ȃȱȱ
preference for his theatre reinforcing this all the more, as an implicit realization that 
he himself had been overly inclined to narrate. ȱȂȱȱȱ
could be compared to that of Lévinas in Totalité et infini: though both are desperate to 
find solid grounds on which to found an ethical relation to the Other, and are 
therefore tempted by the stability of ontology, both realize that the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of temporality cannot be escaped, for these are what actually define human 
experiences of normativity and intersubjectivity. A metaphysics of presence is not the 
answer; thus, Lévinas writes ȱȂ¹ and, one might suggest, Marcel 
subordinates his philosophy to his theatre. 
 
But unfortunately, this is not the end of the story. Though his plays do not themselves 
offer any totalizing narratives, which reduce their significance to an intemporal 
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ¡ǰȱ ǰȱȱ
stressed the philosophical importance of his theatre, he appropriates it for eternalizing 
purposes. ȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȂȱȱȱǻȱLe Dard) are 
reified, so that they become emblematic of the authenticity Marcel wishes to argue for: 
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¹ȱȱȱ·Ȃȱ
(DH: 163), he declared in the William James Lecture ȁ·ȱȂǲȱȁȱȱ
¢ȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȱȱúȱ·ȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¡ȱ
                                                                                                                                                  
then tend to speak of intersubjectivity in terms of presence, its temporality is then eclipsed Ȯ perhaps even 
forgotten. 
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aussi peu que possible pour lui-¹ȂȱǻDH: 164). SȱȱȱȂȱ
ȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȁǽǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·Ȃȱǻȱ
1951d: 151).104 Although Werner appears more exemplary than other characters in this 
particular play, his decision to return to Germany could still be viewed as 
ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ·Ȃȱ
growing love for one another: if Werner leaves, he leaves Béatrice behind, to live with 
a husband who does not seem to appreciate her and who has been having an affair 
 ȱȱ ǯȱȱȂȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ
audience from considering other such possible perspectives. Moreover, as the play 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȂȱȱ
are simply premature. ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȁȱ·¦ȱȱ	ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱřřşǼǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱntain this openness, for 
ȱ£ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȂȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂȱ
(DH: 165). While Marcel might in one sense be said to make a Lévinassian move, 
when he begins to favour his dramatic works over his formal philosophical writings, 
ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱêȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱ
he fails to integrate the (retrospective) instruction that he claims to receive from his 
theatre. The bi-polarity of his work is denied; it defaults on the philosophical Ȯ 
because Marcel seems unable to escape the lure of eternalizing narrative, unable to 
face up to the unsettling instability of time. And so although an Other conception of 
time may ostensibly be offered by his theatre, the theory of time offered in his ê as 
a whole remains at best inconsistent, and at worst, representative of a failure to 
confront Ȃȱȱ¢.
                                                        
104 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱȱŗşśŗȱȱȱȂȱ
play ȱȂȱȱȱ. Marcel statesǱȱȁǽǾȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱȱ··ȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ¸ȱ¥ȱ¸ǲȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ses personnages et de leur liberté qui doit apposer son ȱ¥ȱȱêȱȂǯ 
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Conclusion to Part TwoǱȱ ȱêȱȱ· 
 
According to Richard Cohen, ȁ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯ] is not the 
relation between self and other, but the encounter with alterity as transcendence [itself], 
as the outsideǰȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŗŚŗǼǯȱ Ȃȱǰȱand indeed some of his 
philosophical writings, have been shown to engage with this aspect of alterity, his 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱ
of his plays reinforce, he is also concerned with the self in action Ȯ that is, with the 
basis on which the self might make decisions, and in what lȱǻȁȂȱȱ
otherwise) these decisions might be viewed. It is for this reason that Marcel can still be 
ȱȱȱêȱ, for, as Muldoon informs us, êȱȁȱȱ
philosophical career to unraveling the web of relations that must be determined to 
ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖśǱȱ
ŜŚǼǯȱȱȱǻǼȱȱȱȱêȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱê,1 which, as Part II has shown, is also deeply Ȯ if not first and foremost Ȯ 
ȱȱǯȱȂȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
êǰȱȱȂȱȱ ȱȱ·ǲȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ
theory of time also appears to underwrite each of these two poles Ȯ namely, time as 




can it be identified with the content of his theatre Ȯ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȂȱ
plays dramatize only conflict and ambiguity. Rather, a response from the spectator or 
reader is required: a response that is non-totalizing, and lies somewhere between the 
                                                        
1 For more specific discussion regarding their individual projects, see Bourgeois (2002) and Cohen (2002). 
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ȁȂȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂs philosophy and in his theatre. Thus while the 
time of Ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ
the call to responsibility originates in the Other, as opposed to the innate capacities 
and reflexivity of the self (as RêȱǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱLévinassian position in itself. 
 
Indeed, Lévinas has been criticized for not adequately addressing the question as to 
what, in practice, an ethical response to the Other involves,2 or how one might decide 
 ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
responsibility for all. Kearney, for example, points to the problem of discernment that 
arises, if philosophy only approaches the Other as one who surpasses interpretation 
ȱǯȱȁȱ¢ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
hermeneutics of self-and-ȂǰȱȱǰȱȱȁȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
interpretation capable of tracing interconnections between the poles of sameness and 
Ȃǯȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȱ¡ȱȱȱ
alterity, [and] build paths between the worlds of autos and heteros [, ... can philosophy] 
help us to discover the other in our self and our self in the other Ȯ without abjuring 
ȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŗŖǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǰȱȱ ȱ
action is markedly absent. Characters tend to remain silent or paralysed by indecision, 
and this is frequently the result of their inability to judge, or to enter into a critical 
relation with the other. Hence, Raymond, in Un juste, is left mute in his intermediate 
position as a non-supporter of the causes for which World War I has come to stand for, 
and as a close friend to men who are fighting in the trenches and are in need of moral 
support.3 And the identities of characters such as Jérôme and Violette, in Le Chemin de 
crête (1935), are eroded by an other (Ariane) so enigmatic that they cannot determine if 
                                                        
2 See Vanni (2004). 
3 ȁȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻȱŗşŜśǱȱŗśŞǼǰȱ¢ȱ¡ǯ  
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she is a devil or saint.4 Even Werner and Christiane are not proven to be successful: if 
they are presented in a more positive light, this is only because the possibility of a 
relation with the Other is not ruled out; it is not by virtue of any actual relation being 
established. Thus, it seems that there might still be a place for narrative time. As 
êȱ when he responds to Lévinas in Soi-même: 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱ
réflexive. [...] Bien plus, ne faut-ȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱ
·ȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǵȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ




ê, however, can be c£ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱ
starting with hermeneutics rather than with an investigation of what makes the 
hermeneutical situation possible as such. But this is because he is predominantly 
concerned with praxis, and with the interpretative framework that enables the self to 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱǯȱ
Tȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱêȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ
seeks not to resolve but rather to ground itself in the lived tensions of experience. It is 
ȱȱȱȱêȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȁȱ Ȃȱǻla sagesse tragique),5 a wisdom 
that gives a ceȱȱȱ	ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ ȱȮ both his theory 
of theatre, and his conception of le tragique, the consciousness of which, he writes in 
Homo viator (1944), ȁȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱǰȱȂ-à-dire 
ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱÉȂȱǻHV: 192). 
                                                        
4 Violette says to Ariane, for e¡Ǳȱȁȱǯǯǯȱȱȱȱȱǯǯǯȱâȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱâǯǯǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱ¡ȂȱǻCPM: 
284). 
5 See especially SA: chap. 9. 
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(SA: 286). ȱȱêȱȱ illustration of such a conversion in the chorus of 
Antigone, which at no point offers straightforward advice as to how the conflict 
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȂȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ
offer totalizing messages. For both (to ȱêȂȱ ǼǱȱȁȱ·ǰȱ¸ȱȱ
··ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱ praxis ¥ȱ·ȱȂǰȱ¥ȱȱ
ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱréponde à 
ȱȱȂȱǻSA: 288). Yet ǰȱǰȱȱêȱȱȱȱǰȱ
uncertainty, and risk, it is not clear that he is willing to accept such temporal 
discordance for what it is. Instead, ȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱǰȱêȂȱ
overriding desire for stability continues to motivate this circumscription of narrative 
¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŚǼǯȱȁȱȱȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ
£ȱȂǰȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱfrom the 
Ȃȱȱȱǻving decided how to respond to le tragiqueǼȱȁȱȱ
¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȁȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȂǲȱȁ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱ
the subject [seek to] resȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŞǼǯ 
 
So while ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱêȱ
appears to affirm a response too soon. He may speak of le tragique and of the non-
philosophical, but ultimately these discussions remain grounded in the theoretical, the 
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intention of which is to synthesize (or totalize) above all else. Thus, here again, a 
parallel with Marcel can be maintained. Marcel, too, slides between references to le 
tragique as drama and le tragique as philosophical principle: in the preface to his first 
volume of plays, Le Seuil invisible (1914), for instance, he discusses dramatic forms of 
tragedy in direct conjunction  ȱȁȱȱȱ·Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱ
to express.6 And Marcel, too, chooses (eternalizing) philosophical principle over an 
engagement with time: iȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱêȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
stability into his (ostensibly temporal) theory of narrative identity, the non-narrative 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱ-narrated in his philosophical texts, allowing him to draw 
conclusions about how the self can conceive of itself ethically, in a unified way that 
resolves conflict. So although it has been suggested that there might still be a place for 
ȱǰȱȱêȱption Ȯ even when ethically situated Ȯ does not 
appear to be the solution. Our understanding of narrative itself, it seems, must first be 
reconceived;7 and thus, ȱȱ·Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ




tensions between time and eternity in his work. Despite repeated efforts to engage 
with time, Marcel chooses eternity in the end. One question still remains to be 
answered, however: why is it that Marcel always subordinates time to eternity? Part I 
suggested that Marcel might have failed to escape idealism, but another explanation is 
also possible Ȯ ¢ǰȱȂȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
6 ȁǽȱȱȱȱǾȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱ
pensée métaphysique, et pourtant ce ne sont à aucun degré des dialogues philosophiques; ils portent sur les 
ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱ··ȱȱ-même [...]. Je me suis efforcé [...] de montrer le 
ȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşŗŚǱȱŗǼǯȱSee also Marcel (1921; 1924; 1926). 
7 This is exactly what Baroni (2009) aims to do, in specific response to the inadequacies of a êian 
conception of narrative. See also Kearney (2003). 
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think of his philosophy as religious, or, more specifically, as Christian? This is what 
the fifth and final chapter endeavours to ascertain.
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Part Three: Time and Eternity 
Chapter Five: Time and God 
 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱêȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
was also inspired by similarities identified between Marcel and Augustine, whose 
¢ȱȱȱêȱ ȱȱto support his argument that 
phenomenological and cosmological ȱȱǯȱȱȂȱ
concern with time is philosophical,1 however, it is also linked to his religious outlook Ȯ 
just as, this chapter will suggest, might be argued for Marcel. But this theological 
aspect is ȱȱȱêȂȱȱȱǯȱȱêǰȱ	Ȃȱ
eternity in Book XI of the Confessions ¢ȱȱȱȂȱǰȱ¢ȱ
and deepening our understanding of time. Yet eternity is much more than this for 
Augustine: not simply a philosophical concept that serves as a useful counterpoint 
when reflecting on the nature of time, it is generally considered to correspond to a 







principio fecit Deus...Ȃǰȱȱ ȱȱTemps et récit I. Nevertheless, although Ȯ ȱêȱ
acknowledges Ȯ ȁȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȂȱe au texte une 
ȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱ ȱ
                                                        
1 And this, in itself, has been questioned Ȯ by Wetzel (1995) for example, who feels that it is misguided to 
look for a philosophical treatment of time in the Confessions, since this is not AugustȂ preoccupation. 
Rather, Wetzel claims, AugustineȂȱ¡ȱǰ to God, his inability to escape sin, while concurrently 




pour marquer plus fortement la déficience ontologique caractéristique du temps 
ȂȱǻTR I: 22). ȱ ȱǰȱ ǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
engagement with the eternal in this context is not a ȱȱȱêȂȱ
inattention Ȯ at least, not if one is interested in what time means for Augustine. And 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱ
crucial to consider the wider context in which Augustine is writing.2 The fact that 
Augustine feels the need to introduce a notion of eternity when philosophizing about 
time is, in itself, significant. Moreover, as a consequence of drawing this relation, what 
ȱȱ¢ȱȁ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ
when he speaks of time. 
 
êȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȂ··ȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱ·-ȂȱǻTR I: 57), but he nevertheless treats eternity in 
Augustine as a purely negative conception (TR I: 58, note 2), where eternity is 
considered to be just as mysterious as time (TR I: 54). And this misrepresents 
ȂȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂȱ¡ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ
rethink its fundamental nature, the same does not apply for eternity. Eternity, for 
Augustine, is God; and in spite of all that Augustine is unable to understand about 
God, His reality and nature are not in question, but are further affirmed as what is 
most truly real. When Augustine writes on time, what he really seems to be struggling 
to understand is the relation between (temporal) human beings and (eternal) God, the 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
2 ȁAȂȱ ȱȱȱ[...] are motivated in the context of his meditations on the doctrine of creation 
[...]. [...] if Augustine is not always as clear as we could wish in propounding his philosophy of time, we 
should remember that thȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻDeWeese 2004: 111). 
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must be considered in conjunction with eternity; and from this perspective one should 




The question this chapter asks of Marcel, therefore, is whether his reflections on time 
are also an expression of a wider concern with the relation between humans and God; 
for if they were found to be bound up in such a religious context, Part IȂȱêȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȂȱ ȱȱȱ
introduce a notion of eternity when he philosophizes about time, combined with the 
privilege he consistently gives to the eternal and the fact that he himself was a 
religious believer, certainly suggest such a reading to be possible. Indeed, as the first 
section will propose through its comparison of Marcel and Augustine, there is 
evidence to indicate that the framework within which Marcel understands the 
structure of time is Augustinian, and that God might be the eternity Marcel is 
favouring. ȱ ȱȱȱȂȱ with that of Plotinus before 
the Christianization of his Neoplatonic ideas, and asks whether Marcel might not also 
contest this Augustinian understanding of time. To what extent is it useful Ȯ or indeed 
legitimate Ȯ therefore, to situate his project within a specifically Christian context? 
ȱȱȱȱȱȁ	ȂȱȱȂȱ¢? And what implications do 
Ȃȱerences to God have for interpreting and placing his discussions of time? 
These are the questions that guide section three, in its attempt to make sense of the 








nature of eternity were unquestioned for nearly ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŚǱȱŗŗŘǼǯ3 According 
ȱǰȱ	Ȃȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻǯǯȱȱ
time), is atemporal, and as such is (absolutely) beyond the existence of worldly beings. 
Given that Marcel also seems to draw a sharp contrast between temporal human 
worldliness, and the et¢ȱȱȱȁ-¥Ȃȱ ȱin places is related to God, might 
he, too, be positioned within the Augustinian tradition? 
 
Both Augustine and Marcel are alike in their presentation of time as ontologically 
subordinate to, and an epistemological distraction from, authentic eternal Being Ȯ 
which may be identified with God. Owing to the fact that the past is no longer, the 
ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȁ Ȃǰȱȱȱȱ
beings tend toward non-existence, and are fallible because of the way in which their 
understanding is scattered over these temporal fragments. Book XI of the Confessions 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȁto 
taste eternity when their heart is still flitting about in the realm where things change 
ȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȱȱȱȃȄȱǻǯȱśǱȱŗŖǼȂǯȱȁ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
 ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǽ	Ǿȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱŘŘŞǰȱ. 
xi.13), Augustine observes. As he explains in The City of God (413-26 CE), ȁȱ ȱ
was not created in time but with ȂȱǻŘŖŖřǱȱŚřŜǰȱǯȱŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ
ontological and epistemological capacities of human beings, the reality of which is 
                                                        
3 Boethius (480-524), Anselm (1033-1109), and Aquinas (1225-1275) were among the medieval philosophical 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ	Ȃȱ¢ǰȱ
see for example Stump and Kretzmann (1981); Helm (1988); Leftow (1991). 
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dependent on their (atemporal) eternal creator,4  ǰȱ¡ȱȁȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
¢ȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱŘřŖǰȱǯȱ¡ǯŗŜǼǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ
epistemologically constant, and therefore most fully real.5 Humans on the other hand, 
ȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
constraints. They can, however, through devoted contemplation, resist the distraction 
of temporal succession and, in so doing, partake of eternal life insofar as their limited 
ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ-fold, synoptic present aims to 
encourage, for it recognizes the self as essentially unified, despite the perpetual risk of 




For Marcel, too, time Ȯ as temporal succession Ȯ tends toward non-existence, and as 
such constitutes an epistemological distraction. Thus Marcel also argues for a 
conversion of attention: away from a conception of Being that reduces the self to a 
linear chronology (réflexion primaire), toward a fuller, more recuperative engagement 





ȁȱȱ¹ȱȱȂ·ȂȱǻEA: I, 19), and he encourages us Ȯ in the 1943 lecture 




5 ȁȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱd give it fixity, so that for some little moment it may be stable [...]? [...] In 
ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȂȱǻAugustine 1998: 
228, XI. xi.13). 
6 ȱȂȱ¢ȱȮ as for Aquinas, Cary informs us Ȯ ȁseeing the essence of God belongs to the 
created intellȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŝŖǲȱ¢ȱȱȱSumma Theologica, I, 12.4). 
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ȁȱȱ·Ȃȱȱ¡ Ȯ to ȁ¡ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȂ-¥ȂȱǻHV: 213). 
Accordingly, when speaking of the ȱȱȂ¡ȱ(see Chapter Two), Marcel 
describes the scope of human Being as ranging from object-like existence, which 
¢ȱȁȂȱȱǰ7 ȱȁȂ¹ȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻME II: 30), which can never be 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȱȂȱ¢ȱ 
·ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃ·ǯȱȱȂ·ǰȱ-je, car après tout cet être [...] ne peut que 
ȱ¹ȱ·ǰȱȂȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
conférer à moi-même; de la crainte, car je ne puis même pas être tout à fait sûr 
Ȃȱȱȱǰȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂ¹ȱamné à le perdre si la grâce ne vient pas à mon aide; de 
Ȃ·ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¸ǰȱȱȂȱ
est lumière. 
(ME II: 34) 
 
Save the absence of an explicit reference to God, this account of Being seems to map 
almost e¡¢ȱȱȂǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
upon the self by a greater power, and its reference to the grace and light that allow the 
self to become aware of the nature of its individual existence. On other occasions, 
Marcel ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ·Ȃǲ8 and crucially, in certain 
instances Marcel also suggests that authentic being depends on, and is a concurrent 
¢ȱǰȱ	Ȃȱǯȱȁȱȱ¥ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
divine ȱȱȱȱȂ·ȂȱǻJM: 86), writes Marcel in his diary 
on 20 February 1914ǲȱȁȱȱ-ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ




                                                        
7 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¡ȱȱȱdejà comme 
tout obscurscie par la menace du Ȃ¡ȱ, il ne faut certainement pas dire que cette existence-là est du 
non-¹ǰȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱâȱȂȱȱà peine ȱȂ¹ȂȱǻME II: 29-30). 




donnée: tu y trouveras Dieu et tout. Dieu ne flotte pas sur ton horizon, il dort 
ȱȱ·ǯȱȱ·ȱǰȱȂmour creuse. Si tu fuis hors de toi-




ǰȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱexigence ontologique or assurance 
existentielle he so often speaks of, support an Augustinian reading of his philosophy. 
As Erwin Straus and Michael Machado note: 
There is a close parallel between the movement of conversion, by which 
reflective thought passes from the objective order of existence to the 
transcendent order of being, and that by which the self opens into 
communion out of its prior community with the world. [...] Marcel discovered 
that the quest for being contained an implicit awareness of the exigence for 





An analogous notion of personal identity thus appears to permeate the philosophies 
of Augustine and Marcel, as a result of very similar, first-person methods of reflection. 
Fumbling and always interrogative and self-ǰȱȂȱȱȂȱ
autobiographically-grounded meditations both come to recognize glimpses of a 
mysterious, yet indubitable source of (inner) knowledge,10 which, at the deepest level 
of self-consciousness, is said to reveal a yearning oriented (outward and upward) 
 ȱȱȱ	Ȃȱǯ11 ȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ
Ȃȱ
(1998: 185, X. vii.11), pronounces Augustine in Book X of the Confessions. ȁȱ
                                                        
9 Gallagher (1995: 54) and Keen (1984: 107-ŖŞǼȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ 
10 ȱȱȱȱȁ ȱȂȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǻŘŖŖŖǼǯ 
11 For this reason, Harper, who compares the experience of human time to our response when reading a 
familiar tale such as The Sleeping Beautyǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ¡ǯ ȁȱ
respond delightedly to such a tale as that of The Sleeping Beauty because it is in some way familiar to us. Not 
¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȂǰȱhe  ǯȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ
know; we know only what is in some way already experienced. [...] Fulfilment is in soȱȱȱȂȱ
(1955: 14), Harper continues Ȯ ȱǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
¢ȱ ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ	ȱȂȱǻŗşśśǱȱŘşǼǯ Time, in Augustine, is structured in 






ȂȱǻHH: 23), writes Marcel in ȱ
ȱȱȂ
umain (1951), who then 
affirmed, in his second 1961 William James Lecture ǻȁȂǼǰȱȁȂ¸ȱ
Ȃȱ¡ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ¥ȱÉȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱ
¢·¡ȱȂȱǻDHǱȱŚřǼǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȁ1ȱȂȱ




ȱȂȱȱȱȂȱǻRI: 109). Philosophy must engage with experience rather 
than treat it as irrelevant; and to engage properly with experience is to realize that 
ȁȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ·le de sa vie ou de son être, est encore 
··ȂȱǻHV: 28) Ȯ that is, to recognize the reality of the exigence ontologique, which 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱ




ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşşǱȱŞřŜǼǯ12 Indeed, according to orthodox 
Christian belief, human beings are not only finite, as spatio-temporal beings, but also 
ȁȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ13 And this conception of human Being appears to be 
                                                        
12 ȁȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
I may love you, my God. [...] The recalling of my wicked ways is bitter in my memory, but I do it so that 
you may be sweet to me [...]. You gathered me together from the state of disintegration in which I had been 
fruitlessly divided. I turned from unity in you to ȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻȱŗşşŞǱȱŘŚǰȱǯȱǯŗǼǯ 
13 The principal scriptural reference to the Fall is found in the writings of Saint Paul. See especially Romans 
5. 12, 18-ŗşǯȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ified with Paul than 
with Augustine. Paul does not believe that we are born individually condemned, but rather that the world 
itself has inherited a structural fault. Similarly, Marcel argues that ȁla structure même de notre monde nous 
la [la trahison de lȂ¹ǾȱrecommandeȂȱǻEA: I, 148; 23 December 1932), and speaks of the collective nature of 
sin rather than of something which can be attributed to anyone in particular (PI: 115-17, 120-21). Augustine, 
on the other hand, emphasizes personal guilt (including his own, in the Confessions). In Of True Religion (De 
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shared by ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱǻŗŚȱȱŗşŚřǼȱȱȁȱȂ¢ȱȱ-être pas 
de sens à parler de temps avant la chute. Le temps est relatif au monde Ȯ et peut-être 
Ȃ¢ȱ-t-il un monde ȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȂȱǻPI: 118). Notions of responsibility and 
individual salvation thus emerge as simultaneous with (temporal) personal identity in 
Augustine and Marcel, for both present teleological conceptions of Being,14 arguing 
for what Marcel terms ȁȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ··ȂȱǻPI: 
110; 6 March 1943). As beings endowed with freedom, humans are not causally 
determined (hence thȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
in terms of linear succession), but are instead free to develop and better themselves. 
However, having inherited a propensity to sin, time and all its worldliness becomes, 
ȱǰȱȁǽȱǾȱ ȱȂȱǻEA: I, 27; 23 March 1929),15 and personal spiritual 
progress oriented toward God becomes a difficult, yet vital responsibility. 
 
ǰȱȱȱǰȱȁMarcel was profoundly disturbed at the godlessness 
of western ¢ȂȱǻŗşşŚǱȱŗŗ6); and for Marcel this godlessness was, at least in part, 
ȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ ȱȱǱȱȁȱǰȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ
ǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşśśǱȱŚŖǼǰȱȱȱȱȱŗşśśȱ¢ȱȱ
by Ȃȱ.16 Accordingly, it therefore seems, Marcel will often emphasize 
Christian aspects of his thought when differentiating his position from other 
philosophies, presenting non-religious conclusions as, in some sense, inadequate Ȯ 
especially when ethical questions are at stake. This is most evident with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                  
vera religione; 390 ǼȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ




ȱȱȄǯȱȱȱȱȱȱtuck in them and glued to them with love through the physical senses. 
For these things pass along the path of things that move towards non-existence. They rend the soul with 
pestilential desires [...]. But in these things there is no point of rest: they laȱȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱŜŘǰȱǯȱ
x.15). 
16 ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ£·ȱȱ···ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱ
à laquelle nous assistons Ȯ ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱ
qȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻHV: 219). 
 209 
Sartre, in response to whom Marcel positively embraced the Christian label attributed 
to hȱȱȂ ȁȂ¡ȱ-ȱȱǵȂȱǻbefore later rejecting it), 
using this as a basis on which to qȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ ȱǻǼȱ
brand of existentialism. ȁȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ·ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
fondateur Ȯ lui-même serait le premier à en convenir Ȯ mais seulement comme le chef 
ȱȱȱȂ¡ȱtȂǰȱȱȱȱ 1947 article 
ȁ¡ȱȱ·ȱ·Ȃǯȱȁȱȱȱȱ··ȱǰȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ·¢ȱȂȱȱ·ȱȱȱirrésistiblement 
attirée par des conceptions qui ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȂ¡ȱ
ȱȂȱǻŗşŚŝǱȱŗśŝǼǯȱȁȱȱȱ¡Ȃǰȱ ǰȱȁȱȱ
ȱȱȂ·ȱȂȱ¡ȱȱ¹ȱ·Ȃǯ17 On the contrary, he 
ǱȱȁȱȱȱȂȱȱà peu près dans la vérité en disant que 
Ȃ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱ·ǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŚŝǱȱŗśŞǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃ¡ȱȱȱ·ȱȱ£ȱn-Paul Sartre (written 1946), in the case of 
existentialism proper Ȯ ȱǰȱȁȱȱȂȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ··ȱ¥ȱȱ
ȱ·³ȂȱȮ ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞŗ: 86). But for philosophers such as Sartre, 
¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ··ȱȱ·ȂȱǻȱŗşŜŞǼǰȱȁȱ·ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¡ǯȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
nous oblige perpétuellement à choisiȂȱǻPST: 127). To define freedom only in relation 
ȱȱȂȱǰȱ ǰȱǰȱȱȂȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
indisponibilité. Moreover, it actually fails to engage with concrete existence, because it 
ignores the exigence ontologique that Marcel feels lies at its very depth, and which 
                                                        
17 Sartre does not, in fact; but if he is considered to be ȱȱȱȂ¡, this raises questions 
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȂȱȱ ȱȂȱȱǯ  
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communicates to us our metaphysical dependency on God.18 ȁȱ·ȱȱȱ
avons à défendre in extremisǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ¹ȱȱȱȱȱ





la grâce, je ne prends pas ce mot dans je ne sais quelle acception abstraite et laïcisée, il 
Ȃȱȱȱȱ¦ȱȱȱȂȱǻHH: 187). For Marcel, it therefore appears, 
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ	Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
genuinely free individuals capable of engaging in positive human relations, the 
possibility of which Marcel ȱȂȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱ
freedom and values on the human self alone,19 and refusing to acknowledge the 
broader community in which we all exist as created beings20 Ȯ a community which, we 
must be humble enough to acknowledge, is ultimately dependent on God. 
 




ȱ··ȂȱǻHV: 223). Such existential humility, as a requirement for intersubjective 
disponibilitéǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȂǰȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȮ 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȮ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱǻǼȱ
existence in relation to GodȂȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ
                                                        
18 In Les HommȱȱȂ
ǰȱȱȱȱȁun homme ne peut être ou rester libre que dans la 
ȱùȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱǻHH: 24). ȁ-¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¢ȱ-t-il pas de 
personne humaine et ne peut-il pas y en avoir; ce ne serait aȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
··ȂȱǻRI: 155), he writes in his 1940 essay ȁȱȱȂȱȱȱȂǯ 
19 As already suggested in Chapter Two (p. 70, note 3ŞǼǰȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ ȱȂȱ
philosophy is questionable. In this case, there is no acknowledgement of Ȃȱ(2004) argument that 
freedom pour-soi is at once freedom pour-autrui. 
20 ȁȂȱȱ¡ǰȱȂ-à-ȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱǻHH: 196). 
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ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱ¡ȱȱ
finitude are unable to ground the permanent, absolute, or unconditional; we need, as 
ȱ ǰȱ	ȂȱǯȱIn an undated diary entry (c. 1930) Marcel writes: 
ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱǽȂȱ··ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱ¹Ǿȱȱ
ȱȱȂ·ǲȱȂùȱȱȱȱǵȱ··ȱȱȱȱ
Ȃêtre même Ȯ ȱȂȱȱǯ 
Acte de transcendance avec contrepartie ontologique qui est la prise 
ȱȱȱǯȱȱȂȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¹ȱ
Ȃȱȱȱ·ǯ 
(EA I: 66) 
 
Hence values, for Marcel, become (or at least have to be able to become) ideals Ȯ 
otherwise Marcel fears that they will simply collapse, without anything to ground the 
possibility of their unconditionality. ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ




Accordingly therefore, in the case of hope, Marcel declares ȱȁȱȂȱ
··ȱȱȂȱ·¢ȱȱȂ·Ȃ: ȁȱ··ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂȱ
conscience en espérant de renforcer [...] un certain lien [...]. Ce lien, de toute évidence, 
eȱȂȱȂȱǻHV: 65). 
 
In order for human time to be truly meaningful, then Ȯ to be able (freely) to value, and 
ȱ¡ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȮ a 
metaphysics must, Marcel seems to be suggestingǰȱȱȱȱ	Ȃȱ¢ǲȱȱ
as (finite and imperfect) temporal beings, our freedom to do so is not intelligible 
ȱȱȱ	Ȃȱ ȱȱǯȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ
thus appear to be founded on a Christian Ȯ and in particular, Augustinian Ȯ 




position. Does this mean that Sartre was right to define Marcel as a Christian 
philosopher of existence? Not necessarily, the next section will now argue, for there 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱǻȱthe very least) render this 
Augustinian reading problematic. 
 
5.2 Challenging Augustinian Time 
 
For all the parallels that have been suggested between Marcellian and Augustinian 
ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Augustinian, calling into question whether such a reading of Marcel Ȯ although 
possible Ȯ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ
Whereas in Augustine, for example, communion with the eternal is deferred to the 
after-ǰȱȱȁthat day when, purified and molten by the fire of your love, I flow 
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱŘŚŚ-45, XI. xxix.39), ȱȁȱȂȱȱȱ
speaks of is not absolutely separate from this one.21 Rather, Marcel postulates a 
gradation between (temporal) existence and (eternal) être, which is more akin to 
Ȃȱ(205-270 CE) understanding of time and eternity before his philosophy was 
Christianized (notably by Augustine).22 As Philip Turetzky tells us, ȁȱȱ
Neoplatonism had a profound and continuing influence on Augustine, even after his 
ȱȱ¢Ȃǲȱȱȁȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
21 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱau delà a un sens, comme il faut 
ȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱùȱȂȱ··ȱȱȱȱȱ-Ȃȱ
(ME II: 158). 
22 Camus explores the Christianization of Neoplatonism in the thesis he wrote for his âȱȂ·ȱ
supérieures ǻȁ·¢ȱ·ȱȱ·Ȃǰȱ·ȱȂǰȱŗşřŜǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
four chapters on Augustine. As Ronald Srigley summarizes in the introduction to his translation, Camus 
¡ȱ ȱȁȱȱ	ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ
ȱȱǽǾȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ
plausible to the minds of Greeks and Romans ȂȱǻȱŘŖŖŝǱȱŜǼǯȱȱǰȱȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ
ȁȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻȱŗşşŞǱȱ¡¡Ǽȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ
quest for union with God. See Augustine (1998: Book VII). See also Grandgeorge (1967). 
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ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ ȱȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱśŝǼǯ23 Particularly significant here is the 
ȱ ȱȂȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
relation to eternity24 ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȁ¢Ȃȱǻȱ
One, the Intellectual-Principle/Nous, the (World) Soul):25 foundational metaphysical 
forms that express themselves by overflowing their own bounds, generating a 
subordinate substance of lesser reality and in so doing creating a gradation between 
ȱȂȱǻǼȱ¢ȱȱ ¢ǰȱspatio-temporal matter.26 The break can be 
traced back to the first Christian council of bishops at Nicaea (325 CE), convened by 
ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¡Ȃȱsuggestion that 
Ȃȱȱȱȱ¢¢ȱȱȱ	ǯȱȂȱȱ ȱ
overruled by the council, which decided instead to declare God the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit of one ontological substance (homoousios). Thus, as John Rist writes: 
after Nicaea, forms of Platonism which might look like (or be claimed to look 
like) the subordinationism of Arius were increasingly impossible for orthodox 
Christians. One traditional part of Platonism was thus excluded, and 
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǽǳǾȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
telescope the Plotinian hypostases of the One and Nous, making the Forms 




                                                        
23 ȁȂfluence du néo-ǰȱ¸ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂǰȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂ³ȱȱȱȱȱ
Augustin fut converti au christianisme. [...] saint Augustin reprend les arguments de Plotin, mais il les fait 
ǲȱȱȂȱȱȂȱ¡Ȃȱǻ	ȱŗşŜŝǱȱŗśŖǼǯ 
24 ȁȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ǿȱȱȱȱ
of eternity with the unchanging and transcendent intelligible world and time with the physical world of 
ȂȱǻSmith 1996: 196). As Turetzky reports, this concern is a response to Plato, who ȁ ȱȱ
entirely clear about the nature of eternity and its difference from its image, timeȂ (1998: 48) Ȯ thus causing 
Plotinus to question how it is possible for humans to have a share in eternity, if they themselves are in time. 
25 See Plotinus (1962). 
26 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂs attempt to integrate matter into a single universe caused in its totality by 
the One is a comparative upgrading of the world of physical nature ǽǳǾ and a softening of the soul-body 
dualism of the PhaedoȂȱǻȱ1996: 391). 
27 Rist is right to limit his discussion to the importance of Nicaea for the reception of Platonism within 
Christianity, for at the time there was no real orthodoxy to speak of; rather, there were many Christianities, 
amongst which were debated many ideas and beliefs. Ȃȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ
ȱ ȱ¡ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǱȱȁ it was 
not clear whether it meant specific or generic identity, and that enabled bishops of differing standpoints to 
agree to itȂȱǻŘŖŖŗǱȱŗşŞǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¡¢ȱǻȱ
1993: 107). It was not affirmed as an exclusive statement of faith until the Council of Constantinople (381 
CE) Ȯ ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ
(2006) is a good starting point for further reference. 
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In this way, the Nicene Creed led to the decisive separation of God from time and the 
world.28 ȱ¢ǰȱȁȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
united  ȱ	Ȃǰȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȁȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
in the suggestion that a human might become 	ȂȱǻŗşŞřǱȱŗŝŘǼǯȱMarcel, on the other 
hand, refuses an absolute divide between God and the world which would prevent 
humans from sharing in his eternity:29 ȁȱconviction la plus intime, la plus 
inébranlable Ȯ ȱȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȮ ȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ
veut nullement être aimé par nous contre le créé, mais glorifié à travers le créé et en 
ȱȱȂȱǻEA: I, 169), he writes in his diary on 4 March 1933.30 As he declares as 
early as 27 January 1914: ȁȱȱȂȱȱÉȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱ
ǲȱȂ·ȱȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
à lui. Seulement, il iȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂǰȱȱȂȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȂ·ȱȂȱǻJM: 36). 
 
This (subjective) emanationism avoided the difficulties Marcel confronted in his 
earliest philosophical writings (collected, for the most part, in the first half of the 
Journal)ǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱǻǼȱȱ
¢ȱȱ¡ǯȱȂȱ¢ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ
render religious faith intelligible. Hȱ¡ȱȱȱȁȱȂȱǻŗşŜŞǼǱȱ
                                                        
28 ȁȱȱȱȱ chasm between divine substance and created substance, as two quite 
separate, distinct entities, wholly unlike, with different powers and properties. The divine, they believed, is 
life, truth, goodness, and beauty; created being, on the other hand, receives life, truth, goodness, and beauty 
ȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȂȱǻ
ȱŘŖŖŜǱȱŝŞǼǯ 
29 The early Augustine, who believed in a special closeness between God and the soul, might have endorsed 
ȱǯȱ¢ȱȱǱȱȁȱȱeature of the prehistory of the inward turn [...] is that there 
is so little that distinguishes turning to the soul from turning to God. [...] Later in his career Augustine 
becomes aware that this pattern of talk is not as Catholic as it should be, and in the Retractions ȱȱȂȱ
ǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŗŖśǼǯȱǰȱȁ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ	ǰȱȱȱȱ
ȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŗŖŝǼǯ 
30 This position can be related to ȂȱǻŗŞŞŜ-ŗşŜśǼȱȱȱȁȂȱ¢ǰȱ  establishes a 
relation between human beings and God: we are always for-God, and God is always for-ǯȱȁ-
Ȃȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ£ȱ	ȂȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşśŗǱȱśş-66). 





faut-il dire aux essences ¡ȱȱȱȂȱȂȱǻŗşŜşǱȱŘśŜǼǯȱ
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȁ¡Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
temporally manifest: ȁȱȂ¢ȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱ ȱȱ17 
January 1914. And this leads Marcel to dismiss all proofs of, or positive affimations 
concerning, the existence of God as extraneous: ȁȱȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ·ȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 33; 27 
January 1914). However, testifying to the intelligibility of religious faith becomes 
¢ȱȱȱ	Ȃȱ¡ȱȱȱ on some level. ȁȂȱ
ȱȱȱǽȱȱ·ǾȂǰȱȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ
est incompatȱȱȱȱȂȱ¡ǰȱǯǰȱȱȱla foiȂȱǻJM: 39; 28 
January 1914). At this stage, then, Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱdualistic, 
owing to this separation of reason and faith;31 conscious intellectualizing reflection can 
only falsify or negate the transcendent reality that Marcel wishes to affirm.32 But as 
Charles ȱǱȱȁȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ
ȂȱǽǯǯǯǾǵȱȱ-t-ȱȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǵȂȱǻŗşŝŗǱȱśřǼǯȱȱtions 
might also be asked of the relation between faith and the concrete experience of the 
ȱ ȱǱȱȁȂ-ȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱ
ȂǵȂǰȱȱCharles Du Bos (1931: 141). Is not the significance of the 
here and now utterly dismissed by such absolutist subordination to the transcendent? 
 
                                                        
31 ȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȁȱȱ¸ȱȱȱJournal métaphysique, réalité 
ȂȱȱexistenceǰȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂ¡ǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ··ǰȱȱ¥ȱùȱȂȱȱréalité il faut 
résolument transcender existenceȂȱǻŗşřŗǱȱŗřŜǼǯ 
32 On 31 January 1914, for example, he writes: ȁ¥ȱȱǰȱȱ·¡ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
terme de son exercice se nie elle-¹Ȃǰȱȱȁȱ·¡ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱ
ǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱÉȱȱȱȱȱȱ·¡ȱȱȂȱ··ȱ-¹ȱȱȱȱȂȱ
·ȂȱǻJM: 50). This aversion to conceptualization is visible thȱȂȱǯȱȱȁȱȱ
¸ȂȱǻŗşŚŝǼǰȱȱǰȱȱǱȱȁǰȱǰȱǰȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȂȱǻRA: 304). 
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Yes, is the answer. And this is precisely what Marcel realizes during the First World 
War. ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŗŝȱȱŗşŘŖǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
nȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻJM: 231-32). Marcel thus announces his 
 ȱȁ·¢ȱȂȱǻJM: 305; 24 May 1923); and personal and 
interpersonal experience become increasingly important as his philosophy develops 
further. From the second part of the Journal onward Ȯ especially following the 1925 
ȱȁ¡ȱȱ·ȂȱȮ faith and the empirical no longer mutually exclude 
one another. The meaȱȱȁ¡Ȃȱȱǰȱȱȱȱdoes not entail 
objectifying, spatio-ȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱǻJM: 312), 
ȁ¡Ȃǰȱȱ	ǰȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ£ȱȱȮ with the 
crucial implication that it now does become possible to attribute existence to God, 
because existence is not one and the same as objectivity.33 ȁ	¦ȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȂȱ
ȱ·ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȂ¡ǰȱȱǽǯǯǯȱ
ȂǾȱȱȱȱ·Ȃǰȱȱǯȱȁȱȱ¥ȱȱȱ





Marcel has come to learn from his deeper, phenomenological engagement with 
experience is, as he tells us in ȁȱ··ȱ·ȂȱǻŗşŚŖǼǰȱȱȁcroireǰȱȱȱȱǽǰȱǳǾ 
ȂȱȱȱȱȱtoiǰȱȂ-à-dire en une réalité personnelle ou supra-
ȱȱȂ¹ȱ·ȱȱȱ·ȱ-delà de tout jugement 
                                                        
33 ȁȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱúȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ essence 
¹ǰȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȂ·ȱ
ȱȱȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂexistence... il ne saurait en effet être question de voir en elle une 
qualité qui entrerait en coȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȂȱǻJM: 304; 24 May 1923). 
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ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȂȱǻRI: 220). And for this reason, in 
Ȃȱ ǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱǱȱȱ
·ǰȱȂ··ǰȱǯǰȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱ¢ȱ
Éȱȱ¸ȱȂȱȂȱǻRI: 53).34 It is thus in an interpersonal sense, 
Marcel decides, that faith in God can be considered intelligible;35 and if the human 
relation to God cannot be grasped in objectively determinable terms, this is only 
analogous to the difficulty of pinpointing what it is that founds a (genuine) relation of 
love between two human beings.36 ȁǽȱǾȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱ¡·ȱ¸ȱ
humbles, très immédiates, que la philosophie a en général le grand tort soit de 
·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱǻRI: 14), insists Marcel in the 
introduction to ȱȱ¥ȱȂ (1940)ǲȱȁȂȱȱȱ¢·ȱȱ
ȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ··ǰȱȂ-à-ȱȂȱȱ··ȱȮ 
du même ȱȱ··ȱȱȱȂȱǻRI: 15).37 
 
Thus, Marcel now clearly rejects the traditional Augustinian approach to God, which 
presents divine eternity as absolutely separate from temporal human existence. The 
human relation to God is instead personal, in continuum with interpersonal relations. 
ȱȂȱ¢ȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
the traditional Christian model of time. For Marcel, the ontology of (unChristianized) 
                                                        
34 ȁȱǰȱȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǰȱȂ¡ȱ
sur Dieu, je suis amené à constater que je peux plutôt lui parler, que parȱȱǯȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȂǰȱȱ
ǰȱȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂȱǻGM: 
70). See also JM: 304. 
35 ȁȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱ[Marcel] suggests, look first at the ordinary human acts of 
putting-trust-in or being-faithful-to, of making a promise and bearing witness. You may not understand 
what it means to believe in God, but you may have some sense of what it means to trust a friend or to be 
faithful to your wifeȂȱǻCain 1963: 89). 
36 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȂǲȱȱȱȱ¢·¡ǰȱȱ
ȂȱȱȂȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱâȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱǯȱȂȱȱȱ
ȱȂȱ·ȱȱ¸ǰȱȱ·ȱȱȂ¹ȱ·ǲȱȱȱȱa priori que cet inventaire ne lui 
rendra pas son amour transparent pour lui-¹ȂȱǻJM: 226; 23 February 1920). 
37 ȁȱȱǰȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱǰȱȂen est pas moins réeȂȱǻȱŗşŝŗǱȱŗŗŚǼǯ 
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Neoplatonism seems a more concrete and (therefore) philosophically satisfactory 
account Ȯ because the gradation it postulates allows human time to be related more 
substantially to eternity, and because this view does not completely denigrate the here 
and now, by making any and all Being dependent on the (eternal) reality of a separate 
Ȯ and thus abstract and impersonal Ȯ God.38 ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱ
of time should be related not to Augustine, but rather to an earlier Plotinian model for 
which God is not important. 
 
Hence, the extent to which a specifically Christian context is important for 
ȱȂȱ ȱȮ in particular, his discussions of time and eternity Ȯ is 
entirely debatable, as Marcel gives us good reason to question whether it is necessary 
to read his philosophy with God at all. Marcel continually insists that he has no 
interest in proclaiming the truth of established religious dogma, proving the existence 
of God, or articulating divine attributes. He detests theodicy and dogmatic theological 
discourse, asserting in one of his earliest notebooks (1913-ŗŚǼȱȱȁȱ¸ȱȱ
Ȃ¡ȱȱȱǽȱǾȱ¸ȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
·¢ǰȱǽǾȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻFP: 94).39 
In fact, in the preface to Le Seuil invisible ǻŗşŗŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂun phénomène naturelȂȱǻŗşŗŚ: 8); 
and this outlook does not seem to change, even after his conversion. Unlike Augustine, 




                                                        
38 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ǰȱu plutôt comme sceau. [...] La valeur est-elle conférée du dehors? 
úȱȂȱǻPI: 214; 5 August 1943). See also ME II: 75. 
39 See also DH: 181; EA: I, 37, 169; HH: 103; JM: x, 36, 65-66, 158-59, 255, 264; ME II: 74-75, 80, 133, 141, 173-74, 
175; PST: 259, 263; RI: 53-54, 169, 238. 
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ǽǳǾǰȱelles ne la supposent pasȂȱǻHP: 241), Marcel contends in the 1933 lecture ȁȱȱ
Ȃ. 
 
Furthermore, faith in God is questioned by Marcel. On a personal level, he remains 
somewhat uncertain about the authenticity of his own commitment to Catholicism, for 
he finds religious faith difficult, and this leads him occasionally to identify with non-
believers more than with believers.40 And on a philosophical level Marcel does not 
ȱȱȱȱ	ȱǱȱȁ-ȱ·ȱȱȱ·ȱǵȂȱ
(EA: I, 90), he asks, for example, in a diary entry dated 11 March 1931. And more 
¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱŗşśŖȱ	ȱȱȁȱȱȱ
Ȃ·ȂǼȱȱȱ ȱȁȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ³ȱ
dans sa sainteté, de toute affirmation portant sur la destinée de Ȃ·ȱȱ
·ȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȂȂȱǻME IIǱȱŗśŜǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ
Ȃ¢ȱȱ-être aucun sens à assigner un caractère littéralement supra-terrestre à cet 
invisible où la destinée inter-subjective est appelée ¥ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȂȱ
(ME II: 158). 
 
ȱȱǰȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱConfessionsǰȱȱêȱ
reading of time and eternity in Marcel appears entirely apt, for Marcel seems to want 
                                                        
40 See his correspondence with Du Bos (Marcel 1974a: 33, 43). See also EA: I, 26; RI: 158. 
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to keep his philosophical affirmations separate from theology:41 ȁȱȱȱȱ
ȱǽǳǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻPST: 193), he states categorically in the 
ȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşŜŞǼǲȱȁȱȂȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱ
confondre les mystères enveloppés ȱȂ¡·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȮ la 
ǰȱȂǰȱȱ¡ȱȮ ȱȱ¢¸ȱ···ǰȱȱȂȱȱ
ȱ·ȂȱǻHPǱȱŘŚřǼǰȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȂǯȱȱȱȱȱ
philosophical project, therefore, one might conclude Ȯ as Marcel himself comments on 
28 January 1914 Ȯ that ȁȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
¸ȱ·ȂȱǻJM: 39). Experiences with faith-like structures such as love, hope, 
and fidelity, are clearly at the heart of his concerns, for it is to their reality that Marcel 
wishes to testify, in spite of their (logical) unverifiability. In order for these forms of 
faith to be intelligible, Marcel argues that a notion of eternity is needed, in addition to 
an engagement with time. However, this section has called into question the 





5.3 Philosophy, Ethics, and Theology: The Meanings of Eternity in Marcel 
 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ ȱǰȱ
which Ȯ as Gillman observes Ȯ appear to be referring to the same reality (1980: 216), 
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
interpretations seem to be applicable ȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǲȱȱȱȱ
require us to side with one over the other, or can the two perspectives in fact be read 
                                                        
41 ȱȱêǯȱȱan interview with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay (1994-95) he explains, 
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǻȁȱâȱȱȱȱâȱȱȱȂǼǱȱȁȂȱȱ
le souci Ȯ vivant une sorte de double allégeance Ȯ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ¸ȂȱǻŗşşśǱȱŗŜǼǯ 
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together? I will argue for the latter, and suggest that Marcel can therefore be seen as a 
ȱȱȱȁ ȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
its (controverǼȱȁȱȂǯȱAfter first outlining why I believe this connection 
can be made, and what holding such a philosophical position entails, I will compare 
Marcel with Lévinas in order to illustrate this reading in more detail, and further 
highlight its implications for interpreting time and eternity. I will then draw attention 




This new French philosophical trajectory, stimulated by Lévinas and Henry (1922-
2002) and continued by thinkers such as Lacoste (1929-), Marion (1946-) and Chrétien 
(1952-),42 ȁȱȂǰȱ¢ȱ¢ȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ
discourse can admit and describe religious phenomena through the discovery of a 
new phenomenological principle or a new mode of phenomenality [: ...] a 
phenomenology that rejects the anterior condition of a horizon and that challenges the 
¢ȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖ00: 113).43 ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
beginning. As explained in section two, from his earliest work onward, Marcel has 
tried to understand religious faith on its own terms Ȯ that is, existentially, and 
independent of religious doǱȱȁȱȂȱȱȱȂȱ¥ȱ·ȱȱȱȱ
le sens du je crois ȱȂ·ȱ·¢ȱȱǲȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ
nullement tenu dans cette tentative de faire abstraction des données que me 
fournissent les religions existanteȂǰȱȱ ȱȱȁȱ··ȱ·ȂǯȱWhat is the key 
to avoiding such abstraction? A phenomenological approach, Marcel decides. ȁȂȱ¥ȱ
                                                        
42 Other philosophers associated with this movement ȱǰȱêǰȱȱȱǻŗşŚŚ-). 
43 On the theological turn in recent French philosophy see also Goodchild (2002); Bloechl (2003); Simmons 
(2008). 
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partir du je crois ȱȱ·ȱȱ··ǰȱȱȂȱȂȱǻRI: 219), he insists. 
Initially, of course, Marcel had no religious faith of his own to analyse (recall that his 
conversion was not until 23 March 1929); but for Marcel this was no reason to dismiss 
the faith of others. On the contrary, Marcel felt it was his duty to take faith seriously. 
As a philosopher genuinely concerned with investigating the reality of existence, he 
aspired to be able to place all aspects of human experience Ȯ faith included. ȁȱȱ
·ȱȱ··ǱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¥ȱȱǰȱ
Ȃȱ·ȱȱȱȂ·ȂȱǻŗşŜşǱȱŘśŜǼǰȱhe explained in his 
ȁȱȂȱǻŗşŜŞǼǯ44 And just as Marcel, here, was open to something 
¢ȱȱ£ȱȱȱ ȱȁȂǰȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ
of the self and its intentionality if we are to understand anything of Being Ȯ for Being 
transcends us, is a mystery; it cannot objectively be grasped like the answer to a 
definable problem. The implication of this, as Marcel acknowledges, is that nothing 
can be affirmed about the truth of faith or religion absolutely. But equally, this means 
that religious faith cannot simply be dismissed from philosophy on the grounds that it 
cannot be comprehended completely. IȱȁȱȱȂ Marcel declares: 
la reconnaȱȱ¢¸ȱǰȱùȱȂ³ȱȱȱ·ȱ
ȱȱȱ·¢ǰȱǽǳǾȱȂÉȱǽǳǾȱȱȂésion à une 
religion déterminéeǰȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȂȱ··ȱȂ¥ȱ
ȱȂȱȱ·ȱȂȱ·vélation tout autrement que ne pourrait 
ȱȱȱȱȂ¢ȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱȱ




Long before phenomenologists such as Henry, Marion, or Chrétien, therefore, Marcel 
was already seeking a way, through phenomenology, to admit the transcendent Ȯ and 
in particular the religious Ȯ into philosophical discussion. 
 
                                                        
44 See also DH: 43-44, 46; EC: 71; EPR: 77; RA: 309-10. 
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ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱ¢ǰȱ ǰ and thus 
the recent, more widespread shift in French philosophy has roused strong opposition 
Ȯ ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ
underlines what is at stake for philosophy here. Responding first to Lévinas,45 and 
then to Henry, Marion, and Chrétien, Janicaud complains that the bounds of 
phenomenology have been transgressed, because God has been introduced into a 
discipline where God does not belong. ȁ··ȱȱ·ȱȱ¡ȂȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱ
144, 149), Janicaud declares adamantly; but in the case of this new movement, he feels, 
ȁȱ··ȱȱ··ȱȱȱȱ[sic] par une théologie qui ne veut pas dire 
ȱȂȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱŝŚǼǯȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱ
phenomenology, where phen¢ȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȂǰ46 and 
where God is thus excluded from the phenomenological reduction.47 A question is 
therefore raised concerning what the phenomenological method is, and what it can 
hope to achieve. Janicaud objects to new ph¢Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
blurring of boundaries between phenomenology and theology, which he believes 
confounds the empirical with the ideal by blending immanence Ȯ the (allegedly) 
proper object of phenomenology Ȯ with transcendence. ȁȱ··ȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱǯȱȱȂȱȱ¥ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ¥ȱȱ
·ȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱŜřǼǰȱȱǲȱȁȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱ
ȱȱȂ¡·ȱȱȂȱǰȱȱǰȱȱ·crire patiemment pour la 
ÉȂȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱŝśǼǯȱAnother way of wording the question with which this section 
began, therefore, would be to ask whether immanence (which might be related to 
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱcendence 
                                                        
45 ȁTotalité et infini Ȃȱ·ȱȱȱ¸ȱêȱȱȱȱȱ³ȱùȱȱ
ȱ·ǰȱ¥ȱȂ·ȱȂȱȱ··ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ
mais explicitemeȱ·ȂȱǻȱŘŖŖşǱȱŜśǼǯ 
46 See especially Husserl (1965). 
47 See Husserl (1931: 173-74, §58). 
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ǻȱ ȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ	Ǽȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ
exclusive. Certainly, it has become traditional to see them as such,48 and it is in 
defence of this tradition that Janicaud rejects new phenomenology. As Kosky advises, 
 ǰȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
religion as a discipline lead one to assume that transcendence is absolutely foreign to 
ȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŗŗśǼǯ49 
 
ȱȱȱȱȁPhilosophie, théologie négative, ·ȂȱǻȱŗşŜŞǼǰȱMarcel 
in fact questions himself rhetorically about ȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱ¢: 
ȁȂ¹-vous pas sorti du domaine de la philosophie pour pénétrer dans celui de la 
ǵȂȱǻPST: 269), he asks, before explaining in hȱǱȱȁȱȱȱ¥ȱ
·ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
Ȃȱ··ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȂt-à-dire en deçà de 
Ȃ·ȱ¥ un crédo déterminé dans un certain ¡ȱ·ȱ·Ȃȱ(PST: 
270). ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱǰȱ¢Ȃȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ
to describe the full range of possible experience; and this entails challenging the 
assumption that phenomenological analysis coincides with intentional objectivity. As 
·ȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŝśǼǰȱȁǽȱǾȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱǲȱȱ·ǾǰȱȂȱȱ·¥ȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻDVI: 96). For Marcel and the new phenomenologists, intelligibility 
ȱȱǯȱǰȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȁȱ
                                                        
48 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ
would have to be in the nineteenth-century philosophy of religion starting from Kant and running through 
Hegel to Nietzsche. This short history was worked out within a set of boundaries: either philosophy 
operates within the limits of phenomenal immanence and a transcendent God is wholly confined to faith 
(Kant) or else philosophy steps beyond these limits to include God within the field of a now extended 
ȱǻ
Ǽǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ	ȱȱȱȱ	ȱǻ£ǼȂȱǻ¢ȱŘŖŖŖǱȱŗŗśǼǯ 
49 Indeed, Marcel rejects the opposition between immanence and transcendence in ME I: 82. 
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Ȃǰ50 which brackets the horizon of objectivity or of Being that the 
phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger fail to question.51 One must not define 
phenomenology in such a way as to preclude the possibility of alterity preceding 
intentionality, they contend.52 Transcendence must be testified to, and this is why 
Marcel insists on introducing eternity into his phenomenological analyses in addition 
ȱǲȱ ¢ȱȱ£ȱȱȁ¢¢Ȃȱȱeing, while nevertheless asserting that 
this can be approached, through his (phenomenological) approches concrètes. 
 
With respect to religion, therefore, Marcel and the new phenomenologists demand 
that we ask what kind of god should be bracketed in the phenomenological reduction, 
instead of making absolutist decisions concerning any and all gods (or forms of 
transcendence) and the nature of their relation to the human from the start.53 After all, 
(actual) human experience testifies to the possibility of religious faith as a mode of 
being, and Marcel and the new phenomenologists want to explore the potentialities of 
its existential significance.54 ȁȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ³¥ȱȂȱ··ȱȱǰȱȂ·ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
50 The first reduction is the Husserlian reduction, which excludes all that is transcendental, all that cannot be 
reduced to an object of consciousness Ȯ  ȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȂǯȱȱ
ȱȱȱ
Ȃȱion to Dasein Ȯ that is, to an (existential) intentionality broadened to 
Being-in-time-and-the-world Ȯ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ£ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȁȂǯȱȁes formes de la phénoménologie déployées respectivement par Husserl et Heidegger 
¡ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱǻȱȱǼȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱȱȱ·¸ǱȱȱȂÉǰȱ
sinon comme objet ou comme étantȂǰȱ ȱȱȱȁ·ȱ¥ȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŗǼǯȱȁLa dernière 
réduction en effet met entre parenthèses toute condition objective ou bien ontique fixée à ce qui se donne, 
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱǻ1991: 70-71). 
51 ȱȱȱȁȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȮ he states Ȯ ȁȱȱ-ci soit 
·ȱ···ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ¸ȱ·¢ȱȱ¡ȂȱǻDS: 92). 
52 Thus Marion argues that every phenomenon surges forth as a gift (don), and Lévinas puts great emphasis 
ȱȱȂȱ¢ǯȱMarcel, too, states that ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱ¹ȱ·ȱ¥ȱ
ȱȱȱȱùȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻRI: 8), and, like Lévinas, refers to such 
ȱȱȁȱȂȱǻRI: 188). 
53 In his (two-ǼȱŗşŜŜȱȱȁǰȱ·ǰȱȂǰȱêȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ
£ȂȱȱȱǱȱȁȱȱȱÉȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂ·ȱȱle Gai SavoirǱȱȃȱ
esȱȄǲȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱǲȱȱȱȂa tué [...]; et enfin quelle 
ȱȂ·ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŜşǱȱŚřśǼǯ 
54 ȁȱȱȱ-think that dimension of our experience which we designate religious cannot begin apart 
from a critical consideration of what we mean by knowledge and certainty. What will count as an answer to 
ȱȱȱ ȱ	ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾǵȂȱ(Pax 1972: vii). 
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ȱ¹ȂȱǻME II: 8),55 ȱȱȱȱȱŗşśŖȱ	ȱǰȱȁȂ-ce que 
Ȃ¹ǵȂǯ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱŘŜȱȱŗşŚřǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȂȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ¥ȱȂȱȂȱǻPI: 124).56 
The god all agree should be excluded, therefore, is the god targeted by Heidegger in 
his ȱȱȁ-¢ȂǱ57 a god who is appropriated solely for philosophical 
purposes, used to explain away difficult problems and ground eternally the 
(unquestioned) unity and transparency of metaphysical accounts Ȯ and indeed 
theological accounts, to the extent that theology draws upon philosophy for its own 
justification.58 ȁ¸ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ·¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȂȱȱ
Ȃǰ admits Marcel in his Journal on 30 November 1920ǯȱȁȱ-il que Dieu soit 
                                                        
55 ǯȱêǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ·ȱ·ȱȱ
nom de parole de Dieu; ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ
chose comme une ȱȱȂȱǻŗşŜşǱȱŚŚŖ-41). See also PI: 261-62. 
56 Here, an existential thread extends back to Kierkegaard, for whom subjectivity (rather than imposed, 
objectively stated dogma) was the core of religion (see in particular Kierkegaard 1946); indeed, immediately 
after this remark Marcel comments: ȁȱȱ¸ȱ¥ȱȂȱǻPI: 124). Though Kierkegaard had no 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱt, when Marcel later learns of his work he identifies with 
Ȃs project retrospectively, appreciating especially his use of dramatic expression to explore 
existential paradoxes (akin, Marcel feels, to his own dramatic investigations of existence in his plays), and 
his preference for indirect discourse (Marcel 1966). But of course, philosophy and religion can be thought 
together in different ways. Thus, Ȃȱbelief that ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻFP: 






Ȃ¡ȱǯȱȱȂȱȂǰȱ ȱȮ and here he would place Marcel Ȯ ȁȱȱȱ
·ȱȱȂ¡ǰȱȱȱ·ȱou supprimant les essences ou natures, et comme 
ȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȂ·ǰȱ- Ȃȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱ
Ȃ¡ȱ¢Ǳȱȱ¹ȱȂȂǰȱȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȄȂȱǻŗşŚ7: 13). 
Marcel did try Thomism briefly, it should be noted, but for him this led to a philosophical dead end, and he 
quickly rejected its approach. ȱ Ǳȱȁȱǰȱȱ·ȱȱȱ¹ȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱǰȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȱ·¢ǰȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȱȱ
philosophie elle-¹ȂȱǻŗşşŗǱȱŘŚřǼǯȱSee also Devaux (1974: 91-92); Keen (1984: 101-03). 
57 ȱȱȁ-¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱCritique of Pure Reason to refer to the 
kind of transcendental theology that thinkers such as Anselm (in his ontological argument for the existence 
of God) carried out, which derived knowledge of God from concepts alone. 
58 
ȱ¡Ǳȱȁȱ¢ȱȱȱngs with respect to the ground that is common to all 
beings as such, then it is logic as onto-logic. When metaphysics thinks of beings as such as a whole, that is, 
with respect to the highest being which accounts for everything, then it is logic as theo-loȂȱǻŘŖŖŘǱȱŝŚǼǯȱ
ȁȱ¢ǰȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ	ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
¢Ȃǰȱ
ȱǲȱȱȱȁ-theological character [...] has become questionable for thinking 
not because of any kind of atheism, but from the experience of a thinking which has discerned in onto-theo-
logy the still unthought ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŘŖŖŘǱȱŜŞǼǯȱǰȱȁman can 
neither ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŘǱȱŝŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȱubordinate to the (higher) order of 
philosophical reason, the absolute coherence of which is worshipped above all else. 
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ȱȱȱȱǵȂȱ(JM: 254).59 Such an either/or decision rests on the assumption 
that immanence and transcendence Ȯ and by extension reason and faith, time and 
eternity Ȯ are diametrically opposed.60 However, if human subjectivity is taken to be 
defined by transcendence (signified by eternity) as well as (temporal) immanence, the 
possibility of an intersection between reason and faith, and therefore between 
phenomenology and theology, is opened up.61 ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
vocabularies of Being and God to co-exist without antagonism.62 
 
For such a redefinition of the subject to be philosophically productive, however, the 
irreducibility of the transcendent must be preserved Ȯ on an interdisciplinary level, 
where a distinction must be maintained between the two fields in order to prevent 
phenomenology from subsuming theology, as well as within phenomenological 
analysis itself, where the absolute nature of religious (and, in general, transcendent) 
phenomena must not be compromised by the self and its intentionality. With respect 
to the former, as J. Aaron Simmons observes, the new phenomenologists tend to 
ȁǽǾȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱşŗŜǼǰȱȱ
¢ȱȱȱȁȱȃȄȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
actuality to be affirmed (even though some of [the philosophers] personally ǼȂȱǻŘŖŖŞǱȱ
                                                        
59 At this time, Marcel had not yet developed his phenomenological approach, so he finds the subjectivity 
that he is left with after refuȱȱȱ	ȱ¢ȱǱȱȁȱȂ·ȱȱȃȱȂ¢ȱȱ
ȱȱ··ȱȱȱȄǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¹ȱ·ȱȱǯȱMais alors ne 
sommes-ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ·ǵȂȱǻJM: 254). 
60 ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱȂ, writes Marcel on 18 May 1943: ȁou bien la 
certitude se confond avec le salut, au sens religieux de ce mot, et dans ce cas la métaphysique perd toute 
autonomie et en fin de compte toute réalité. ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȮ et 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻPI: 185). 
61 ȁȱȱ·ȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȂnt est tout à fait différent dans les deux cas. La religion ne peut en effet 
Ȃ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ·¡ȱǽǯǯǯǾǯȱȱ





avec une certaine idée de la philosophie comme système, cette idée elle-même ne peut certainement plus 
¹ȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻHH: 92). 
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917). And this applies equally to Marcel, who, in a 1949 	ȱȱǻȁ·¡ȱ
ȱȱ·¡ȱȂǼȱ ȱȱȱȁ¸ȱ¡Ȃȱȱȱȱ
central to his philosophy, declares: 
cette recherche est phénoménologique et non pas ontologique. Je veux dire 
que je ne me demande pas du tout ȱȱȱȂȱȱȂ¹ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ
absolu qui ne pourrait être que Dieu et qui conférerait lui-¹ȱȂ¡ȱ
ǽǳǾǯȱȱȱȱ-¹ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ¡ǰȱ
ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ ces jugements se 
ȱȱȂǯ 
(ME I: 103) 
 
In general, therefore, his conclusions are often qualified with phrases such as ȁȱȱ
plaçant bien entendu en deçà de la religion proprement diteȂ (RIǱȱŗŚǼǰȱȁen deçà de toute 
spécification théologiȂȱǻME II: 171), ȱȁsans que celle-ci soit forcément référée à un 
ȱȱ¸ȱ·¢ȱȱ¡ȂȱǻDS: 92),63 for Marcel explicitly insists 




désigne sous le nom dȱȂǲ65 ȁȂȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
seul décider ce qui peut ou non être regardé comme Dieu. Je poserai en principe [...] 
ȂȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱȱȂ·ȱ
instaurant comme Dieu quelque chose que la conscience croyante refuse de 
ÉȱȱȂȱǻME II: 8). Thus, in the same Gifford Lecture, Marcel asserts 
that ȁȂ¡ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱȱ·ȱȱ
ȱȂȱǻME II: 7)66 Ȯ transcendence which, as Marcel maintains in Homo 
viator (1944)ǰȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱǻHV: 7); he will 
                                                        
63 See also PI: 255-56. 
64 In ȱ
ȱȱȂ
umain, for example, Marcel ȱȱȱȱȱȁle droit de poser à 
ȱȂȱȱȂ¡ȱȱ··ȱȱ-¹ȱȱȂȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱȂǲȱȁ¹ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¡Ȃǰȱȱ, ȁil ne peut certainement 
ȱ¹ȱ·ȂȱǻHH: 92). 
65 See also ME I: 83. 
66 See also PST: 234. 
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not cross over into theology and draw on religious sources of authority in order to 
ȁȂȱȱǯ67 
 
In this way, then, it is true to say (as section two suggested) that God is not essential to 
the transcendent eternity Marcel is arguing for.68 And yet at the same time, God 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȮ for the very same reason in fact, because 
to exclude God completely would simply be to affirm the other pole of the binary that 
Marcel wants to oppose, a binary which equates the immanent and temporal with the 
rational, and separates these absolutely from transcendence, eternity, and faith.69 





negated in its claim to autonomy, to self-¢ȱȱȂǲȱȱȱȱ
ȱȁȱȱȱȱǽǳǾȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşşśǱȱŗśřǼȱȮ that is, ethics. 
 
Indeed, as was explained in Chapter Four, philosophy, as Lévinas conceives it, is not 
ontology in the first instance but ethics. This is because Lévinas wants, primarily, to 
ȁǽǾȱȱȱȱȂ-¥ǰȱȱȱȂȱǻDVI: 114, note 15) Ȯ but, 
he maintains, transcendence (including that of God) cannot signify so long as 
                                                        
67 ȁȱȱȱ··ȱǰȱȂȱȱ£ȱ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻMarcel 1976: 16). 
68 Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
reflections, as Troisfontaines (1954) and Cain (1963: 50) suggest, nor can Tsukada assert, in such a 
straight ȱǰȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁla Vérité qui est Amour, 
Ȃ-à-ȱȂȱǻ1995: 245). 




¢Ȃȱ¢ȱourse dominates.70 Like Marcel, therefore, Lévinas is not 
interested in proofs for the existence or non-existence of God, which attribute an onto-
theological sense of eternity to His being and thereby commit, as Westphal phrases it, 
ȁȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŗǱȱŗŝǼǯ ȁȱȱȱ·ȱȂ, writes 
Lévinas in the foreword to ȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂ· ǻŗşŞŘǼǰȱȁȂȱȱconcrétude 
phénoménologique dans laquelle cette signification pourrait signifier ou signifie, même 
si elle tranche sur toȱ···ȂȱǻDVI: 7) Ȯ the idea of trancher sur toute 
phénoménalité being key, for the metaphysics of presence can only be broken if 
philosophy allows phenomena to be given without being entirely present, that is, for 
the possible disruption of my time by an Other.71 ȁȂ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
Ȃ¹ȱȮ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂ¹ǰȱȱ·ȱ¹ȱȱȂ-¥ȂȱǻDVI: 114), 
ȱ·ȱȱȁȱȱȱȂǯ 
 
Because of this desire to ground philosophy in concrete phenomenal experience, 
however, if, as Lévinas states in ȱȂ¹, ȁȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱ·ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂȱȮ irréductible à 
ȂȱȱȮ ȱȂȱǻAE: 33),72 	ȱȱȱȁȱȃȱȄȱȱ
ȂȃȱȄȂǯȱǰȱhe ¡ȱȱȁȱȱȱȂǰȱ	ȱȱȁȱ
Ȃ··ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂ··ȱȂȂȱǻDVI: 115) Ȯ  ȱ·ȱȱȁ··Ȃǰȱȱ
defines in ȱȂ¹ ȱȁȱȱ·ȱȱȂfini [...] à partir du visage [de 
ȂǾȂȱǻAE: 27). In other words, God is always (first) approached via the ethical 
                                                        
70 ȁȂ·ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱǻDVI: 125). 
71 ȱǰȱ·ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻ¢ǼȱȱȂȱ
ǰȱȱȁaprès la certitude du cogito, présent à lui-¹ȱȱȱ¡¸ȱ·Ȃǰȱȱȱȱ
ȁȱȱȱȂǰ ȁȱ¸ȱ·ȱȱȱȃȂȱȱȱ³ȱ¸ȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱǽǯǯǯǾȄȂȱ(DVI: 106; see also TI: 40-41, 85). Despite having an idea of infinity therefore, 
Descartes finds that its content exceeds what he himself can ever think. ȁȱȂȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱ
·ȱȱȱȱȱȂȂǰȱ·ȱǲȱȁȱ·ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ
pensée du fini, est la diachronie même du temps, la non-Êǰȱȱ·ȱ¹ȂȱǻDVI: 12). 
·Ȃȱȱȱǻȱǰȱl) claim then becomes, as Critchley explains, his 
ȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ
ǽǾȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŘǱȱŗŚ-15). 
72 See also AE: 151. 
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relation to the Other.73 ȁȱ·¢ȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȂǰȱȱȱȱTotalité et infini; 
il ne peut y avoir, séparée de la relation avec les hommes, aucune 
ȁȂ de Dieu. Autrui est le lieu même de la vérité métaphysique et 
ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂȱȱȂȱȱ
Dieu, mais précisément par son visage, [...] la manifestation de la hauteur où 








conceived as an extension of interpersonal relations Ȯ that is, as a relation which can 
only ever be approached via the ethical relation to the other.75 In fact, this is 
commented on by Lévinas in Hors sujet ǻŗşŞŝǼǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱǱȱȁǯȱ	ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ
ȱ¡ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǯȱȱȂȱȱȱ¹ȱȂȱ
ȂȱȂȱ¥ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻHS: 30). Furthermore, 
as Chapter Four suggested, the transcendence that eternity represents in Marcel seems, 
in the first instance, to be ethical (and not religious). As Gallagher (1995) rightly 
obǰȱȂȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȮ that is, to human Being in 
specific relation to God Ȯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱ-
political thought, as responding to the devaluation of life that Marcel senses around 
                                                        
73 ȁǰȱȱȱǰȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱǰȱȱ¥ȱȂȱǻTI: 326). 
74 ȱȱǰȱȁȂȱȱǰȱȱ·ǰȱȱȁȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ¹ȱȱȂǰȱȱ
ȱȱ·ȂȱǻTI: 30). See also EN: 19; TI: 79. 
75 ȱȂȱǰȱȱȱŗşŝřȱ ȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱ ȱȁȱ¢¸ȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȁȱ¢¸ȱȱȂȂȱǻȱŗşşşǱȱ
interview 3), I would argue that Marcel always starts with the human. For in order, in the first part of the 
Journalǰȱȱȱ	Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱ
uses the cogito ȱ ȱȱȱȱȁȱȂ·ȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȂȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻJM: 37; 28 January 1914). It is only once he has demonstrated, with respect to this more 
concrete human situation, that his notion of Ȃ· can be considered intelligible, that Marcel feels he 
ȱȱȱȱȱ	Ȃȱǯ 
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him (le monde casséǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȂȱȱ
position as mediator between believers and non-believers. Indeed, quite frequently, 
Marcel himself suggests that if he employs religious terms, these are ȁ·ǽǾȱȱ
langage reli¡ȂȱǻHV: 29) and are only illustrative,76 and thus he often restates his 






ȁȱ··ȱȂ-il pas essentiellement la rébellion de la créature contre son Créateur 
ǽǯǯǯǾǵȂȱȁȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱÉȂǰȱȱǰȱȁȱȱ¢ȱ¡-
mêmes, en présence des abus, des horreurs systématiques que nous avons vu se 
··ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ··ȱ
qui affecte de seȱ·ȂȱǻHHǱȱŜŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȁ·ȱȂȱȱ
ȱȱȱǰȱȁȂȱȂȱȱȱ··ȱȱȱȂȱǻHH: 62). 
¢ǰȱȱȁ·Ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱ
·Ȃȱǻblished 1968) is primarily a reaction against the devaluation of life, as 
opposed to an affirmation of anything specifically religious (PST: 151-74).77 As Marcel 
ȱȱȱȱŗşśŖȱ	ȱȱǻȁȱȱȱȂ·ȂǼǱȱȁȱȱ
terrestre est apparue de plus en plus généralement comme une espèce de phénomène 
ȱǰȱȱȱ¸ȂȱǻME IIǱȱŗśŖǼǯȱ
ǰȱȁȱȂȱȂȱ
ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȂȱǻME II: 166); and what is most 
important in this ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȁȱǽǯǯǯǾȱ¥ȱ
ȱǰȱȂ-à-dire en deçà de toute spécification théologique, 
Ȃ·ȱȱȂ·ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻME II: 171). 
                                                        
76 Although they also accept that ȱ£ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢Ǳȱȁȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱ··ȂȱǻHP: 242), states ȱȱȁȱȱ
Ȃǯ 
77 See also HV: 132. 
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However, the indissolubil¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȂȱ
philosophy stems from their eschatological temporal structure,78 that is, their 
unconditional investment in the promise of an unverifiable future with and for 
others.79 It is here that a possible, but not inevitable,80 intersection with the theological 
opens out, where, for some, God can become existentially significant81 Ȯ though 
Marcel does not wish to dictate the theological content of such an experience, because 
his task is only to think this possibility. In the same way as with the Lévinassian 
ethical relation, which, Newman explains, ȁȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
person, but the approach of what makes the Other an Other in the sense of 
transcendence [illéitéǾȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŗŘŗǼǰȱȱȱf the eternal or infinite is necessary in 
Marcel in order to maintain this ethical openness, and prevent the self from de-
temporalizing the relation through objectifying primary reflection. As Lévinas writes 
in Totalité et infiniǱȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȂȱ
                                                        
78 ȱȁȂȱȱȱǻle messianisme sans messie; le messianique sans messianisme) in Derridean 
ǰȱ ȱȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱǰȱȱȱit aucune révélation 
··ǰȱȱȂȱ¥ȱȱȱȂȱǻȱŗşşŜǱȱŘŞǼǯȱSee also Derrida (1993). 
79 ȱȂȱǻȱ¢Ǽȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ
suggestive of a timeless and more definitive unity, when he attempts to define this presence further it is 
clear that he does not mean to suggest any fusion or closed relation, where otherness can only be lost. 
ȱȱȱȱȁǽǾȱ¸ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱǽǰȱǾȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȂȱ
ȂȱȱǯȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂ·ȱȱȱȂȱǻPI: 255), he affirms in the 1951 
¢ȱȁ·ȱȱ·Ȃǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱŗŚȱ¢ȱŗşŚřǰȱȱȱȱȁune intime 
·ȂȱǻPI: 187) between presence and transcendence. 
80 ȁȱȱȱȱȱ¥ȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȂ-à-dire qui ne peut se 
satisfaire ni de ce qui est dans le monde, ni même du monde lui-même considéré en sa totalité Ȯ totalité 
ȂȱȱȱȮ peut très bien rester néanmoins en deçà de toute conversion à une religion 
ȱ·ǯȱȱȂ¢ȱȱ¥ȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻME II: 134). 
81 ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȁ-chrétienȂȱǻHV: 136Ǽǰȱȱȁ£ȱ·-·Ȃȱ(HP: 242), and of 
ȁȱ¸-ȱ·ȂȱǻME I: 83; see also PST: 288). ȱȱ ¢ǰȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ
the tradition of negative theology. ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱŗşŝŖǱȱȁȱȱȱs cherchons à cerner 
la pensée que nous avons eue en disaȱȂȱȱǰȱȱȱe nous tromper gravement. [...] 
ȂȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ¥ȱȱ·ȱ·ȂȱǻGM: 59). Indeed, on 26 March 1943 he 
Ǳȱȁȱȱȱȱȱje puisse croire est un Dieu qui accepte, dans un certain sens qui veutǰȱȂȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻPI: 124, note 1). ȱǰȱȱ
Ȃȱ ǰȱȁȱȱ
metaphysics in theology to the extent that it shows all positive theological images of God rely on a ground 
ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱ¡¡Ǽǯȱȱǰȱȱ
ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
questioning of any metaphysics that is open to the theological. For this reason, therefore, Bradley argues 
that ȁere is a sense in which negative theology is central to modern French philosophy Ȯ not because of 
some more or less hidden theological or nihilistic agenda [...] but because it names [or: is structured to 
recognize] an essential tension to which all thoughȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŚǱȱŘŗŞǼǯ 
Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱ£ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǻȱ ȱȱȱȱ
the latter part of this chapter), his negative theology does not quite achieve the constant movement between 
affirmation and negation of which Rubenstein speaks, where one pole, in a sense, becomes the other, and 
causes their polarity to collapse (2003: 396). 
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ȱȂȱǻTI: 302). But consequently, as Marcel recognizes in a 1970 interview with 
Boutang, ȁȱ·ȱȱȂ·ȱȱȱ¡ȱȂȱȱȱ·Ȃȱ
(GM: 93). Phenomenological experience is rendered ambiguous and undecidable.82 
 
This uncertainty is, theoretically, the aim. ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱ
ȱ¹ȱ·ȱ¥ȱȂÊ·ȂȱǻEA: II, 39), acknowledges Marcel in the 1933 
ȱȁȱȱȂ·ȱȂǲȱȁȱȱǽ¡Ǿȱȱ
ȱ¥ȱ·ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȱȱǽȱȱȱǾȱȂȱȱ··Ȃȱ
(PI: 125), he re-affirms on 26 March 1943.83 And indeed, indeterminacy is generally the 
message the reader receives as concerns tȱȱȱ	ȱȱȱȱȂȱ
work: Marcel, like Lévinas, employs a deeply religious vocabulary while refusing to 
describe God as a distinct reality; what is meant by these terms is always in question, 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱetative closure. However, Marcel seems 
ultimately unable to tolerate such ambiguity, one of the most prominent 
manifestations of this discomfort being his unease concerning the hazy relation 
between existence and être. ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱȱȂ¡ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȂȱ
toujours occupé ȱȱȱȱȱ·ȂȱǻME II: 25), he confesses in his second 
ŗşśŖȱ	ȱȱǻȁ¡ȱȱ¹ȂǼǰȱȱ£ǰȱȱhis reply to a 1968 
article by Keen, that ȁto claim that existence is different from being [...] would be to 
¢ȱȱȱȱ£ȱǰȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȂȱǻȱ
and Hahn 1984: 122). The truth is that, in spite of himself, Marcel still wants to be able 
to speak of something objective, because otherwise his philosophy has nothing 
definitive to say. 
ȱ ȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱȂȱ¥ȱȱ·Ȃǰȱȱȱȱ
                                                        
82 Illéité ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ·ȱȱȁǽǾȱȱȂȱȱ·ȱȂȱeligieuse, qui ne se dit 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȂȱǻAE: 230). 
83 ǯȱ·ǱȱȁȱÊ·ȱȱ·ȱ¥ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ





utilité pour mon travail sur la certitude méta¢ȂȱǻPI: 126). Marcel wants to 
discover something certain, and he wants to be able to communicate this to others:84 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ








The date of this (late- Ǽȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǯȱȱȱ
evident from all of his writings, Marcel clearly believes that unconditional love and 
faith are possible. But with a distinct lack of either around him, he seems to need 
reassurance that the social situation can be changed. He thus wants his philosophy to 
be able to say something that can help to encourage a more hopeful outlook Ȯ ȁȱ
·ȱȂ·ȂȱǻHVǱȱŗŞśǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŚŘȱȱȁ·issance et 
··ȂǯȱȁȱȂȱ·ǰȱȱȂ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
de ses responsabilités en même temps que des dangers qui menacent notre planète, de 
tâche plus imprescriptible que celle qui consiste à retrouver ces assurances 
¡ȱǰȱȱȱȂ¹ȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂImage 
de DieuȂȱǻPST: 75), he declared in the ȱȁȂ
ȱȱȱȱ·-
·ȱ¡ȂȱǻȱŗşŜŞǼǯȱSo just as Lévinas attempts, in Totalité et infini, 
to provide an absolute basis for ethical life through a definitive account of the 
ȱ ȱȱȂȱȱǻvisage), Marcel seeks to establish an absolute 
                                                        
84 	ȱǰȱ ȱȂȱŗşŝřȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȂǱȱȁȱ
ȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȄǯȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȂȱȱâȱȂȱ
recherche sur la nature de la découverte. [...] OǰȱȱȱêȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻEAGM: 25). 
85  ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȁȱȂ¢ȱȱȱ¥ȱȱȱȱ¸ȱ
ȂȱǻPI: 127). However, at the end of April he reaffirms his search for certitude (PI: 156-58). 
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ȱ·ȂǯȱHowever, slipping into this mode betrays the theoretical principles 
¢ȱȂȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ
into the onto-theological dogmatism that Janicaud targets in his protests.87 Marcel may 
not want to argue for a commitment to religion through his references to something 
eternal, but in practice his philosophical use of God does sometimes suggest this Ȯ 







In places, one also senses that Marcel might be speaking more as himself than as a 
ǯȱ	ǰȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ
the human is always personal. The existential philosopher must take his or her 
individual experience seriously, he argues, because life is never lived from a third-
                                                        
86 ȱȱȱǰȱ·ȱȁ ȱȱȱǽ¢Ǿȱǰȱȱȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
the Good, a desire for God. [...] I would not be so quick to leave ph¢ȱȱȂȱǻŗşşŞǱȱȱśǼǯ 
87 As early as the first part of his Journal, this propensity to over-ontologize is apparent. Marcel wants to 
ensure that faith does not regress into objective affirmation, and so he introduces the notion of divine grace 
to perform this philosophical function. ȁȱ¦ȱȱȱȱȱendant et inobjectivable de 
ȂȱȱȂȱǻJM: 60), he writes on 5 February 1914. That is, la grâce acts as the guarantor of faith, so that 
Marcel can be certain that his philosophy is able fully to account for faith. And although he recognizes that 
his early work is too idealist, Marcel does not put a halt to this tendency, but continues, in places, to ground 
the human in the divine: ȁSans doute peut-on conclure [...] Ȃȱ·ȱȱ¹ǰȱȂȱȂȱȱ
ȂȱǻJM: 158), writes Marcel affirmatively on 18 December 1918ǲȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱ
ȱ¥ȱȱȱȱÊȂȱǻŗşřŝǱȱŗŝşǼǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱŗşřŝȱȱȱȱSociété 
française de philosophie. 
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person perspective. However, such an approach is difficult, because it then becomes 
hard to decide how personal philosophical engagement can justifiably be; and 
arguably, Marcel sometimes oversteps the mark and speaks on behalf of himself 
personally Ȯ referring perhaps (?) to himself, as Christian, when he writes phrases 
ȱȱȁȱ·ǰȱ·ȱȱȱȂȱǻHV: 100) Ȯ rather than as a philosopher 
 ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱǯȱȱǰȱȱȁȂȱǻȱȁȂǼȱȱ
Ȃȱ¢ȱǰȱin many cases, be read as conforming to the conventional 
ȱȁȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰ88 in whose 
position the reader is encouraged to imagine themselves. And yet in order to lay the 
foundations for such emp¢ǰȱȱȁȂȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ	ȱȂȱȱȱȱ
autobiography, and the winding, almost associationist character of his philosophy, 
one therefore feels that thiȱ¢ȱȱȁȂȱȱȱǻȱ¢ȱ¡ȱȱ
Ǽȱȱ ȱȂȱȁȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯ 
 
Since Marcel tells us, on a number of occasions, that he is personally convinced that 
ȱȱȁǽǾȱȱȱȂ¡ȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱȂȱ·Ȃȱ
(HH: 92),89 ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȮ especially the tone on 
which they end Ȯ therefore invites scepticism concerning the rigour of his arguments, 
for Marcel often makes extensive use of religious metaphors and similes which, in 




                                                        
88 Anderson comments that  ȱȱȁ ȱȃȄȱǰȱ[Marcel] is not referring to his own individual self 
ȱȱȱȂǰȱȱǰȱȱȱas suchȂ (1985: 274). 
89 See also HP: 242. 
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thèmes donnés, se ressaisit, se concentre, se rassemble autour de la Personne absolue 
qui, seule, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȂȱǻHV: 170). Marcel also 
speaks frequently of saintliness, which he seems to take for granted as part of a 
natural progression; but since this is a specifically religious notion, this, again, 
effectively fails to question God.90 ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ	ȱȱǻŗşśŖǼȱ
concludes with the following remarks: 
à partir du moment où nous rendons nous-mêmes perméables à ces 
ȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȂ·ȱ-être au départ que des 
solistes [...] tendons à devenir peu à peu les membres fraternels et émerveillés 
Ȃȱȱùȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȱȱ
doute bien plus près que nous de Celui dont il ne faut peut-¹ȱȱȱȂȱ
conduit la symphonie mais Ȃȱest la symphonie dans son unité profonde et 
intelligible, une unité à laquelle nous ne pouvons espérer accéder 
Ȃȱ¥ȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱȂǰȱ
imprévisible pour chacun de nous, est pourtant inséparable de sa vocation 
propre. 
(ME II: 188) 
 

ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱǽǯǯǯǾȱȱ-deçà de la révélation 
ȱȱȱȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ǼȱȁȱȱȂȂǯȱThese 
comments, however, feel rather token, for his closing lines do not give any indication 




monde, cette lumière sans laquelle nous pouvons être assurés que jamais nous 
ne nous serions mis en route. 
(ME II: 188) 
 
The exigence ontologique in Marcel, then, although intended to be interpreted as the 
immanence-transcendence now advocated by the new phenomenologists, is in places 
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȂȱ
philosophy is at times very Augustinian; God is not always as indefinite as Marcel 
likes to declare. 
 
                                                        
90 See RI: 190-91. 
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This over-£ȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱȂȱ¡ȱȱȱȂȱ
atheism, as well as Ȃȱȱ-writing of Bergson when he reviews 
Ȃȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱto affirm a 
spiritual dimension to existence, praising it only when the possibility of identifying 
Ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱ
ȱȱȂȱ(reductive?) engagement with biology. In the 1929 article 
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ Ǳ 
Je crois à présent que la structure même de sa philosophie exclut ǽǳǾ la 
·ȱȂȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱǯȱȱȱȂst en effet développée comme une série 
Ȃ¹ǰȱ·ȱȱȱ·ment, mais portant sur des objets 
ȱ··ǯȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ
réalité spirituelle en elle-même et le sens de notre destinée pouvaient-elles 
ȂȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǵȱJe 




Bergson to draw the spiritual conclusions Marcel feels are befitting of his attempt to 
engage with the concrete. Despairing at the contemporary philosophical situation in 
France, where he sees only presumptiousness and arrogance resulting from a 




ȱȱ·ȱȂȱ£ȱȱȱ·é véritable, et 




Marcel thus regards the publication of Les Deux Sources ȱȁȱ··ȱ
ȱ¸ȱȂǰȱǰȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱ³ȱȱȱȱȱȂ¥ȱ·ȱȱ·ȂȱǻŗşřŘǱȱ
                                                        
91 ȁȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱ·ȱ·¢ȱ¹ǰȱȱȂȱ
spiritueȱǰȱȱȂȱȂ¥ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ·ȱȱȱ
ȱ¢¸ȂȱǻMarcel 1932a: 558). 
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śśŞǼǰȱȱȁǽǾȱȱȱȱ¸ȱȱȱ·ȱ¡ȱȱȱ
au christianisme [...] mais à certaines affirmations centrales des grands mystiques 
·ȂȱǻŗşřŘǱȱŚŗśǼǯȱȁȱȱȂȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȂ¡ȱȱ
Ǳȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ·Ȃǰȱȱȱȱȱŗşřşȱ
ȱȁȂ-ȱȱȱǵȂǯȱȱȱis precisely what he does appear to do: 
ȁǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ¸ȱȱȱȱ·ǰȱȱ-être même est-
ȱȱȱȂǰȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱ
notion of open morality (in Les Deux SourcesǼȱ ȱȁȱȱȱȂ1ȂǻŗşřşǱȱśǼǯȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱǻȁȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱLa Vie intellectuelle ȱȁȂ-
ȱȱȱǵȂȱȱȱTemps présent), it is possible that Marcel is not 
speaking as a philosopher in these instances, but more as a Catholic intellectual. 
 
Marcel does sometimes acknowledge that he can slip out of a philosophical mode, 
criticizing himself retrospectively in the ȱȱȁPassion et sagesse dans le 
¡ȱȱȱȱ¡ȂȱǻȱŗşŜŞǼǰȱfor example, for having 
offered, in his 1930 lecture ȁȱȱȂ·ȱȂǰȱȁune 
ȱȱȱÉȱȂȱȱȱȂ, and explaining that 
ȁȱȂ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂ·ȱȱȂȱǻPST: 282). As he is 
willing to admit that his personal circumstances and adherences can exert an 
unwarranted influence on his philosophical discourse, we can at least, therefore, 
conclude that Marcel does not intend for this to happen. His philosophy, though at 
times difficult to delineate, is evidently in transition, shifting away from onto-theology 




have varying implications for his presentation of time. It is sometimes onto-
theological, for, despite himself, Marcel seems to need objective certainty. Here 
Ȃȱ¢ conforms to an idealist metaphysics of presence, which 
£ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǯȱȱȂȱ
philosophy is coloured by his personal faith in God or his Catholic allegiances, 
however, eternity takes on a theological guise, recasting time as Augustinian. Again, 
the reality of time is subordinated to a more authentic immutable presence. In general, 
though, time and eternity are not presented as so hierarchically distinct. Ȃȱ
discussion of time with eternity stems primarily from the desire to recognize 
transcendence itself, the significance of which is recovered through temporal 
phenomenological analysis, not beyond it; for, as linear organized time is rejected as a 
model for experience, human time becomes less distinguishable from eternity Ȯ an 
eternity that is not atemporal but is rather bound up with time, as the transcendent 
otherness that shatters the self-sufficient identity of immanence. This figuration of 
subjectivity therefore opens the subject up to the other from the start, rendering it 
immediately ethical. Thus, in the same way as Kosky (2001) argues with respect to 
Lévinas, subjectivity in Marcel becomes construed as responsibility rather than as the 
pure consciousness one finds in Husserl. And as a consequence, a broader range of 
phenomena is allowed to appear, including religious phenomena, since, through its 
interplay with an ethically charged notion of eternity, responsible time is structured 
eschatologically. It is here that it is possible for God to become existentially significant. 
It is here that phenomenological eternity becomes possibly theological. 
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Conclusion: Toward what Metaphysics? 
 
nous sommes à la recherche de... Ne songeons pas à remplacer ces points de 




In order to assess the success or even just the specificity of a philosophical position, 
one must first have an understanding of what philosophy is, of its status and role. 
However, this is precisely what Marcel questioned, challenging, in particular, Western 
¢Ȃȱȱȱȱto philosophize always entails building a system: 
ȁȱȱȂȱ¡·ȱȱȱȂ-il pas [plutôt] de présenter une 
ȱǵȂȱǻRA: ŘşŗǼǰȱȱȱȱȁȱȱ¸ȂȱǻŗşŚŝǼǯ The 
problem of consistency that Chapter One points to, it therefore emerged, subscribed to 
the very tradition that Marcel was contesting. His metaphysical discussions of time 
were not necessarily to be understood in the conventional, ontological sense, but were 
rather ambiguous. And thisǰȱȱ ȱȂȱemphasis on the need for a 
plurality of approaches to the metaphysical, led the thesis to consider his thought 
from a number of different angles, paralleliȱȂȱ ȱ¡¢ǰȱȱ
deliberately wandering enterprise. As such, the thesis chooses a range of different 
ȱȱȱǻǰȱêǰȱ·ǰȱǼǰȱshowing his 
philosophy to present a multiplicity of perspectives on metaphysics and its task, and 
thereby demonstrating the possibility of a more positive, productive response to its 
apparent incoherence Ȯ incoherence which may not actually be so undesirable. 
 
Yet if Marcel questions the philosophical tradition he inherits, he nevertheless 
continues to employ its ontological language as he struggles to resist the temptation to 
seek Ȯ and hence privilege Ȯ objectifying coherence. Marcel wants his philosophy to 
say something definitive, and it is this which reinstates a dichotomy between eternity 
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(as constant and stable) and time (as uncertain and impermanent) and assigns 
primacy to the former. For this reason, Marcel is revealed to be a transition figure in 
twentieth-century French thought: between the totalizing methods of scientific 
positivism (e.g. Duhem and Poincaré, in the wake of Comte) and idealism (both 
rational, e.g. Benda and Brunschvicg, and spiritual, e.g. Blondel and Bergsonian 
mysticism), and a post-structuralist approach, most commonly associated with 
thinkers such as Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard, but equally attributable to 
êǰȱ·ȱȮ and even, Lawlor would argue, Bergson. Thus, not only has the 
thesis been ȱ ȱȂȱȁȂ status; it has also explored broader 
movements within French thought which have been neglected. The importance of 
Bergson, for instance, was, before Deleuze, overlooked by existentialists and post-
structuralists, who turned a blind eye to this French philosophical heritage and chose 
instead to recognize German thinkers such as Husserl and Heidegger. The readings of 
ȱȱǰȱêǰȱȱ·, however, recast twentieth-century 
French philosophy, revealing suppressed continuities in its intellectual tradition Ȯ 
including a French parallel to HeideggeȂȱȱȱ
, manifest in 
Ȃȱattempt to distance himself from Bergson, ȱȱȱȱêȱȱ
Lévinas  ȱȂȱȱǯ Indeed, it is Jean HeringȂȱ ȱȁȱ
German phenomenology [...] had remained unknown in France, nevertheless a 
phenomenology would have been constituted there; and this, to a large extent, would 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ	ȱȂȱǻ1950: 75). 
 
It should also be noted that the thesis has not, in fact, been simply concerned with 
time. Rather, guided by this theme, it has examined a host of other philosophical 
topics, engaging with issues relating to the nature of the subject, the other, ethics, and 
religion. This reveals the extent to which questions of time have a bearing on the very 
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possibilities of philosophy itself, for not only do philosophical positions affect how 
time is understood; how one understands time (already) affects Ȃȱȱ
of the task and scope of philosophy. Indeed, Robert Dostal has claimed that ȁȱ
phenomenology of time [...] can serve as a key for understanding not only the relation 
of Husserl and Heidegger, but the development of Continental thought throughout 
ǽȱ Ǿȱ¢ȱȱ ȂȱǻŘŖŖŜǱȱŗŘŗǼ. But more enlightening with respect to 
theoretical movements during this period still, I would argue, are Ȃȱ
phenomenological studies of time, for their indeterminacy (as Marcel is pulled in 
many directions at once) sketches out a range of possible avenues for a metaphysics 
other than a metaphysics of presence (combining phenomenology with hermeneutics, 
for example, or with ethics or a new, possibly theological, notion of givenness 
(donation)), while also highlighting a number of dead ends (idealism, objectification, a 
lack of rigour, over-personalization). This enables us to glean a more intimate 
understanding of what was at stake for philosophy at the time, and of the 
problematics that instigated its various shifts. Encountering French philosophy at this 
crossroads then encourages us to reflect on the route that the philosopher might now 
take, what s/he might hope to achieve, and Ȯ as discussions of the various forms of 
Ȃȱ¢ȱprompt us to consider Ȯ how s/he might be permitted to speak. 
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